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This dissertation argues that the British novel was shaped to a large and as yet 
unexplored extent by shame.  While shame might appear the hallmark of Victorian 
repression, I examine how its revisionary potential works through nineteenth-century 
novelistic form, troubling limited constructions of gendered subjectivity, social roles, 
and modes of literary engagement.  From the genre’s inception, novelists and readers 
courted the shame—linked to the excessively emotional and feminine—that marked 
novelistic production and consumption.  Rather than disavow or downplay such 
shame, however, nineteenth-century novelists often embraced and reimagined it.  
Elizabeth Bennet’s “mortifying perusal” of Darcy’s letter, Jane Eyre’s humiliation 
before the classroom at Lowood, Becky Sharp’s scandalous exposure when caught 
with Lord Steyne: in these scenes, innovations in novelistic form occur not in spite of 
shame, but through it.  Reading such scenes of shame in works by Jane Austen, 
Charlotte Brontë, William Makepeace Thackeray, and George Du Maurier, I show 
how influential experiments in narrative technique engage shame as a model of self-
conscious reflection, narration, and reading that refines the novel’s form and cultural 
status by redefining the implications of close contact with feminized emotion.  Such 
displays of shameful self-consciousness countered the widespread denigration of 
irrational feminine emotiveness that haunted the novelist and novel reader throughout 
the century, offering instead an analytic yet still emotionally charged form of 
investment in literary and social conventions.  By placing these texts in dialogue with 
 historical and current theories of emotion that highlight shame’s capacity to forge 
identity and social attachments in ways that do not depend on strict identification with 
others or with social norms more broadly, I approach nineteenth-century novels as 
incisive theorizations of shame in their own right.  In thus helping us to think beyond a 
stark binary of identification or critical detachment, novelistic shame enriches ongoing 
discussions of the stakes of emotional investments—in others, in social conventions, 
and in literature. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
FOR SHAME  
Consider, to begin, the following brief montage, culled from the nineteenth-
century British novel’s prodigious inventory of shame:   
 
“Oh Rebecca, Rebecca, for shame . . . How can you—how dare you have such 
wicked, revengeful thoughts?”  
  
 “—do, for shame; an’ come an’ go on with your patch-work, like a little lady.” 
 
“shame on ye! sit ye dahn, ill childer! they’s good books enough if you’ll read 
‘em.”   
 
  “For shame! for shame! . . . What shocking conduct Miss Eyre.”  
Together these moments—from Vanity Fair, The Mill on the Floss, Wuthering 
Heights, and Jane Eyre, respectively—illustrate the invocation of shame that ushers 
many of the nineteenth-century novel’s most famously mortified heroines into its 
narratives and onto the literary scene.1  In mapping the conspicuously rich and 
troublesome site, and source, of shame presented by the nineteenth-century British 
novel, it is worth lingering briefly on the shaming that starts Jane Eyre, that novel 
whose eponymous narrator has been dubbed the “heroine of fulfillment” and whose 
“I” has been widely understood as a model of engaging and empowered female voice.2  
Anger and sympathy have attained pride of place in feminist assessments of Jane 
Eyre’s highly emotive voice and of nineteenth-century novelistic feelings more 
                                                
1 William Makepeace Thackeray, Vanity Fair (New York: Norton, 1994), 10; George Eliot, The Mill on 
the Floss (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961), 13; Emily Brontë, Wuthering Heights, 4th ed. (New York: 
Norton, 2003), 17; Charlotte Brontë, Jane Eyre, 2d ed. (New York: Norton, 1987), 9.  
2 Elaine Showalter reads Jane Eyre as the “heroine of fulfillment” in A Literature of Their Own: British 
Women Novelists from Brontë to Lessing, rev. ed. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1999), 112.  Carla 
Kaplan provides a useful overview of feminist criticism’s longstanding investment in reading Jane 
Eyre’s personal fulfillment and ownership in relation to her authentic and empowered voice: noting that 
Jane “does move from silence to speech, thus providing a model of feminist resistance and liberation,” 
Kaplan finds it “hardly . . . surprising that feminist criticism would borrow much of its romance with 
women’s narration, its metaphorics of voice, and its own self-understanding as an enterprise from this 
novel” (6).  See “Girl Talk: Jane Eyre and the Romance of Women’s Narration,” Novel 30, no. 1 
(1996): 5-31. 
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generally—yet what are we to make of the emotion that inspires the first diegetic 
mention of Jane Eyre’s surname, and punctuates her physical imprisonment in the 
metaphorically rich red-room as a young girl—“For shame! for shame! . . . What 
shocking conduct, Miss Eyre”?3  This call “for shame” suggests that shame constitutes 
both an introduction of “Miss Eyre” to the reader and an interpellation of Jane into the 
contours of gendered interiority and social relations.   
We might imagine the call “for shame” as the invasive voice of society 
threatening to repress the more authentic self-expression of the angry Jane, or, 
perhaps, as an affective force imposed from outside the individual that exposes the 
disciplinary violence inflicted by all emotions, even those seemingly more personal 
and salutary feelings like sympathy.  In the chapters that follow, however, I explore 
the implications of the formative call “for shame”—for Jane Eyre and for the 
nineteenth-century novel more broadly—as it weaves into the presentation of 
characters’ interiorities and social relations, and into novels’ structures and narrative 
techniques, in forms not easily accounted for as either pronounced repression or covert 
Foucauldian discipline.  In the case of Jane Eye, the feminist potential of the novel’s 
distinctive voice largely emanates from Brontë’s formal enactment of a shame that 
mingles with and negotiates the extremes of anger’s potentially antisocial alienation 
and sympathy’s potentially oppressive socialization.  The novel’s initial demand “for 
shame” accompanies Jane’s experience of being forced into the red-room and “thrust  
. . . upon a stool,” yet it sets in motion a series of shameful spectacles that Jane, as 
                                                
3 Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar position Jane Eyre’s anger as central to her “rebellious feminism” in 
The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth-Century Literary Imagination 
(New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1984), 338.  Criticism that has more recently shifted the focus to 
sympathy in Jane Eyre includes: Nancy Armstrong, How Novels Think: The Limits of British 
Individualism from 1719-1900 (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2005), 139; Lorri G. Nandrea, 
“Desiring Difference: Sympathy and Sensibility in Jane Eyre,” Novel 37, no. 1/2 (2003): 112-34; Amit 
S. Rai, Rule of Sympathy: Sentiment, Race and Power, 1750-1850 (New York: Palgrave, 2002); Lara 
Freeburg Kees, “‘Sympathy’ in Jane Eyre,” Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900 45, no. 4 (2005): 
873-97. 
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character and narrator, embodies, witnesses and stages with increasing agency, 
aesthetic control and erotic investment.4  In many respects Jane Eyre crystallizes the 
novelistic form of shame that I trace across the nineteenth century, focusing 
particularly on work by Jane Austen, William Makepeace Thackeray and Charlotte 
Brontë in which shame-inflected narration intersects with physical spectacles of shame 
to fashion—in lieu of a sympathetic sameness—intimate relations of difference among 
characters, between present and past selves and, in a more formal sense, between 
experience and narration, story and discourse, and reader and text.   
These writers, I contend, do novel things with the novel’s shame.  From the 
genre’s inception the novel was hounded by a shame closely tied to cultural 
degradations of the feminine more generally.  As William Warner recounts, an early 
response to “the cultural scandal of novel reading” was neatly to demarcate and 
displace the stigma of the “licentious, fantasy-ridden, and debased” somewhere else.5  
Thus the “elevated novel of the 1740s” made inroads to respectability through 
constructions of “degraded and immoral” precursors like Aphra Behn, Delariviere 
Manley, and Eliza Haywood—writers whose works were deemed by mid-century 
critics “distinctly feminine addictions” and similarly depicted into the next century as 
“inappropriately erotic, too feminine, too European, too immoral.”6  Yet any mid-
century elevations of the novel failed to rise above shame, which proliferated 
especially in the century’s last decades when numerous factors combined to aggravate 
longstanding concerns over the feminized novelist and novel reader.   
During the century in which “guilt, shame, and danger came to be so sharply 
focused” on onanism, the public found in the novel, according to Thomas Laqueur, a 
                                                
4 Brontë, 9. 
5 William Warner, “Licensing Pleasure: Literary History and the Novel in Early Modern Britain,” in 
The Columbia History of the British Novel, ed. John Richetti (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1994), 
18, 6. 
6 Ibid., 14, 16, 13. 
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potent “counterpoint of masturbation.”7  And it was female novel readers who were 
cast as “the prototypical absorbed readers”: “just as the woman masturbator was the 
poster girl of dangerous solitary sex—she produced nothing but desire, pure libidinous 
pleasure—the woman reader was the gold standard of the moral corruption latent in all 
fiction.”8  The young woman, by Laqueur’s account, figured as the shamefully 
“misguided reader par excellence, the enthralled reader, the prototypical victim of 
imaginative excess, the representative of ‘the literary marketplace rather than the 
literary public,’ the perfect onanist.”9   
If the female reader condensed qualities perceived as latent in all novel readers 
over the eighteenth century, the dramatic rise, at the century’s end, in the production 
and popularity of novels penned by women novelists and consumed by a growing 
female audience only fueled understandings of the novel as a mortifyingly feminine 
habit.  The intensifying critique of sensibility in the 1780s and 1790s, reaching its 
peak in response to the French Revolution, additionally rendered sentimental 
indulgence in the novel an increasingly embarrassing, feminizing extravagance that 
also looked, to many, shamefully reckless.10  Deidre Lynch outlines one powerful 
novelistic response, at the turn into the nineteenth century, to the perceived “problem 
of the promiscuous circulation and universal exchangeability” that concentrated on 
“vulgar” feminized novelists and readers seen as trafficking in the cheap and ready 
wares of an “accelerated print market.”11  Romantic novelists, she argues, countered 
this perception with heroines distinguished by their privatized, domesticated style of 
                                                
7 Thomas W. Laqueur, Solitary Sex: A Cultural History of Masturbation (New York: Zone, 2003), 186, 
303. 
8 Ibid., 340. 
9 Ibid., 340. The quotation is from John Brewer, The Pleasures of the Imagination: English Culture in 
the Eighteenth Century (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1997), 103.  
10 Markman Ellis outlines the increased debate over sensibility in these decades in “‘The Dangerous 
Tendency of Novels’ and the Controversy of Sentimentalism” in The Politics of Sensibility: Race, 
Gender and Commerce in the Sentimental Novel (New York: Cambridge UP, 1996).  
11 Deidre Shauna Lynch, The Economy of Character: Novels, Market Culture, and the Business of Inner 
Meaning (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1998), 132, 127, 130. 
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reading, a style that offered to those characters—and by extension to the novel readers 
emulating while also closely reading them—“the opportunity to certify their powers of 
taste, mental discipline, and sympathetic identification” in order to “affirm their 
individual distinction” in a print culture “rapidly becoming a mass market.”12   
While Lynch shows how the cultivation of sympathetic identification could be 
invoked against the threatened “vulgar[ity]” of superficial and overly public 
consumption, the very depths of sympathy fending off one type of degradation invited 
shame of another sort that warrants closer attention.  For with the consolidation of the 
ideology of separate spheres in the nineteenth century and its reification of woman’s 
“natural” domestic proclivities, a widespread cultural investment in a feminine 
predisposition for sympathetic indulgence continued to undermine the status of the 
woman reader and the novels she preferred, even as women’s reading practices and 
the novel as a genre were carving out a more legitimate place in the home and in 
female education.  Kate Flint’s wide-reaching survey of Victorian constructions of the 
woman reader helps to illuminate this persistent source of shame: “Over-identification 
with the characters about whom one was reading, and a capacity to be emotionally, 
irrationally stirred, even to the point of imitation, by their example, were the most 
frequently remarked characteristics of the woman reader in the mid-nineteenth century 
. . . women, it was believed, could not help reading in this way, since they were 
biologically programmed for motherhood, and a capacity for sympathetic 
identification with the feelings of others was considered a sign of maternal worth.”13  
The perfect Victorian housewife, it seems, could still slide too easily, and through the 
very qualities that ostensibly made her so well-suited for domesticity, into excessively 
                                                
12 Ibid., 131-32. 
13 Kate Flint, “Women, Men, and the Reading of Vanity Fair,” in The Practice and Representation of 
Reading in England, eds. James Raven, Helen Small, and Naomi Tadmor (New York: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 1996), 252.  Flint presents a more extensive version of this argument in The Woman Reader, 
1837-1914 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993).  
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“stirred,” solipsistic reveries that recall those of “the perfect onanist.” 
Thus, despite significant advances in the novel’s respectability and aesthetic 
legitimacy over the nineteenth century, authors and readers during the period courted 
the shame—linked to the excessively emotional and feminine—that marked novelistic 
production and consumption.  Rather than downplay or disavow this shame, however, 
many influential novelists embraced and reimagined it, integrating spectacles of shame 
into their plots and engaging feminized shame as a model of narration and a desired 
mode of reading.  Elizabeth Bennet’s “mortifying perusal” of Darcy’s letter, Jane 
Eyre’s humiliation before the classroom at Lowood, Becky Sharp’s scandalous 
exposure when caught with Lord Steyne: in these scenes, innovations in novelistic 
form occur not in spite of shame, but through it.  Reading such scenes of shame in 
works by Austen, Thackeray and Brontë, I show how the negotiation of shame 
motivates some of the most significant features of their styles and of nineteenth-
century novelistic technique more broadly, including free indirect discourse, direct 
address, and retrospective narration.  Shame provides a basis for these novelists’ 
attempts to refine the genre’s form and cultural status by redefining the implications of 
close contact with feminized emotion, and by positioning shame as a productive 
means for revising—rather than simply normalizing or suppressing—emotionally 
charged aspects of gendered subjectivity, social relations, and literary engagement.  
SHAME’S FORM  
Theorists of emotion have been drawn to shame’s ability to produce 
compelling, embodied spectacles that exert a strong relational pull without reinforcing 
strict identification with others, or with social norms more broadly.  Certainly social 
norms, and a communal sense of those norms, can create punitive shameful spectacles; 
at the same time, however, both the shamed subject and the spectator can recognize 
the signified shame, and even feel for others through shared proximity to that shame, 
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without fully accepting it as their own interior emotional content or demanding it of 
another.  The spectacle of shame can compel identificatory socialization; but it can 
also produce more differentiated relations around the form of shame.  
To delineate shame’s productive features, I approach its form through the lens 
of recent feminist and queer theory, affect theory and narrative theory, as well as 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century aesthetic theory.  I take my most basic working 
definition of shame from Silvan Tomkins’ formulation that it is an interruption of a 
communicative connection: “The innate activator of shame is the incomplete reduction 
of interest or joy. Hence any barrier to further exploration which partially reduces 
interest or the smile of enjoyment will activate the lowering of the head and eyes in 
shame.”14  Shame’s paradigmatic posture of the bowed head in Tomkins’ work 
captures the important, “incomplete” quality of shame’s disrupted connection with 
another: shame is a look down, but not a look completely away.  Distinguishing 
shame-humiliation from contempt-disgust, Tomkins makes this lingering investment 
in reconnection constitutive of shame: “Shame-humiliation is the negative affect 
linked with love and identification, and contempt-disgust the negative affect linked 
with individuation and hate. Both affects are impediments to intimacy and 
communion, within the self and between the self and others.  But shame-humiliation 
does not renounce the object permanently, whereas contempt-disgust does.”15 
In considering shame’s role in the historical production and reception of the 
novel, I am especially interested in its narrative form.  Or, in the terms conceptualized 
by contemporary theorists like Brian Massumi, I focus on shame as an emotion—as an 
affect that has undergone “sociolinguistic fixing” and insertion into “semantically and 
                                                
14 Silvan S. Tomkins, Affect, Imagery, Consciousness: The Complete Edition, vol. 2. The Negative 
Affects (New York: Springer, 2008), 353-54. 
15 Ibid., 362. 
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semiotically formed progressions, into narrativizable action-reaction circuits.”16  
Placing Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s account of shame alongside Adam Smith’s mid-
eighteenth-century theory of sympathy (which, as we will see, also advances a less 
explicit theorization of shame) can especially illuminate the “narrativizable … 
circuits” of shame.  Both Sedgwick and Smith approach shame through thought 
experiments that not only highlight the oddly individuated relationality that shame can 
accommodate, but also suggest how shame’s relational potential might be a function 
of form, especially of the staging of a contagiously emotive spectacle that can be 
incorporated in varying ways into social scenarios and cultural and personal 
narratives.  The theories of Smith and Sedgwick provide for the chapters that follow a 
suggestive background against which to read nineteenth-century literary innovation, 
bringing into relief the revisionary valence of the shameful spectacle as a function 
specifically of novelistic form—a dynamic I term shameful signification.  
Sedgwick, drawing on Tomkins’ work, investigates shame’s disruptions of 
identification—disruptions that do not, as a result, obliterate interest, communication, 
or identity.  Using the posture of lowered eyes and bowed head to capture shame’s 
distinctive relationality, she focuses on the protoform “moment when the circuit of 
mirroring expressions between the child’s face and the caregiver’s recognized face . . . 
is broken”17  This prototypical “disruptive moment, in a circuit of identity-constituting 
identificatory communication,” exemplifies Sedgwick’s more generalized assertion 
that shame can round out and fuel such a circuit—rather than just break it—by 
ushering in new forms of communication and new forms of identity-constitution less 
dependent on absolute interest or identification (36).  Shame, she writes, “is itself a 
                                                
16 Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 
2002), 28. 
17 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity (Durham: Duke Univ. 
Press, 2003), 36.  Further references will appear in the text.  
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form of communication.  Blazons of shame, the ‘fallen face’ with eyes down and head 
averted . . . are semaphores of trouble and at the same time of a desire to reconstitute 
the interpersonal bridge”; likewise, “in interrupting identification, shame, too, makes 
identity” (36).  Shame simultaneously operates as a truly theatrical performance of 
disconnection, in the sense that it is dramatized for the other, and as a performative 
act, in the sense that it makes the self.  Sedgwick thus describes “the double movement 
shame makes: toward painful individuation, toward uncontrollable relationality,” as it 
“mantles the threshold between introversion and extroversion, between absorption and 
theatricality, between performativity and—performativity” (37, 38). 
Sedgwick’s efforts to recuperate shame depend, to a certain extent, on 
emphasizing its basic structural capacity for forging identity and communication in 
ways that do not depend on strict identification and, in fact, thrive on identification’s 
inevitable breakdowns.  Through such emphasis, she pressures understandings of 
shame as purely prohibitive or repressive, instead casting shame as an affective mode 
that can accommodate—even drive—identificatory elasticity and revision within still 
legible and sociable identity and group formations.  This space of revision, rather than 
pure rupture, depends on shame’s potent communicative quality.  Sedgwick locates an 
alternative social glue in the fact that “shame is both peculiarly contagious and 
peculiarly individuating,” and this strangely individualized contagion stems, I argue, 
from shame’s form (36).   
Although the form of shame I am underlining is not discussed by Sedgwick, it 
can be seen in an extended scenario with which she illustrates shame’s contagious 
quality.  She recounts that in lectures on the topic of shame,  
 
I used to ask listeners to join in a thought experiment, visualizing an unwashed, 
half-insane man who would wander into the lecture hall mumbling loudly, his 
speech increasingly accusatory and disjointed, and publicly urinate in front of 
the room, then wander out again. I pictured the excruciation of everyone else in 
the room: each looking down, wishing to be anywhere else yet conscious of the 
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inexorable fate of being exactly there, inside the individual skin of which each 
was burningly aware; at the same time, though, unable to staunch the 
hemorrhage of painful identification with the misbehaving man. (37)  
Here, the odd structure of “painful identification” evokes shame’s capacity to bind 
individuals through spectacular, visualized form despite unstable content.  For 
Sedgwick’s “misbehaving man” displays little or no shame of his own; instead what is 
noteworthy is his apparent lack of it.  The shame the audience catches, then, comes 
from recognizable form without certain content, from a scenario that demands shame 
according to social convention, while its primary signifying subject does not have to 
feel it for it to be transmitted to others.  The shameful scenario binds members of the 
audience without the affective content of shame truly belonging to them, either; what 
Sedgwick calls their “painful identification with the misbehaving man” is in some 
sense an identification with a lack of required shame: it evacuates each audience 
member’s shame even as the scenario produces and spreads it.  To the extent that the 
audience member comes into even closer proximity to shame than its apparent 
source—the “misbehaving man”—“identification” fails really to be established at all.   
Just as the shame in this thought experiment proves hard to pin down, its 
results are also difficult to fix: Sedgwick “picture[s]” the audience’s “painful 
identification,” but one could imagine shame’s “double movement” veering “toward 
painful individuation,” with onlookers feeling less connection through shame than 
anger with or contempt for the “misbehaving man,” and trying to put squarely on him 
the shame he maddeningly refuses.  Or the movement could swerve “toward 
uncontrollable relationality,” with the man fully succumbing to shame and closely 
identifying witnesses feeling similarly overcome.  Sedgwick’s thought experiment 
lingers, however, on the space between these poles, the oscillating “movement” along 
a spectrum of opposition and identification that constitutes shame’s productive terrain.  
Her spectacularly shameful scenario thus lays bare the form of a shame that can 
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produce relational transactions—akin but not reducible to “identification”—in which, 
despite “the excruciation of everyone,” no one actually owns the circulating shame. 
 The distinction I am drawing between shame’s fluid relationality and one of 
stricter identification depends on recognizing a number of distinctions within 
Sedgwick’s thought experiment itself: between the scenario, the signifying body of the 
“misbehaving man,” and each individual’s interior emotional content.  In fleshing out 
these distinctions, we can usefully turn to another thought experiment that engages the 
same features, but puts them to the opposite use of solidifying identification: Adam 
Smith’s oft-cited example of sympathy with “our brother upon the rack.”18  Smith 
introduces his theorization of sympathy—the centerpiece of his influential Theory of 
Moral Sentiments, first published in 1759—with an image of sympathy at the height of 
its effect.  The relational goal is the closest emotional equivalence possible: while 
Smith acknowledges that individualized sensations and senses pose barriers to actual 
transmission of the “immediate experience of what other men feel,” representational 
features nonetheless can align to convey, with a certain immediacy, feelings that, 
“though weaker in degree,” are “not altogether unlike” the feelings of others.  The 
most important of these features is the scenario—the “like situation”: 
 
Though our brother is upon the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, 
our senses will never inform us of what he suffers. They never did, and never 
can, carry us beyond our own person, and it is by the imagination only that we 
can form any conception of what are his sensations. Neither can that faculty 
help us to this any other way, than by representing to us what would be our 
own, if we were in his case . . . By the imagination we place ourselves in his 
situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it 
were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him, 
and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, 
though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them. His agonies, when they 
are thus brought home to ourselves, when we have thus adopted and made 
them our own, begin at last to affect us, and we then tremble and shudder at the 
thought of what he feels. (11-12) 
                                                
18 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002), 11. 
Further references will appear in the text. 
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In Smith’s account, sympathy works primarily through the pull of the scenario and its 
capacity to facilitate the spectator’s imaginative insertion into it.  But the sympathetic 
transmission of pain in this example depends not only on the dramatic, encompassing 
scenario of the rack, but also on the way that this particular scenario minimizes 
representational or responsive wiggle room, violently forcing continuity between 
scenario, signifying body, and interior emotional content in order to guarantee 
unambiguous and quick communication to the sympathetic spectator.  The 
hyperbolically constrictive structure of the scenario pins the signifying body into a 
highly visible and legible place with a limited range of likely emotional responses, 
virtually ensuring suffering as both the victim’s and the viewer’s only, near-identical 
response.  The rack captures sympathy’s most seamless workings, modeling its 
spectacular and transparent signification and connecting such representational 
techniques with the relational imperative of emotional equivalence between 
individuals as the grounds of intimacy and sociability.  The rack exemplifies, for 
Smith, the form of sympathy, a form whose spectacular emotional pull is similar to 
that of the form of shame in Sedgwick’s thought experiment, but which significantly 
demands the neat alignment of interior emotional content as well.   
Smith’s Theory also, however, illustrates how historical accounts of sympathy 
themselves sought to loosen the rigidity of sympathetic imperatives, turning to shame 
in the process of imagining other forms of individualized relations.  Shame emerges in 
Smith’s text as a feeling that marks and fills the cracks of sympathy’s fragility.  Next 
to the rack, one could place his invocation of the pillory to figure an alternative 
relational model, built around shame, that the text gingerly but consistently 
approaches:   
 
A brave man is not rendered contemptible by being brought to the scaffold; he 
is, by being set in the pillory. His behaviour in the one situation may gain him 
universal esteem and admiration. No behaviour in the other can render him 
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agreeable. The sympathy of the spectators supports him in the one case, and 
saves him from that shame, that consciousness that his misery is felt by himself 
only, which is of all sentiments the most unsupportable. There is no sympathy 
in the other; or, if there is any, it is not with his pain, which is a trifle, but with 
his consciousness of the want of sympathy with which this pain is attended. It 
is with his shame, not with his sorrow. Those who pity him, blush and hang 
down their heads for him. He droops in the same manner, and feels himself 
irrecoverably degraded by the punishment, though not by the crime. (71) 
Smith initially notes shame as merely the affective sign of obliterated sympathy: 
shame is synonymous with the man in the pillory’s “consciousness that his misery is 
felt by himself only.”  He immediately retreats from this extreme notion of shame, 
though, positioning it more specifically as an aftermath to ruptured sympathy.  A 
connection felt by the spectator, restricted to a shared sense of the man’s shame, takes 
the place of sympathy’s more complete alignment of emotion.  The assertion that 
“There is no sympathy in the other” is qualified: “or, if there is any, it is not with his 
pain, which is a trifle, but with his consciousness of the want of sympathy with which 
this pain is attended.”  The disruption of sympathy itself opens up a space of near-
sympathetic connection around a shared awareness of sympathy’s breakdown.  In the 
possibility that one can still sympathize with the man in the pillory’s “shame,” if “not 
with his sorrow,” a relational space unfolds that is not quite sympathy, and that relies 
on the mutual recognition that sympathy is compromised and complete sympathetic 
identification is impossible.  Shame’s continued relationality depends on the 
“consciousness of the want of sympathy” that is embedded within it—an embedding 
of lack quite different from the mere absence of sympathy. 
The physical mirroring of the sympathetic spectacle remains intact, here, but 
with dramatically different signification.  Rather than acting as transparent signs of 
interior emotional content and its identical communication, the heads we see 
“droop[ing] in the same manner” bespeak a relational disconnection that resists 
equivalence but also avoids total illegibility.  Incorporating aspects of the rack’s 
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sympathetic signification, Smith’s pillory theatrically demands recognition and 
response: this form, however, encompasses a range of emotional options and 
interpretive possibilities that can still constitute communication and sociability, if not 
of sympathy’s ideal kind.  On the one hand, the scenario spectacularly binds the man 
and his observers despite varied emotional states.  On the other hand, the scenario also 
accommodates a split within the victim’s own experience of shame, as he “feels 
himself irrecoverably degraded by the punishment, though not by the crime.”  Similar 
to the shame-forged sympathy that is not quite sympathy, the victim is both shamed 
and not ashamed: he has a palpable relation to the form of shame, but does not entirely 
possess its intended content.  Even more than in Sedgwick’s thought experiment, the 
signifying body and its spectators are here linked by the irresistible contagion of a 
punitive form embodying social convention, while none are fully conscripted into its 
universalizing mandates.  
 
SHAMEFUL SIGNIFICATION 
The nineteenth-century novel exhibits and extends the sorts of relational and 
representational permutations of sympathy (and of related affective modes such as 
sensibility and sentimentality) that theoretical valorizations of sympathy, like Smith’s 
Theory, were themselves pursuing.  Novelists such as Austen, Thackeray and Brontë 
employ formal shifts in novelistic representation that could be considered shameful 
signification, as opposed to—but also deeply entwined with—sentimental 
signification.  A rich body of critical work has delineated how formal strategies 
support the affective aim of sympathetic identification in the eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century development of the British novel: drawing on such work, I 
characterize sentimental signification as a set of narrative techniques defined by, and 
pursuing, an ideal of sympathetic continuity between interior emotional content and 
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the signifying body, and between feeling subjects (including characters and readers) 
linked through emotional identification, physical mirroring, and identically shared 
feelings.19  An alternative representational mode of shameful signification emerges in 
tandem and in tension with sentimental signification in the eighteenth century, and 
becomes increasingly important in shaping formal features of the nineteenth-century 
novel.   
As deployed and developed in the nineteenth-century novel, shameful 
signification engages the representational techniques that sentimental novelists used 
for sympathetic mimesis and adapts these techniques to accommodate greater 
emotional disjunctions among characters, between text and reader, and among readers. 
The novelistic exploration of the ideological and formal potential of shame draws on 
the compelling, spectacular form of shame that we find in both Smith and Sedgwick, a 
form that can relationally bind individuals through shameful scenario and signifying 
body, while loosening the rigid continuity of interior emotional content.  Formal 
strategies of shameful signification seek shame’s distinctive relational pull not only 
through the staging of physical spectacles in the novel’s plot, but also through effects 
of narration that mimic and stretch these spectacles’ accommodation of individualized 
difference.  In this study I treat the innovative ways in which Austen, Thackeray and 
Brontë narrate shame as particularly rich instances of shameful signification that 
exemplify how nineteenth-century novelists significantly, if variously, enact shame in 
story and discourse—using it to motivate dramatic plot points and innovative narrative 
techniques, to stage social spectacles of shame along with a distinctive way of telling 
                                                
19 See, for example: G.J. Barker-Benfield, The Culture of Sensibility: Sex and Society in Eighteenth-
Century Britain (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1992); Barbara M. Benedict, Framing Feeling: 
Sentiment and Style in English Prose Fiction, 1745-1800 (New York: AMS Press, 1994); Claudia L. 
Johnson, Equivocal Beings: Politics, Gender, and Sentimentality in the 1790s: Wollstonecraft, 
Radcliffe, Burney, Austen (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago P, 1995); John Mullan, Sentiment and 
Sociability: The Language of Feeling in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); 
Adela Pinch, Strange Fits of Passion: Epistemologies of Emotion, Hume to Austen (Stanford: Stanford 
Univ. Press, 1996); and Janet M. Todd, Sensibility: An Introduction (New York: Methuen, 1986).  
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about them.   
My emphasis on shameful signification reframes critical discussions of gender 
and emotion in nineteenth-century British literature and culture.  In The Madwoman in 
the Attic: The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth-Century Literary Imagination, 
Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar map a feminist poetics that combines questions of 
gender with those of feeling and form, and positions one feeling—anger—as central to 
such concerns.  Anger’s persistent critical preeminence in the wake of Gilbert and 
Gubar’s influential study has given way to a set of shifting yet related affective modes 
that dominate recent critical analysis of nineteenth-century feeling, from the crisis of 
sensibility at the start of the century, to the mid-century focus on sentimentality and 
sympathy, to the rise of sensationalism in the century’s later decades.  The emerging 
body of criticism on these affective modes has usefully expanded the array of 
emotions being given attention and has redrawn the common late-eighteenth-century 
boundary for studies of British sympathy, sensibility, and sentimentalism, exploring 
their continued cultural and aesthetic relevance even after the decline of the “cult of 
sensibility.”  In some cases, such Nancy Armstrong’s work on the “logic” of sympathy 
and sensibility, the shift in affective focus coincides with an explicit reassessment of 
the emotional investments of Gilbert and Gubar’s feminist poetics.20  In others, the 
widened purview enables a needed recovery of critically neglected feelings, with 
attention to their specificity in the nineteenth-century British context.  Taking up the 
topic of Victorian sentimentality, Miriam Bailin argues, for example, that “the critical 
organizing principles that have provided common points of departure in discussions of 
eighteenth-century British or nineteenth-century American sentimental fiction do not 
                                                
20 In How Novels Think, Armstrong positions Gilbert and Gubar as representative of a problematic 
emphasis on compensatory forms of emotional private property in feminist interventions in novel 
studies, an emphasis that “convinced a generation of readers that acquiring a voice—access to print, or 
what might be called cultural agency—could compensate for the forms of property that traditionally 
authorized the rights-bearing citizen” (139-140).    
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adequately account for the Victorian British variety.”21  And introducing a special 
journal issue on “Rethinking Victorian Sentimentality,” Nicola Brown highlights the 
need for studies of sentimentality that will “open up public discussion of an aspect of 
Victorian culture that is too often ignored or maligned (even if surreptitiously enjoyed 
in private).”22  Recent writers on sympathy and sensibility similarly find these feelings 
unduly overlooked: Lorri Nandrea notes the “[s]urprisingly few critical studies of the 
status of sympathy and sensibility in Victorian fiction”—a scarcity that has begun to 
be redressed, over the last decade, in monographs by Audrey Jaffe, Rachel Ablow, and 
Amit Rai.23  
In part because shame is so frequently invoked by novelists to negotiate the 
perceived risks of emotional absorption concentrated, at different points in the century, 
on sensibility, sentimentality, sympathy, and sensationalism, I argue that shame is 
equally constitutive of the period’s aesthetic and social possibilities.  Without 
flattening the specific contours of these affective modes—of sensibility as Austen 
conceives it, for instance, as opposed to Brontë’s concerns over sympathy or 
Thackeray’s over sentimentality—I trace the relational dynamics and signifying 
structures of sentimental signification that they share, which particularly come into 
view as each is revised through shameful signification.  On the one hand, shame limns 
the workings of the affective modes whose conventions it breaches.  In so doing, it 
illuminates a variously embodied, century-long anxiety over literary ideals of intense 
emotional identification, often also seen pejoratively as feminized over-identification, 
                                                
21 Miriam Bailin, “‘Dismal Pleasure’: Victorian Sentimentality and the Pathos of the Parvenu,” ELH 66, 
no. 4 (1999): 1015. 
22 Nicola Brown, “Introduction: Crying Over Little Nell,” 19: Studies in the Long Nineteenth Century 4 
(April 2007): 2. 
23 Lorri Nandrea, “Desiring Difference: Sympathy and Sensibility in Jane Eyre,” Novel 37, no. 1/2 
(2003): 112.  The first book-length project devoted to Victorian sympathy was Audrey Jaffe’s Scenes of 
Sympathy: Identity and Representation in Victorian Fiction (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 2000), which 
was followed by Amit S. Rai’s Rule of Sympathy: Sentiment, Race and Power, 1750-1850 (New York: 
Palgrave, 2002) and Rachel Ablow’s The Marriage of Minds: Reading Sympathy in the Victorian 
Marriage Plot (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2007). 
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emotional extravagance, irrationality, and susceptibility.  On the other hand, even as 
shame anatomizes these anxieties and the conventions which produce them, it 
provides the novelists I consider with an alternative affective mode, one with the 
potential to disrupt analytically, without disengaging from, the emotional investments 
that suffuse feminized subjectivity and novel reading. 
Adding shame to the mix of emotions under critical consideration thus expands 
our understanding of the range of feelings that shape gendered relations and reading 
practices in the nineteenth century, while also contributing to the developing criticism 
on other affective modes.  Elucidating the fraught status of emotional identification in 
the period, shame also sharpens the view of how these anxieties were constellated in 
relation to anger and other emotional states considered attractively disruptive but also 
dangerously unsocial.  Described in the broadest terms—terms that will acquire more 
nuanced elaboration throughout this study—Gilbert and Gubar’s celebration of anger’s 
subversive energy, animating a “rebellious feminism,” has been followed by increased 
trepidation over the normalizing effects of feeling in the construction of the modern 
gendered individual, especially when the feelings in question involve sympathy or 
sensationalism.24  Novelistic engagements with shame demarcate a suggestive space 
between these two poles taking shape in the nineteenth-century public imagination, as 
novelists consistently turn to shame to mediate between the extremes of oppressively 
normalizing socialization (particularly associated with emotional over-identification) 
and the potentially antisocial alienation of rebellious emotion (such as anger) or of 
emotional retreat (such as ironic detachment).  To be sure, shame functions for some 
novelists as a way of absolutely imposing critical distance on characters who over-
identify or who misread—and on the novel’s own readers.  Yet for other novelists, 
including those I consider here, shame is central to imagining a more fluid relation 
                                                
24 Gilbert and Gubar, 338.  
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between emotional absorption and detachment, seemingly uncritical and critical 
reading practices—an interplay posited as necessary for complete, competent, and 
pleasurable interpretation.  As I explore how novelists experiment with shameful 
signification to stretch shame’s potential as a relational, representational and 
hermeneutic alternative to the sympathetic imperative of strict identification, I pursue 
how this potential speaks to the problematic allure of identification within the history 
of the novel, but also in our current cultural climate.  Throughout this study I turn to 
novelists who share an engagement with shame that can help us further to understand 
and shape the affective terms of ongoing discussions in feminist criticism of the 
possibilities and limitations of novelistic feelings.  
 
READING SHAME 
For Shame is comprised of three chapters and a coda that examine the 
significant interplay of emotion, gender and narrative innovation in the nineteenth-
century British novel.  My opening chapter complicates the tendency in feminist 
criticism to read shame as repression in Austen’s oeuvre, by contextualizing it within 
turn-of-the-century debates over the feminized vulnerability and excess of the “cult of 
sensibility” and its sentimental novels.  I argue that Northanger Abbey (begun in 1798, 
posthumously published in 1818) positions the shamed heroine as a spectacular, 
emotionally compelling centerpiece, one designed to replace the sentimental, and 
particularly gothic, female corpse.  As the deathly allure of the female corpse becomes 
a figure, in the novel, for an overly absorbed reading practice and the stagnant gothic 
conventions that inspire it, Austen imagines shame as one alternative for a reading 
“Miss” who “lays down her book” with either “affected indifference, or momentary 
shame.”25  While later novels abandon Northanger Abbey’s explicit satire of gothic 
                                                
25 Jane Austen, Northanger Abbey (New York: Norton, 2004), 22. 
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tropes, the shaming of their heroines can be similarly understood as the pursuit of a 
“momentary shame” that can reanimate the sentimental conventions, cast as a corpse, 
that Austen refuses either to preserve morbidly or to bury indifferently.  I trace how 
Austen’s narrative innovations, especially in free indirect discourse, revise the voicing 
of emotions employed by novelists like Samuel Richardson, Ann Radcliffe and 
Frances Burney who were variously invested in sensibility, enabling Austen to depict 
heroines whose brushes with humiliation—fleeting and psychological, as opposed to 
permanently physicalized—create new pleasures, rather than merely limiting the 
heroine’s desire, or the reader’s engagement, to the extremes of either sentimental 
stasis or “affected indifference.”   
My second and third chapters turn to two immensely popular mid-century 
novels, William Makepeace Thackeray’s Vanity Fair and Charlotte Brontë’s Jane 
Eyre.  Published in 1847, both novels cultivate distinctive narrative voices that model 
a proximity to shame that productively extends across gendered characters and 
narratees as an eroticized meeting point between the male and female and, more 
broadly, the culturally masculine and feminine.  In Chapter Two I consider the oft-
noted literary self-consciousness of Thackeray’s style as a specifically shameful self-
consciousness.  By emphasizing self-consciousness as a feeling—one that is feminized 
in Vanity Fair—I complicate the widespread perception that Thackeray’s extremely 
self-conscious narration enacts a gendered emotional problem, a stark rupture between 
denigrated feminine sentimentality and contemptuous masculine detachment.  Rather 
than mocking all feminized emotion as woefully passive and unreflective, Thackeray’s 
narrative voice—and particularly his direct address—portrays feminized shame as an 
alternative to sentimental excess.  The shameful spectacles of the novel’s dual female 
protagonists become models for both a style of narration and mode of readerly 
engagement that can facilitate emotionally charged analysis, avoiding the hazardous 
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extremes of self-indulgent sentimentality or callous critical detachment.   
While feminist criticism has been wary of Vanity Fair’s narratorial voice, the 
retrospective autobiographical narration in Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre has been 
widely viewed as a model of empowering female voice.  In my third chapter I argue 
that the feminist potential of Jane Eyre’s voice largely emanates from its enactment of 
a shame that mediates between the problematic extremes of rebellious anger and 
sympathetic submission—extremes that seem, at the novel’s start, to constitute the 
limited range of both affective options for the characters and representational options 
for the novel itself.  Turning attention from Jane’s much-discussed crisis in the red-
room to her less-analyzed school shamings, shared with Helen Burns, I explore how a 
shame-inflected narrating voice intersects with physical spectacles of shame in Jane 
Eyre to stage intimate relations of difference among characters, between present and 
past selves and, in a more formal sense, between experience and narration, and reader 
and text.  
I conclude with a coda that explores how the rise of sensation fiction in the 
second half of the century revives cultural concerns about emotional identification as a 
feminized, physical and emotional vulnerability, and how shame, as with earlier 
concerns about sensibility, sentimentality, and sympathy, provides a novelistic 
alternative to overpowering sensation.  George Du Maurier’s Trilby (1894), a fin-de-
siècle successor of the 1860s sensation novel, emerges from this cultural debate 
around sensationalism as a particularly concrete example of how continuing anxieties 
over the novel’s commodified mass production of literary sensation intersect with 
aestheticism at the century’s end and manifest themselves in characters sensationally 
split through shame.  Trilby’s hypnotic vocal performances—skillfully manipulated by 
Svengali to seduce any listener while the hypnotized Trilby herself is evacuated of 
agency and even consciousness—emblematize a nightmarish specter of direct 
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emotional transmission through a spectacularly exposed female that both critics of 
sensationalism and authors seek to address.  Shame’s role in breaking the hypnotic 
spell, by guaranteeing Trilby’s aesthetic and moral worth, captures the lasting 
novelistic investment in shame as an aesthetic and relational alternative to emotional 
submission or antisocial alienation at the century’s close.
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CHAPTER ONE 
SHAME AND SENSIBILITY:  
JANE AUSTEN AND THE HUMILIATED HEROINE 
 
“AFFECTED INDIFFERENCE, OR MOMENTARY SHAME” 
 “Ought sensibility to be cherished or repressed?”  This question, starkly 
framed as the title of an October 1796 Monthly Magazine article, reflects a widespread 
sense at the end of the eighteenth century that the “cult of sensibility” was becoming 
increasingly embarrassing.  “There was a time,” the unsigned article declares, “when 
sensibility was taken under the patronage of that powerful arbiter of manners—
fashion. Then, height of breeding was measured by delicacy of feeling, and no fine 
lady, or gentleman, was ashamed to be seen sighing over a pathetic story, or weeping 
at a deep-wrought tragedy.”1  Wielding shame against an excessive “degree of 
softness, that soon became ridiculous,” the article sharpens the sense that extreme 
sensibility is an extravagance whose time has passed.2  This use of shame echoes that 
of even novelists like Ann Radcliffe, who, though she might seem to have an 
irrepressible flair for emotional indulgence, also pits shame against sensibility.  In a 
speech on the “dangers of sensibility” in The Mysteries of Udolpho (1794), a wise 
father warns his daughter, about to embark on sensational gothic adventures, 
“Sentiment is a disgrace, instead of an ornament, unless it lead us to good actions.”3  
According to this cautionary lecture, sensibility’s potential disgrace stems from its 
“dangerous quality, which is continually extracting the excess of misery, or delight, 
from every surrounding circumstance” so that “we become the victim of our feelings, 
                                                
1 “Question: Ought Sensibility to be Cherished or Repressed?” The Monthly Magazine 2 (October 
1796): 706.  For a useful contextualization of this article in relation to debates on sensibility in the 
popular press, novels, and other discourses, see Markman Ellis’s “Sensibility, History and the Novel” in 
The Politics of Sensibility: Race, Gender and Commerce in the Sentimental Novel (New York: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996).  
2 “Question: Ought Sensibility to be Cherished or Repressed?” 706. 
3 Ann Radcliffe, The Mysteries of Udolpho (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1998), 80. 
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unless we can in some degree command them.”4  Yet such a warning is significantly 
tempered by the equally pressing need to avoid callous overcorrection: “I would not 
teach you to become insensible, if I could; I would only warn you of the evils of 
susceptibility, and point out how you may avoid them.”5  The Monthly Magazine 
similarly brandishes shame against both sensibility’s “ridiculous” excesses and the 
“contrary extreme of affected insensibility,” a “freezing air of indifference” 
constituting “a rude and vulgar kind of stoicism, of which Zeno would have been 
ashamed.”6  Affective indulgence or “affected insensibility”—either, it would seem, 
invariably leads to shame.   
Such was the general mood as Jane Austen drafted early versions of 
Northanger Abbey and other of her major works.  Faced with the perilous extremes of 
a sensibility culturally degraded as feminized irrationality and passive susceptibility, 
and an insensibility cast as frigid and austere, Austen also engages shame.  She 
invokes shame, however, not just to broach but to reframe the question of whether 
sensibility “ought . . . to be cherished or repressed.”  Across her novels, Austen 
fashions shame as a valuable mediator between sentimental absorption and what she 
terms, in Northanger Abbey, “affected indifference.”7  Rather than repress or disavow 
sensibility in order to avoid its shame, Austen revises the emotional intensities and 
investments of sensibility through shame, and especially through innovative novelistic 
displays of shame.  By attending to shame’s revisionary, mediating role in Northanger 
Abbey, we can trace the productive possibilities of shame that Austen draws out of the 
novels of contemporaries like Frances Burney and predecessors such as Samuel 
Richardson and develops in her own body of work.  In what follows, I consider 
                                                
4 Ibid., 79-80. 
5 Ibid., 80. 
6 “Question: Ought Sensibility to be Cherished or Repressed?” 706. 
7 Jane Austen, Northanger Abbey (New York: Norton, 2004), 22.  Further references will appear in the 
text. 
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Austen’s representational experiments with shame first in Northanger Abbey, and then 
throughout her career, in order to show how shame functioned as an increasingly 
important alternative to sensibility in shaping the novel’s shifting cultural status and 
form.  And although Austen confronts a historically specific formulation of repressive 
shame as it comes into contact with sensibility, by reading shame in relation to her 
negotiations of sensibility I further intend to challenge a common equation of shame 
and repression in current critical approaches to Austen’s work. 
 In shame, Austen faces an emotion persistently yoked with sensibility, but also 
the novel, a genre often dismissed as excessively feminine, emotional, and 
commercial.  It is not surprising, then, that she explicitly addresses shame in her 
famous defense of the novel in Northanger Abbey; perhaps more unexpected is that 
her defense of the novel itself employs shame.  Austen’s narrator begins this defense 
with a seemingly firm disavowal of shame, refusing to participate in injurious shaming 
practices directed at novel writers and readers: “I will not adopt that ungenerous and 
impolitic custom so common with novel writers, of degrading by their contemptuous 
censure the very performances, to the number of which they are themselves adding” 
(22).  As the defense of the novel continues, however, Austen stages her own 
alternative scene of shame.  Out of the “common cant” of readers “decrying the 
capacity and undervaluing the labour of the novelist” (“I am no novel reader—I 
seldom look into novels—Do not imagine that I often read novels—It is really very 
well for a novel”) she focuses on a specific female reader (22).  Imagining this reader 
being confronted with the aggressive question “And what are you reading, Miss—?” 
Austen ventriloquizes, through the “young lady,” a reply that gives way to the 
narrator’s own adamant praise of the novel form:  
 
“Oh, it is only a novel!” replies the young lady; while she lays down her book 
with affected indifference, or momentary shame.—“It is only Cecilia, or 
Camilla, or Belinda;” or, in short, only some work in which the greatest 
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powers of the mind are displayed, in which the most thorough knowledge of 
human nature, the happiest delineation of its varieties, the liveliest effusions of 
wit and humour are conveyed to the world in the best chosen language. (22-23)  
Here Austen gestures at a shame very different from “degrading” or “contemptuous 
censure,” positioning “momentary shame” as a promising alternative to firm 
repudiation for a woman caught in the act of absorbed reading, who thus “lays down 
her book with affected indifference, or momentary shame.”  One alternative to 
absorption—“affected indifference”—implies that the posture of indifference to an 
enthralling novel must be a false pose.  The other alternative to absorption—
“momentary shame”—is syntactically positioned as the hinge between “affected 
indifference” and enthusiastic praise of novels like Cecilia, Camilla or Belinda.  
Momentary shame appears to facilitate a movement between critical distance and 
impassioned investment, while constituting a movement away from the 
“contemptuous” shaming that would seek to put the novelist and novel reader in their 
place.  These affective possibilities take shape in a formal movement between the 
quoted voice of a reading heroine and that of a narrator speaking as a novelist and also 
exposing herself as a reader—one who appears to have lovingly, closely yet also 
critically read not just Burney and Edgeworth but numerous gothic and sentimental 
novelists.   
 This brief scene of disrupted reading offers a suggestive précis of shame’s 
function in Austen’s oeuvre, as well as the narrative strategies she develops to tease 
out shame’s productive elements.  Austen introduces a heroine—a “young lady”—
who might negotiate the extremes of overwhelming absorption and “affected 
indifference” through “momentary shame.”  Throughout Northanger Abbey, as in its 
defense of the novel, the fraught maneuverings of the “young lady” are explicitly 
those of a novel reader, and are also linked to those of the novelist.  The “young lady” 
can look up from her book in shame without disdainfully flinging it away, while the 
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narrator-novelist, it appears, can also reassess the shame of novelistic tradition and 
convention without breaking all emotional ties to the genre.  In her later works, Austen 
continues to evoke and more subtly signal the heroine’s affective possibilities as 
representative of those of the novelist and the novel reader, experimenting with both 
the mediating function and the formal features of momentary shame that first arise in 
Northanger Abbey’s defense of the novel.  The defense articulates a dynamic 
constellation of affective positions—absorption, “affected indifference” and 
“momentary shame”—and Austen uses the charged contact of distinct voices to 
capture shame’s potential to mediate among these positions.  The defense’s voices 
include the voice of the “common cant” of society (“I am no novel reader”), of the 
heroine (“Oh! it is only a novel!” and “It is only Cecilia, Camilla, or Belinda;”), and of 
the narrator (“or, in short, only some work in which the greatest powers of the mind 
are displayed . . .”).  These closely connected yet separate voices bring into relief how 
Austen often more ambiguously layers disparate vocal strands, while asking the reader 
to differentiate among them.  Rather than silence the “common cant” and its shaming 
of literary conventions, Austen accentuates it, while enacting the revisionary potential 
of “momentary shame” by mingling shaming cant with the self-consciously deviating 
voices of the narrator and the heroine. 
Austen’s defense of the novel additionally enumerates the qualities of the 
novel she wishes to celebrate.  We might consider its embedded scene of disrupted 
reading as also a scene of disrupted emotional identification, similar to those we have 
seen staged by Adam Smith and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick in their theorizations of 
shame.  To approach the scene in this manner begins to connect the possibilities Smith 
and Sedgwick explore in shame’s form with the historically specific aims Austen was 
pursuing as a novelist.  As Sedgwick suggests, shame’s disruption of strict 
identification—whether it be with a person, a book, or society more generally—can 
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still maintain interest; shame thus opens a space of separation and individuation that 
nonetheless does not require “affected indifference” or contemptuous detachment.  As 
an affective alternative to ideals of sympathetic likeness, shame promotes the novel’s 
“most thorough knowledge of human nature, the happiest delineation of its varieties,” 
which sensibility’s forms, for Austen, risk effacing.  In Austen’s work the “happiest 
delineation of . . . varieties” depends especially on a “momentary shame” that, by 
wavering between absorption and detachment, avoids fixing both a stagnant form of 
shame and an absolute affective rupture.  And insofar as interruptions of emotional 
susceptibility and over-identification can motivate self-conscious critical reflection, 
shame allows Austen to make claims to “the greatest powers of the mind” on behalf of 
her heroines, as well as the feminized novelist and novel reader who—especially 
through the “best chosen language”—mix emotional sensitivities and critical 
reasoning.  
When Austen fleshes out her defense’s skeletal scene of interrupted absorption 
in Northanger Abbey’s larger narrative of Catherine Morland’s constantly frustrated 
gothic fantasies, a particular kind of absorption comes to the fore in Catherine’s 
fixation on the lurid remains of women’s suffering.  In Bath, Catherine is enraptured 
by The Mysteries of Udolpho, and especially by the prospect of “Laurentina’s 
skeleton” behind “the dreadful black veil!” (26).  Such enthusiasm for traces of female 
pain continues to dominate Catherine’s gothic speculations during her stay at 
Northanger Abbey, a stay she hopes will unearth “some awful memorials of an injured 
and ill-fated nun” (96).  But each time Catherine breathlessly approaches an expected 
unveiling—of the “memoirs of the wretched Matilda” or of Mrs. Tilney murdered or 
essentially buried alive in captivity—another emotive spectacle unfolds instead, as 
Catherine recognizes her mistake with searing shame (109).  Repeatedly substituting 
the shamed reader for the gothic corpse, Northanger Abbey positions the humiliated 
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heroine as an emotionally compelling centerpiece, one designed to replace the 
sentimental spectacle of overwhelming female suffering, while still retaining and 
reworking much of its affective charge.  This switch of figures encapsulates a strategy 
present throughout Austen’s work, as she consistently employs shame to confront both 
the impasses and lingering allure of sensibility.   
For Austen, the sentimental corpse serves to condense a number of broad 
cultural and more specifically literary concerns over not just extravagant sensibility, 
but an ultimate insensibility that might accompany it.  Catherine is attracted to gothic 
forms of women horrifically fixed in permanent, all-encompassing states of suffering, 
and her fixation on such prospects is presented as similarly entrapping, an encroaching 
absorption into an unreflective over-identification with spectacular misery.  But the 
figure of the moribund body, waning from relentlessly constant pain, also suggests 
that such emotional enclosure might eventually become trite, tired, even affectively 
deadening.  From this perspective, the problems Austen poses through the 
sensationally victimized body open out from the contemporary context of Radcliffean 
gothic to a broader troubling of sensibility’s literary conventions that harks back to 
Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa and its offspring.  The looming specter of an expiring 
(or expired) heroine who consistently fails to materialize in Northanger Abbey 
registers an anxiety over the last gasps of sentimental conventions—conventions that 
might lose their potent effect through overuse, or that might simply buckle under the 
weight of a representational mode that demands complete and overwhelming 
surrender to its effects as the terms of emotional engagement.  Austen wields shame 
not to deliver a final blow to this mode, however, but to reanimate novelistic 
conventions that she refuses either to preserve morbidly or to bury indifferently.  For if 
absolute absorption and identification is the readerly stance invited by gothic novels 
and novels of sensibility more generally, shame enables for Austen a distance that 
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transforms, rather than merely rejects, the affective hold characteristic of such works. 
While the morbidly immobilized female body figures the risks of novel 
reading, and of conventions that might ensnare a reader, it additionally evokes the 
plight of the novelist in Northanger Abbey.  Austen explicitly connects the position of 
the feminized novelist to that of an “injured body” in her defense of the novel, which 
pleads to fellow novelists: “Let us leave it to the Reviewers to abuse such effusions of 
fancy at their leisure, and over every new novel to talk in threadbare strains of the 
trash with which the press now groans.  Let us not desert one another; we are an 
injured body” (22). Anticipating the replacement of a sentimentally expiring heroine 
with a shamed one that will dominate the later sequences set in Northanger Abbey, 
Austen here conjures the shamed status of a collective “injured body” for herself and 
other novelists to harness its affective power.  At the same time she carefully 
distinguishes this self-proclaimed “injured body” from the passively expiring, 
“groan[ing]” form that the contemptuous reviewers would make of it, through their 
rhetorical conflations of novelists with an exhausted maternal “press” reproducing 
“trash.”  The imagery of a feminized “injured body,” however, contains a threat that 
extends beyond the abuses of dismissive reviewers who would do the novelist harm.  
For even as Austen rejects the reviewers’ invective, she relies on a sentimental cliché 
for her pathetic appeal—the cliché of besieged, unjustly “injured” femininity that she 
herself parodically cites many times in Northanger Abbey.  This collective “injured 
body” thus flirts with the danger of merging indiscriminately with extant novelistic 
techniques for producing emotional impact, and of passively reproducing tired forms 
even in the attempt to prove the true “capacity” and “labour of the novelist.”  The 
moment epitomizes a difficulty that haunts the novel’s narration, as Austen repeatedly 
attempts self-consciously to acknowledge and critique novelistic clichés without only 
parodically repeating or rejecting them, and thereby simply recycling or deflating 
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emotional effects.  The heroine-reader’s dilemma of extreme absorption or “affected 
indifference” thus extends to the narrator-novelist as well, who struggles to establish 
critical distance from the excesses of the literature of sensibility, without severing all 
emotional connection to the “injured body” of novel history and conventions. 
In Northanger Abbey, the “injured body” or corpse that suggests interpretive 
snares for Catherine and stylistic lures for the novelist often takes a specific textual 
form: the form of the sentimental letter.  Henry Tilney’s playful narrative of the gothic 
delights awaiting Catherine at Northanger Abbey, which fuels her frantic 
investigations upon their arrival, culminates in an overwrought first-person fragment 
that proclaims, “Oh! thou—whomsoever thou mayst be, into whose hands these 
memoirs of the wretched Matilda may fall” (109).  As Henry’s story mimics 
Radcliffe’s techniques, its climax further alludes to a rich tradition of sentimental 
epistolary novels chronicling the likes of a wretched Clarissa.  In this tradition, as in 
Henry’s own story, the emotive letter encapsulates the aims and methods of a literary 
system of signification—what I will be terming sentimental signification—for 
modeling and inciting emotional identification, particularly with a heroine’s exorbitant 
pain.  After Northanger Abbey, the gothic trappings of imprisonments and corpses 
recede from Austen’s narratives, but the letter remains.  By attending to these 
epistolary remains as they appear across Austen’s work, we can trace her ongoing 
negotiations of sensibility—as an emotional mode and a literary style—through 
narrative innovations that self-consciously revise sentimental epistolary form.  As we 
will see, the scene of shame in Austen is often, also, a scene of reading, and 
specifically of letter reading.  In such scenes Austen establishes affinities with the 
literature of sensibility, while exploring deviations from sentimental signification and 
the mode of readerly absorption and identification that it invites.  Before turning to 
such scenes, then, it is useful first to examine some of the injured bodies of 
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sensibility—Radcliffe’s Adeline, Richardson’s Clarissa, and Burney’s Camilla—
which had a strong influence on Austen, in order to delineate more fully the features 
of sentimental signification that Austen draws on and reacts against and to illuminate 
the disruptive force of shame taking shape in close relation to sensibility over the 
eighteenth century.  Austen’s displays of shame maintain connections with the 
tradition of sensibility, but they also respond to the significant role that shame itself 
plays in the work of influential novelists who were variously invested in sensibility.  
Considered in this light, Austen’s work helps to establish a central place for shame, as 
much as sensibility, in the development of the British novel.  
 
“IT IS TIME TO CONQUER THIS IMPETUOUS SENSIBILITY” 
Henry Tilney’s conjuring of the “memoirs of the wretched Matilda,” addressed 
to “Oh! thou—whomsoever thou mayst be,” taps into a staple of gothic fiction; but it 
also refers to a specific moment in Radcliffe’s The Romance of the Forest (1791) that 
starkly employs the mechanics of sentimental signification.  In Radcliffe’s novel the 
long-suffering heroine, Adeline, discovers a moldering manuscript by a “wretched 
writer” that describes his long imprisonment, anticipates his inevitable murder, and 
pleads, “O! ye, who may hereafter read what I now write, give a tear to my sufferings: 
I have wept often for the distresses of my fellow creatures!”8  The author of this 
manuscript clearly articulates sentimental designs: to stage a pointed, unambiguous 
display of an overwhelming emotion (“my sufferings”) that will yield tangible proof 
(“a tear”) that the emotion is not only recognized, but sympathetically mirrored by 
another (132).  The writer could not ask for a more obedient reader than Adeline, who 
exclaims, “Your miseries, O injured being! are lamented, where they were endured.  
Here, where you suffered, I weep for your sufferings!” (132). This neat exchange of 
                                                
8 Ann Radcliffe, The Romance of the Forest (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1986), 132.  Further 
references will appear in the text.  
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suffering between an “injured being” and a responsive reader enacts a well-oiled 
novelistic version of Adam Smith’s rack of sympathy, with Adeline’s verbal response 
condensing and aligning all of the constitutive features we have identified in Smith’s 
famous example: the scenario, the signifying body, and the interior emotional content 
that mutually reinforce strict emotional identification between the sufferer and the 
witness. In Radcliffe’s version, the “you” who “suffered”—and is seemingly defined 
by this overwhelming emotional content—is matched by an “I” who “weep[s] for your 
sufferings” and provides a body that amplifies the scene’s emotional symmetry.   
The insistent deictic “Here” that begins Adeline’s statement points to 
additional signifying elements that reinforce such a receptive response to the spectacle 
of pain: “Here” refers to the claustrophobic prison cell that held the suffering body in 
place, ensuring that it would have no end other than that of a pathetically, unjustly 
murdered corpse.  Like Smith’s rack, the dank cell provides a hyperbolically 
constricted and uncluttered scenario that virtually guarantees intense pain as the 
prisoner’s interior emotional response, and literally fixes the body as the transparent, 
poignant signifier of the unadulterated misery a sympathetic spectator will replicate in 
her own transparently emotive body.  Adeline’s plaintive “Here” thus designates an 
intricate representational structure that works to close gaps between the scenario of 
suffering, the signifying body, and interior emotional content, and also between the 
sufferer and the identifying witness, ensuring that “Here, where you suffered, I weep 
for your sufferings!” 
While Adeline’s “Here” evokes a scenario, space, and body of unequivocal 
pain, it also accumulates another significant referent, that of the manuscript itself.  
After reading the prisoner’s plea for “a tear,” and before offering her vocalized 
assurance of it, “Adeline paused.  Here the wretched writer appealed directly to her 
heart” (132).  This moment’s pause supplements the “Here” of the cell’s spatial 
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structure with the “Here” of the writer’s manuscript, and in the slippage from “Here” 
to “Here” links Adeline’s emotional susceptibility and mimetic tears to a narrative 
form that “appealed directly to her heart,” highlighting how epistolary narration 
provides a vehicle particularly suited to the designs and features of sentimental 
signification.  The prisoner’s manuscript functions, as in much of the literature of 
sensibility, as a material object and a level of narration that each solidify emotional 
identification.  The physical features of the document—its faded and decaying status, 
conveyed by descriptions and by typographical markers meant to indicate its 
unreadable passages—make it a textual counterpart to a rotting corpse.  The letter 
especially takes on the role of an additional, transparently signifying body (even 
something of a replacement), when the prisoner writes, “I will continue my journal 
nightly, till the hand that writes shall be stopped by death: when the journal ceases, the 
reader will know I am no more” (133).   
Along with the moving materiality infused into the letter, its emotional grasp is 
enhanced by the form of an “I” directly addressing a “ye, who may hereafter read what 
I now write.”  Much like the scenario of the cell, this first-person voice is uncluttered 
by other voices muddying the narration.  The voice of the single “I” does not waver in 
its emotional tenor either, sticking to one affective note for the duration of the tale, an 
unrelenting refrain of constant “misery” and “suffering.”  The staged exchange 
between the “wretched writer” and Adeline also exemplifies the series of mirroring 
readers often inscribed in sentimental epistolary novels.  The prisoner asks his reader 
not just to share his sufferings, but to mimic his own way of reading pain: “I have 
wept often for the distresses of my fellow creatures!” In turn, Adeline’s properly 
responsive reading body, similarly operating simultaneously as a hermeneutic model 
and an additional spectacle of distress, provides the next link in the chain of emotional 
equivalence, marking a clear point of entry for the novel reader.  Even as the prisoner 
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casts his manuscript toward any “ye, who may hereafter read what I now write,” the 
specific form of his address—that of an “I” directly addressing and making specific 
emotional demands on a “you”—outlines a narrowly delineated space of reception that 
constitutes true sensibility, both for the letter-reading character and the novel reader. 
Radcliffe constructs this adept sentimental exchange late in the eighteenth 
century, drawing on the preceding refinements of an abundance of sentimental 
novelists, but also registering her culture’s growing ambivalence over sensibility.  
Adeline’s deeply inflected “Here” thus resounds with the energy of deftly orchestrated 
sentimental signification, yet further resonates with the anxieties of Radcliffe’s time.  
The near-seamless call and response of sensibility takes an eerie turn after Adeline 
firmly announces that “Here, where you suffered, I weep for your sufferings!”  
Adeline then, Radcliffe writes, “started and listened, and thought she heard ‘Here’ 
distinctly repeated by a whisper immediately behind her” (132-33).  The errant echo 
suggests that a fantasy of mimetic emotional connection has been pushed to 
disorienting extremes: Adeline’s subsequent look at the mirror, with caution “lest 
some other face than her own should meet her eyes,” further raises the threat of 
alienation and loss of self where one expects consolatory sentimental contact (134).  
The voice of the novel’s omniscient narrator, which had briefly given way to the first-
person address of the prisoner’s manuscript, reenters the scene along with the 
unnerving echo, and clarifies its meaning: “[Adeline’s] imagination was now strongly 
impressed” producing “distempered senses” and a “fancy” that “gradually subdued 
reason,” the narrator explains (132, 134).  The passage’s reverberating “Here,” joined 
with the narrator’s commentary, upsets the sentimental ideal, along with its privileged 
epistolary narrative form; through it, Radcliffe here articulates concerns that extreme 
sensibility could involve a dangerous assault on reason and self-assertion.   
Especially significant for the consideration of Austen is the form this 
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articulation takes, as the intrusion of additional voices complicates an idealized 
symmetry of emotion and address between an epistolary “I” and a responsive “you.”  
Radcliffe’s disruptive voices, unsettling sentimental signification even as she skillfully 
deploys it, resemble experiments in narrative voice employed by contemporaries like 
Burney and Austen to counteract sensibility’s excesses and complicate its popular 
epistolary form.   For Burney and Austen, though, these disruptive voices also come 
with a specific feeling—the feeling of shame.  To help explain such a pairing of form 
and feeling, we can look to an earlier novel that, unlike Radcliffe’s Romance, 
maintains sentimental epistolary form throughout and takes the form to great 
emotional (and indeed page) lengths.  In Clarissa (1747-48), shame strikes a 
discordant note from within sentimental epistolary form, jarring with the sentimental 
signification that Richardson so effectively and influentially develops. The shame that 
grates, in Richardson’s text, against a sensibility very much on the rise in the 1740s—
with Pamela and Clarissa the reigning deities of sensibility’s burgeoning “cult”—
provides both suggestive roots and an important point of departure for the uses made 
of shame by Burney and Austen at the century’s end.  
While The Romance of the Forest offers an exemplary moment of sentimental 
exchange between Adeline and a “wretched writer,” Clarissa is the oft-cited exemplar 
of the sentimental novel, achieving a potent pairing of sentimental designs and 
epistolary narrative form.  Epistolary exchange gives Richardson a prime vehicle for 
sentimental signification; Clarissa Harlowe’s “tragical story” consists of an 
unrelenting accumulation of oppressive scenarios and emotive posturings of a body 
that weeps, faints, declines, and eventually dies—and also writes letters that both 
convey and further materialize her corporeal displays of unmitigated suffering.9  As 
                                                
9 Samuel Richardson, Clarissa, or The History of a Young Lady (New York: Penguin, 1985), 1163. 
Further references will appear in the text.  
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Clarissa’s pen swerves mid-sentence from weakness or her tears hit the page, her 
letters, written at the moment of intense emotional experience, reflect her body’s 
highly legible signification of overwhelming interior pain.  The epistles that help close 
any gaps between the scenarios and signifying body of pain also work to reduce the 
emotional distance and difference of anyone reading Clarissa’s pain: within the plot, 
the multiple correspondents exhibit a sequence of replicated relations, in which the 
addressed “you” is in turn fleshed out as an “I” whose own responsive body and 
responding letters further model the demands of sensibility for the novel reader.  In 
addition, Clarissa’s correspondents fall into two starkly opposed groups: those with 
proper sentiment, who recognize and replicate Clarissa’s intense misery, and those 
with a callous insensibility, like Robert Lovelace and Clarissa’s family, who refuse to 
admit or to identify with Clarissa’s extravagant suffering.  Richardson brings together 
horrific plot points, representations of the transparently emotive body, and epistolary 
narration to fashion Clarissa as a moving sentimental spectacle of suffering, one that 
requires strict identification with her displayed pain as the terms of a feeling response. 
But as easy, and accurate, as it is to view Clarissa as a paradigm of sentimental 
suffering, it is also useful to conceive of her as constituting two affecting spectacles in 
the novel—that of suffering and of shame.  Each involves a different configuration of 
signifying elements, each maintains a distinct relation to the epistolary narrative form, 
and each is differently positioned, by Richardson, as accommodating or frustrating 
feminine authority and agency. 
For much of the novel, Clarissa acts and writes to embody a suffering that she 
adamantly claims as her own and proffers for others’ recognition.  Alongside this 
suffering, however, she is confronted by a shame that, though she refuses to accept it, 
she cannot help but acknowledge.  We have seen in our discussions of shame’s form, 
especially as it takes shape in the theories of Sedgwick and Smith, the productive 
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possibilities of a compelling form that can provoke mutual recognition of a shameful 
scenario, even as the spectators and the ostensibly shamed individual refuse to fully 
own the circulating shame.  Richardson’s depiction of Clarissa’s trials presents a 
harrowing version of such a tension between the appearance and experience of shame.  
When forced into becoming a public spectacle of shame through an abduction and 
rape widely viewed as elopement and seduction, Clarissa finds herself caught between 
her public shame and personal conviction that it is not deserved.  The gaping rupture 
between scenario and interior emotional content at times violently tears apart her 
signifying body, as well as her letters.  Such violence erupts early in the novel, in 
Clarissa’s response to the curse pronounced by her father on “your wicked, your 
shameful elopement” that will bring lasting “punishment, both here and hereafter” 
(509).  Clarissa declares that the “dreadful letter”—conveying her father’s curse along 
with her sister’s sweeping condemnation that “Everybody, in short, is ashamed of 
you”—“has unhinged my whole frame” (510, 513).  The “unhinged … frame” figures 
the pressure of an exterior, punitive fixing of permanent shame, which weighs on 
Clarissa throughout the plot even as she maintains her belief of the curse’s unjust 
severity and misapplied demand for her interior shame. 
Clarissa’s “unhinged … frame” reaches its breaking point after she is drugged 
and raped by Lovelace—a time that Lovelace anticipates as one “when her pride of 
being corporally inviolate is brought down; when she can tell no tales, but when (be 
her resistance what it will) even her own sex will suspect a yielding in resistance” 
(879).  In focusing on Clarissa’s public loss of face—and thus of a morally authorized 
voice—along with her physical violation, Lovelace predicts the multiple, tangled 
violations that precipitate an extreme disintegration of body, mind and narrative.  
While Clarissa returns immediately to her writing, we are told through Lovelace’s 
letters that “what she writes she tears, and throws the paper in fragments under the 
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table, either as not knowing what she does, or disliking it; then gets up, wrings her 
hands, weeps, and shifts her seat all round the room: and then returns to her table, sits 
down, and writes again” (889).  A transcription of these fragmentary papers follows, 
and the fragments convey an “unhinged … frame” that entails both Clarissa’s 
disoriented mind—a jumble of “thought, and grief, and confusion, and (Oh my poor 
head!) I cannot tell what,” she writes—and her sense of a shattered body, which is 
made most vivid in her story of “a lady” whose supposedly tamed animal “tore her in 
pieces” (890, 891).  Throughout the papers, these dislocations appear especially linked 
to another painfully perceived disjunction, that between her shameful social status and 
her actual innocence. The papers insistently conjure a form of shame that Clarissa 
cannot escape: “How art thou now humbled in the dust, thou proud Clarissa Harlowe!” 
one paper begins, while another bemoans her fall in others’ esteem, felt acutely as the 
loss of a public place of “elevation,” that of “applauded purity, to look down from on a 
prostrate adorer, and an admiring world, and up to pleased and rejoicing parents and 
relations!” (891, 892). In figuring herself as a “humbled creature,” Clarissa amasses 
imagery of spoiled surfaces—garments, reputation, skin—that belie her true content: 
“Yet God knows my heart, I had no culpable intentions!” (891, 892). 
Such striking figures of mind and body “unhinged” by the glaring gap between 
a shameful social appearance and a blameless interiority are amplified by a further 
unhinging of the epistolary narrative frame that so effectively stages the sentimental 
spectacle of suffering throughout most of the novel.  Clarissa still pens letters—even 
at a frantic pace—but they are ripped apart, crossed out, undelivered and, for the most 
part, undeliverable in their cryptic incoherence. The breakdown of the material letter 
coincides with a breakdown of sentimental address and reception.  In the discarded 
papers, Clarissa’s “I” struggles yet fails to connect with a receptive reading “you” who 
might understand and share her feelings.  In addition, the “I” itself becomes 
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increasingly unstable throughout the fragments, as first-person self-expression gives 
way to both the third-person account of “a lady” whose story refracts Clarissa’s own, 
and the censorious voices that detach from and turn back on the “I” when Clarissa 
calls herself a “thou now humbled in the dust, thou proud Clarissa Harlowe.”   
In the final paper, Paper X, the imagery of ruined surfaces culminates in a 
particularly explicit, indelible mark of shame, while the “I” most extremely detaches 
from a single, letter-writing subject.  Instead, Paper X contains various, jumbled 
literary excerpts, littered with indeterminate Is and yous and scrawled by Clarissa in 
haphazard fashion (see figure 1).  Among these excerpts is a loose quotation from 
Hamlet that especially links the instability of speaker and addressee in Paper X to the 
stain of shame: 
 
   —Oh! you have done an act 
That blots the face and blush of modesty; 
            Takes off the rose 
From the fair forehead of an innocent love, 
And makes a blister there!— (893)10 
Veering far from the neat exchange of epistles and emotion that Richardson perfects 
for sentimental displays of suffering, the cacophony of blurring and ambiguously 
authored voices in Clarissa’s fractured papers appears better suited to depicting an 
alienating experience of shame.  In particular, torn up letters, fragmentary quotations, 
and chaotic shifts in voice give material and narrative form to the intense social and 
self alienation resulting from Clarissa’s “blister[ing]” branding as a shameful spectacle 
that can be neither ignored, nor effaced, nor accepted as more than skin deep.   
                                                
10 Clarissa alludes to an exchange in which Hamlet responds to Gertrude’s question “What have I done, 
that thou dar’st wag thy tongue / In noise so rude against me?”:  
 
   Such an act 
That blurs the grace and blush of modesty, 
Calls virtue hypocrite, takes off the rose 
From the fair forehead of an innocent love 
And sets a blister there …  
 
See William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Prince of Denmark 3.4.40-45.    
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Figure 1. “Paper X,” from Samuel Richardson,  
Clarissa . . ., vol. 5 (London, 1748), 239. 
 
To portray such shame, Richardson violently disrupts the sentimental 
signification and epistolary framework that he carefully constructs throughout most of 
the novel.  But rather than pursue this representation of shame, at the height of 
Clarissa’s epistolary disorientation in Paper X the narrative presents the bare blueprint 
of a “retreat” from shame in another scribbled excerpt: 
 
When honour’s lost, ‘tis a relief to die, 
Death’s but a sure retreat from infamy. (893)11 
This quotation, from Samuel Garth’s The Dispensary, contains the glimmer of an 
                                                
11 From Samuel Garth, The Dispensary (London, 1699).  
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outline of what will follow: Clarissa’s drawn-out demise and its aftermath, a narrative 
conclusion Clarissa’s doctor aptly characterizes when he diagnoses “her case to be 
grief” and that Clarissa herself suitably captures in the observation that “Death from 
grief was, she believed, the slowest of deaths” (1075, 1341).  Considered in light of 
Clarissa’s disturbing confrontation with the form of shame, epitomized in her 
fragmentary papers, we can read the notable extremity of Clarissa’s suffering and 
death from “grief” as an aggressive sentimental repairing of the social and signifying 
ruptures of shame.  The painstaking re-configuration of Clarissa as a spectacle of 
suffering—specifically a “sad sight”—becomes an effort that harnesses not just the 
formidable energies and signifying strategies of the heroine for the remainder of the 
novel (up to her death scene and beyond), but also those of the narrative more broadly 
(895).  
 In the first letter by Clarissa that is actually delivered to Anna Howe after her 
rape and her subsequent escape from Lovelace’s control, we can see how at odds her 
particular confrontation with shame is with her sentimental ideal of herself and her 
intimate relations with others, and with the sentimental signification she uses to 
support such an ideal.  Clarissa struggles to remake her epistolary relation to Anna so 
that it can accommodate, even alleviate, her excruciating sense of shame.  She begins 
by telling Anna that “Once more have I escaped—but alas! I, my best self, have not 
escaped!” (974).  To counter the splintering of the self by the oppressive form of 
shame, Clarissa tries to imagine her letter as a mirroring form that might help repair 
the damage, even if the letter can no longer reflect back a coherent version of herself 
consolidated by a mimetically identifying other. Clarissa thus asks her correspondent 
to “let me, at awful distance, revere my beloved Anna Howe, and in her reflect upon 
what her Clarissa Harlowe once was!”; she then attempts to “shake … off” the “vile, 
this hated self!” by “inquir[ing] after a dearer object, my beloved Anna Howe!—
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whose mind, all robed in spotless white, charms and irradiates—but what would I 
say?—” (974).  The abrupt breaking off—on par with the overall “rambling” quality 
of the letter—suggests the difficulty of bending sentimental epistolary exchange and 
its structures of strict identification to the pressures of shame (974).  Ultimately, 
however, the letter to Anna falls into two parts: the faltering of “what would I say?” is 
followed by a concluding section in which Clarissa does pull herself, and her letter, 
together.  Admitting upon “re-perusal” that the first part of the letter has use only as 
evidence of “a distracted mind,” Clarissa more cogently articulates the purpose of this 
“wild incoherence” in the letter’s final lines: to ask for a letter in return that “will 
reach the hands of—your unhappy—but that’s not enough— Your miserable 
CLARISSA HARLOWE” (974).  The valediction entails not just the sign of a 
newfound coherence, but its very source.  For this letter, with its final insistence on 
not just an “unhappy” but a “miserable CLARISSA HARLOWE,” encapsulates what 
is at stake for Clarissa in the cultivation of herself as a “sad sight” and her incessant 
narration of her “sad story” in the remainder of the plot, as she seeks to reclaim the 
narrative powers that her relation to shame threatens and to refashion her self-image, 
public persona, and connections to others in empowering and consolatory sentimental 
terms that are premised on making herself a spectacle of absolute suffering, rather than 
a spectacle of shame.12  
The last part of the novel accordingly charts a self-narration that moves from 
the undelivered and incoherent scraps of an externally inflicted shame to Clarissa’s 
final word on (and because of) her suffering.  Clarissa seems to will herself into 
becoming a corpse, a signifying body that she repeatedly glosses as the material proof 
                                                
12 Among Clarissa’s many invocations of such phrases is her insistence to Belford that “you were not a 
stranger to my sad story,” which he recounts in a letter to Lovelace (1076).  Others reiterate this 
phrasing when, for example, Mrs. Norton says the Harlowes “must one day be acquainted with the sad 
story” (989) and Mrs. Howe requests “the particulars at large of your sad story” (995).  
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of her overwhelming grief, and whose emotive meaning is further fixed by the various 
spatial and linguistic structures she constructs to encase it.  Moving beyond the 
shameful ambiguities of residence in a house of ill repute and a debtor’s prison, and 
those that continue to plague her in a private apartment (and even simply in a mobile 
body), Clarissa settles finally for the unequivocal pathos of being contained as a 
corpse in her coffin.  This structure, along with the prolific writing that anticipates, 
reinforces and even decorates it, enables Clarissa to realign her body, scenario, and 
social position to fit what she feels, and to reconnect with others who must now 
accurately, wholeheartedly identify with her suffering.  In a letter to Anna, for 
example, Clarissa counters her public shame with the space of suffering: “But since 
my character before the capital enormity was lost in the eyes of the world; and that 
from the very hour I left my father’s house; and since all my own hopes of worldly 
happiness are entirely over; let me slide quietly into my grave” (1013).  The grave 
erases shame by “shut[ting] up all my sorrows,” much like her coffin, as well as her 
will and posthumously delivered letters to family and friends (1013).  Clarissa’s last 
letters endlessly renarrate, in order to eradicate, the possibility of shame around her 
“fall” through a simultaneous invocation of her present pain: in the posthumous letter 
to her mother, she transforms herself from one who writes as “a self-convicted 
criminal supplicating to her offended judge for mercy and pardon” to one who is 
“purified by sufferings” (1372, 1373). And in the letter to her sister, Clarissa produces 
redemption and even happiness out of the unchanging signification of her deathly 
“NOW”: she is one who has left behind “error,” “And who NOW, made perfect (as 
she hopes) through her sufferings, styles herself, The happy CLARISSA HARLOWE” 
(1374, 1375).   
As Clarissa falls into disorienting social and linguistic forms of shame, 
ultimately to regain an important measure of control over and through her “sad story,” 
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Richardson experiments with two highly effective modes of staging an emotionally 
compelling narrative spectacle.  For Clarissa, shame destructively assaults agency, 
reason, eloquence and her oft-noted epistolary craft, while suffering becomes the 
affective material for reconstituting a sense of coherence within the self and power 
over how that self is read by others.  Shame and suffering entail radically different 
consequences for the heroine with implications for the novelist as well:  the 
representation of Clarissa’s shame pushes the epistolary narration toward a level of 
formal chaos that Richardson mines for effect but finally retreats from, favoring in the 
end a sentimental form calculated not just to elicit but precisely to define the reader’s 
emotional response.   
Austen’s own experiments with narrating shame can be read against 
Richardson’s engagement with shame, as much as with sensibility.  But Austen enacts 
a reversal, of sorts, of the relation Richardson establishes between shameful and 
sentimental signification, a reversal that draws on Frances Burney’s revaluing of 
shame as corrective of, rather than a justification for, extreme sensibility.  Burney’s 
reworking of a specifically Richardsonian sensibility through shame is most explicit in 
the climax of Camilla.  Published in 1796, Camilla, like Radcliffe’s Romance of the 
Forest, reflects the shifting attitudes of the century’s end by focusing on the irrational 
emotional extravagance that can accompany a young heroine’s acute sensibility.  As in 
Radcliffe’s work, such a troubling of sensibility involves an influx of voices that 
upsets sentimental signification, but for Burney these voices are specifically linked, 
much like they are in Clarissa, to the experience of intense shame.  With its third-
person narration and experimentation with free indirect discourse, Camilla seems 
poised to revisit and revise the epistolary narrative form that Burney herself 
successfully employed in Evelina (1778), and in so doing the novel constitutes a 
pointed response to the form and attendant feelings of Clarissa.  
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Critics such as Miranda J. Burgess have noted that “Camilla climaxes in an 
embedded parody of the death scenes in Clarissa,” arguing that when the novel’s 
eponymous heroine, Camilla Tyrold, ensconces herself in a lonely inn, works herself 
up into a sickly state, and pens heartfelt letters to be delivered after her death, “Burney 
stringently ironizes the excessive self-sacrifice Camilla has learnt from earlier 
romances and conduct books.”13  Burney’s engagement with Clarissa can be further 
elucidated if we consider how Camilla’s sentimental crisis is similarly ushered in by a 
particular experience of shame.  Much of the novel’s plot is devoted to honest 
mistakes—especially in financial and flirtatious matters—that make Camilla 
vulnerable to misunderstandings and to undeserved, exaggerated and in her view 
indelible public shame.  The scene in which Camilla breaks off her engagement with 
the tirelessly suspicious Edgar Mandlebert best captures this consistent assault of 
unjustly inflicted yet undeniable shame: after insisting that “‘I am lessened in your 
esteem,” Camilla finds “[s]he could not go on; imperious shame took possession of 
her voice, crimsoned her very forehead, blushed even in her eyes, demolished her 
strained energy, and enfeebled her genuine spirit.”14  Like Clarissa, Camilla is plagued 
not only by the external imposition of unwarranted dishonor on her “genuine spirit,” 
but also by the belief that intimacy with others cannot sustain the stress of even the 
false appearance of shame.  Distrusting that love can withstand apparent debasement, 
Camilla sees a permanent break from Edgar as the necessary result of “imperious 
shame”: “I know … that appearances have often cruelly misrepresented me; my 
errours you might have the candour to forget, and false appearances I could easily 
clear in my own favour—but where, and what is the talisman which can erase from 
                                                
13 Miranda J. Burgess, British Fiction and the Production of Social Order, 1740-1830 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000), 95. 
14 Frances Burney, Camilla, or A Picture of Youth (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1999), 640-41. 
Further references will appear in the text. 
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my own remembrance that you have thought me unworthy?” (641).   
The “talisman” that Camilla eventually invokes is the spectacle of her 
suffering, which she grasps with rising desperation when her accumulating debts gain 
publicity and land her father in prison.  Discovering herself ever deeper in explainable 
“errours” that on the surface must cast her as a “guilty … perhaps reprobated 
daughter!” Camilla declares of her father’s imprisonment, “What rests thus upon my 
mind … is the disgrace—and the cause! the one so public, the other so clandestine!” 
(830-31).  The immense weight of the shameful scenario at odds with her honorable 
intentions presses on Camilla’s body and language along with her mind: “Her reason 
felt the shock as forcibly as her heart,” producing “[w]ords of alarming incoherency 
[that] proclaimed the danger menacing her intellects, while agonies nearly convulsive 
distorted her features, and writhed her form” (824).  The price of such public disgrace 
increasingly appears to her a sentimental sacrifice that, like Clarissa’s, will be 
conveyed through poignant letters and guaranteed by her declining body and 
anticipated corpse.  Instead of returning home and clarifying matters, Camilla isolates 
herself in a nearby inn and writes progressively despondent letters that undertake to 
repair her tarnished reputation, damaged sense of her self, and broken relations with 
loved ones by staging her thoroughgoing misery.  In a letter to her sister, Camilla 
describes being “[e]ncompassed with all of guilt with which imprudence could ensnare 
me,” and tries to push back by proffering “this small and humble memorial of my 
unhappy existence” (845).  A chapter appropriately titled “A Spectacle” depicts 
Camilla frantically fashioning her expiring body as a further “memorial” of suffering 
that will clinch the pathos of her epistolary appeals.  She sends letters to her parents 
that she believes will “bring them too late”; accordingly, “I ask not now your 
forgiveness; I know I shall possess it fully,” a possession ensured by “the early ashes 
of your erring, but adoring daughter” (869).  The postscript “Not to be delivered till I 
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am dead” similarly secures the results of a letter to Edgar asking that “in this last 
farewell be all displeasure forgotten!” (870).  
If the breaking point of Clarissa’s shame is her disordered, undelivered papers, 
then Camilla’s is surely “A Vision,” the chapter following “A Spectacle.” Paraphrase 
cannot do full justice to the bizarre intensity of this multipage vision, in which 
nightmarish content—the approach and demands of Death—is rendered in a 
sensational flurry of bodies, voices, pages, pens, and fiery, floating characters that 
express intermingling sensibility and shame.  In some respects, Camilla’s vision 
shows remarkable continuity with Clarissa’s epistolary spectacles of shame. 
Oppressed by the mistaken notion that her family is ignoring her letters, Camilla falls 
into a “slumber, feverish nearly to delirium” and dreams that Death appears with a 
“visible figure” and a “hand, sharp and forked” (874).  Death’s literal grasp quickly 
gives way to a more menacing threat, however, of unmoored, accusatory voices that 
evoke the shaming chorus of public opinion as they berate Camilla for courting death 
and demand she justify her moral worth.  The assault culminates in a “terrible” voice 
that ushers in the “Records of Eternity”:  
 
“Prematurely,” it cried, “thou art come, uncalled, unbidden; thy task 
unfulfilled, thy peace unearned. Follow, follow me! the Records of Eternity are 
opened. Come! write with thy own hand thy claims, thy merits to mercy!” A 
repelling self-accusation instantaneously overwhelmed her. “O, no! no! no!” 
she exclaimed, “let me not sign my own miserable insufficiency!” (875) 
Camilla futilely resists, finding herself compelled “involuntarily” to write “guilty 
characters” in the “immense volumes of Eternity” (875).   
Like Clarissa’s fragmented papers, the “Records of Eternity”—in which 
Camilla fears to “sign my own miserable insufficiency”—appear to approximate 
epistolary form the better to stage a spectacular breakdown of sentimental self-
possession and address.  But, as we have seen in Clarissa, the epistolary machinery 
that can poignantly materialize shame’s disorienting form can also fortify a defense 
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against it.  By the logic of sentimental convention Camilla is poised, after writing her 
“guilty characters,” to pull herself together and reclaim control through a purposeful 
signing of her misery.  Such an opportunity is emphasized when a voice observes, 
“These are thy deserts; write now thy claims”; however, Camilla struggles against the 
chance to stake her “claims” on her corpse with even greater desperation, still to no 
avail: 
  
In vain again she called;—pleaded, knelt, wept in vain.  The time, she found, 
was past; she had slighted it while in her power; it would return to her no 
more; and a thousand voices at once, with awful vibration, answered aloud to 
every prayer, “Death was thy own desire!” Again, unlicensed by her will, her 
hand seized the iron instrument. The book was open that demanded her claims.  
She wrote with difficulty . . . but saw that her pen made no mark! She looked 
upon the page, when she thought she had finished, . . . but the paper was blank! 
. . . Voices then, by hundreds, by thousands, by millions, from side to side, 
above, below, around, called out, echoed and re-echoed, “Turn over, turn over . 
. . and read thy eternal doom!” In the same instant, the leaf, untouched, burst 
open . . . and . . . she awoke. (875-76, ellipses in original) 
While the “immense volumes of Eternity” requiring Camilla’s first-person account 
evoke the epistolary conventions of sensibility, a glaring blank here takes the place of 
the expected sentimental conclusion.  This blank page suggests a narrative refusal of 
various incarnations of sentimental closure.  It erases the sentimental corpse as the 
novel’s centerpiece and key to resolution; but it also withholds the enclosing of the 
injured body in a unified first-person voice that fixes signification by conveying one 
emotion in a direct appeal for identification.  The “awful vibration” of multiplying 
voices—chiming “Death was thy own desire!’—resembles Radcliffe’s eerily echoing 
“Here,” an unnerving feedback to sentimental signification symptomatic of sensibility 
gone wrong. 
 The vision’s sensational proliferation of voices thus follows Clarissa in 
highlighting the oppressive aspects of shame, and The Romance of the Forest in 
stressing a self-destructive valence of sensibility.  But the dream’s abrupt ending 
suggests a further function, as the multiplying voices accentuate the horrific blank 
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while also filling it in with a vivifying energy that jolts Camilla awake and grants a 
reprieve from death and “eternal doom.” The vision as a whole, much like these 
voices, is both deeply disturbing and strangely reanimating.  A breaking point of 
Camilla’s shame and sensibility, it is also a turning point in the plot, ushering in a 
happy ending of reunited couples and families.  Upon awakening, Camilla realizes that 
while “only a vision … I cannot shake it off,” and soon after she begins to receive 
letters, contact others, and find that “Something, nevertheless, like internal revival, 
once more, to her own unspeakable amazement, began fluttering at her breast” (876, 
878). An early sign of revival is the impact of a letter from Edgar that, “dead as she 
thought herself to the world, its views, its hopes, its cares, passed straight to her 
heart—that wonderful repository of successive emotions, whence the expulsion of one 
species of interest but makes way for the entrance of another” (878).  Camilla appears 
saved by her “wonderful repository of successive emotions,” and it is a specific 
succession of emotions, of exorbitant sensibility followed by responding shame, that 
proves especially stimulating for the heroine.  In the closing scenes in which Camilla 
finally faces her parents and then reinstates her engagement to Edgar, a palpable 
shame resparks “interest,” neither producing the permanent rupture from others that 
she dreads, nor requiring a counteracting spectacle of her suffering and death.  By the 
novel’s end, a more productive side of shame emerges that can negotiate the 
impositions of “imperious shame” and the problem of what Mrs. Tyrold terms, at one 
point, “impetuous sensibility” (883).  If we look more closely at Camilla’s vision, we 
can see a pivotal site of this transformation, a space of both “internal revival” and self-
conscious formal reinvention.  With its conspicuous blank framed by equally vivid 
voices, the vision itself provides a “wonderful repository of successive emotions” 
through which Burney explores the possibilities of shame directed against sensibility 
to enact not a pure rejection—or erasure—of sentimental conventions, but a revision 
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of them.  And the peculiar structure of voices in the vision—beyond being simply 
symptomatic of oppressive shame or excessive sensibility—contributes significantly 
to the production of a reanimating strand of shame.   
The particular capacity of shame to revive a “species of interest” within 
Camilla’s “wonderful repository of successive emotions” suggests Philip Fisher’s 
theorization of shame as a “successor passion.”15  In his account of the passions, Fisher 
sets shame apart from the “radical singularity” that characterizes the vehement states 
of other passions such as anger, fear, grief, and wonder (53), identifying shame as a 
“successor passion” or the “aftermath of an impassioned state” that provides “a limit 
to the extreme and extrasocial individualism characteristic of the passions” (65).  For 
Fisher, passions as varied as grief and wonder share the “structural fact of indifference 
to others and our conspicuous withdrawal into a closed world of self-concern” because 
each enacts, in its vehement state, the “power of the passions to extinguish the reality 
and claims of others while creating … an almost painfully pressing awareness of the 
self” (67, 60).  The frequent “successor passion” of shame is unique in its “repairing of 
reciprocity,” since “the very premise of shame is the acute feeling of the reality of 
others and of their opinions” (69, 60).  Fisher describes shame as “a telling revelation 
to others that reciprocity had ceased to exist in our eyes” (68).   
Fisher’s figure of shame as a “telling revelation” is itself telling, suggesting 
how shame’s relational possibilities might take shape as an embodied spectacle 
integrated into narrative form.  Indeed, Fisher imagines shame as a particular kind of 
moment in the narrative of an individual’s socialization.  The passions, for Fisher, 
offer attractive potential to radically disrupt the modern socialization of the individual 
“within a more and more universalized and pervasive social existence” (63).  But if 
                                                
 15 Philip Fisher, The Vehement Passions (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2002), 65. Further 
references will appear in the text. 
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most impassioned states enable “a process that goes in the opposite direction” of 
modern socialization by “breaking the hold of the world, including the social world, 
[and] educating each of us about our extrasocial being,” shame instigates the 
individual’s move back toward socialization without disappearing into it (61-62).  
While the other passions entail a “moment of pure present time [that] stands 
uninflected and uncompromised by any secondary feeling for claims of other times 
past or future in which, under other circumstances, we might imagine our identity 
invested,” shame, in contrast, integrates this “pure present time” into a narrative 
sequence—one involving a secondary, reflective moment—that constitutes “social 
consciousness” (61, 62).  “The feeling of shame,” Fisher writes, “occurs in the 
moment of becoming aware of others, the moment of a return to social consciousness 
in which, after a time in which it was forgotten, we remember how we look at this 
moment to those around us who are observers of our condition” (67).  Such social 
consciousness differs, however, from absolute, “universalized” socialization in its 
structure of enhanced memory: the moment of shame does not forget the previous 
moment, but instead contains, even derives its intensity from a time “in which [social 
consciousness] was forgotten.”  Shame remembers the social, but also the possibility 
and experience of forgetting it.  Shame is thus distinctively positioned as a mediating 
“moment,” one that draws on the resources of both radical singularity and extreme 
socialization, without being reducible to either.   
For Fisher the passions are not just “moment[s]” in a social narrative but 
insistently embodied spectacles that establish the individual’s stance toward others.  
The passions, excepting shame, are spectacles of radical singularity that entail both a 
unity of being—as a passion “saturate[s] the body as a whole and the soul or psyche as 
a whole”—and the solitude of disregard for anyone else (54).  With such “totality of 
the self” comes a striking transparency, as the passion’s “capacity to override any 
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division between inner states of feeling and outward expression” produces “an almost 
theatrical visibility to any and all who happen to be nearby” (54, 59, 58).  
Significantly, though, this visibility “does not amount to a dramatization, a display, or 
an appeal to any possible bystanders” but rather a sign of extreme self-absorption (56).  
The transparency of these passions thus has “a fixed or immobile quality, a stubborn 
undiscussable intensity” that marks “the minimal or fragile connectedness … of our 
own inner life to the fact and reality of the lives and claims of others” (67-68).  Shame, 
however, has the potential to transform the absolute and unaware exposure of the 
passions into a “telling revelation” that still preserves, yet revises, the passions’ 
spectacular qualities, reworking them into a self-conscious performance of restored 
reciprocity.  As Fisher notes, “Shame rebuilds the reality of other persons, not by 
means of reasoned reflection, but through the agency of a successor passion” (65).  
Such impassioned “agency” is set in contrast to those passions “that in their rashness 
and self-absorption forget about others entirely and, as a result, fail to control the 
selective publication of experience” (57).  Fisher does not give a detailed description 
of what such a display of shame might look like. But when considered against the 
“stubborn undiscussable intensity” he attributes to the other passions, Fisher’s figure 
of shame’s “telling revelation” provocatively evokes the alternate form of an 
emotional spectacle that could combine the material impact of intense emotional 
exposure with the active “agency” and acknowledgement of “claims of others” that are 
implied by “telling.” Described as “a shame directed at the evidence we come to 
remember later as a telling revelation to others that reciprocity had ceased to exist in 
our eyes,” such shame appears a material spectacle of accumulated effects, one that 
weaves the riveting exhibition of unchecked, transparently embodied extrasocial 
passion into a compelling spectacle that manages both to display and contain, to show 
and tell (68).   
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Camilla portrays sensibility as a dangerous proclivity for emotional indulgence 
that could use the check of such a “telling revelation” of shame.  Mrs. Tyrold most 
forcefully articulates the novel’s critique of sensibility, and the need for some 
restraint, when she finds her daughter alone at the inn and weak from self-induced 
illness: “Repress, repress … these strong feelings, uselessly torturing to us both,” she 
exhorts in exasperation (881-82).  Her further admonitions succinctly capture the bind 
of sensibility understood as “strong feelings” that both create a woman’s particular 
charm and threaten to overwhelm and even efface her: “O Camilla! … with a soul of 
feeling like yours,—strong, tender, generous, and but too much alive, how is it that 
you thus have forgotten the first ties of your duty, and your heart, and have been 
wrought upon by your sorrows to forget the sorrows you inflict? Why have you thus 
fled us? thus abandoned yourself to destruction?” (882).  The strength of feeling that 
constitutes the heroine’s mettle and vitality also harbors a “destruction” and 
“abandon[ment]” of the rational self, such that Mrs. Tyrold must insist “it is time to 
conquer this impetuous sensibility, which already, in its effects, has nearly broken all 
our hearts” (882).  Mrs. Tyrold’s lecture reinforces Camilla’s own earlier pangs of 
conscience over her unruly imagination, which cast her sensibility as unreflective 
submission to a “faulty … desire” for emotional extravagance that involves not just 
“self-neglect” but also the “wholly selfish” wish to become a “self-devoted corpse” 
(872, 873).  In both scenes, sensibility’s risks include the loss of the reasoning self in 
self-indulgent excess and the imposition of oneself onto others in a “selfish” demand 
for emotional connection contingent on absolute, shared pain.  As Camilla’s 
conscience admonishes her, “will no worthier wish occur to thee, than to leave [your 
family] to its sorrows and distress,” anticipating her mother’s harsher rebuke of her 
thoroughgoing self-involvement: “how is it that you … have been wrought upon by 
your own sorrows to forget the sorrows you inflict?” (872, 882). 
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Shame’s “telling revelation”—with the relational and representational registers 
that I have teased out of Fisher’s discussion—offers a suggestive lens for reviewing 
Camilla’s vision, focusing on how it addresses the excesses of sensibility not just 
through shame, but by voicing shame in a particular narrative form.  For the vision 
starts with standard sentimental fare as Camilla imagines her corpse coalescing in 
graphic detail upon Death’s approach: “Every vein was congealed; every stiffened 
limb stretched to its full length, was hard as marble” (874). The vision soon forgoes 
such a display, however, in favor of an exchange of voices that have their own visceral 
immediacy, yet rework key features of sentimental signification.  Rather than pursue 
the sentimental ideal of a unified emotional spectacle Burney unravels the consistency 
of her heroine’s voice and mingles Camilla’s utterances with two other distinct voices: 
the voice of what we might term, borrowing the phrase from Austen, the “common 
cant” and the voice of the omniscient narrator.  In bringing these voices together, 
Burney conveys the threat of shame’s self-effacement but also the possibilities of its 
impassioned agency and reinvigorated relationality.   
When the vision first moves away from the spectacle of Camilla’s 
“congeal[ing]” corpse, it seems to settle on an equally conventional sentimental 
prospect, that of a suffering heroine compelled to give a first-person account of her 
inevitable demise.  The physical pressure of Death’s hand on Camilla’s breast 
transforms into a verbal coercion of her self-narration: 
 
[A] voice hollow, deep, and distant, dreadfully pierced her ear, calling out: 
“Thou hast but thy own wish! Rejoice, thou murmurer, for thou diest!” Clearer, 
shriller, another voice quick vibrated in the air: “Whither thou goest,” it cried, 
“and whence comest thou?” 
 A voice from within, over which she thought she had no controul, though it 
seemed issuing from her vitals, low, hoarse, and tremulous, answered, 
“Whither I go, let me rest! Whence I come from let me not look back! Those 
who gave me birth, I have deserted; my life, my vital powers I have rejected.” 
(874-75) 
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As the vision progresses, such stark expressions of Camilla’s personal feeling 
continue, but the types of feeling expressed begin to waver.  When additional voices—
especially one “so near, so loud, so terrible”—next insist that Camilla not speak but 
write her self-account in the “Records of Eternity,” she is thrust into a position even 
more reminiscent of the epistolary mode; Camilla’s adamant, sentimental declarations 
of pain and necessary death give way, however, to a burgeoning shame, one now 
directed at the very extravagance of her sensibility:   
 
A force unseen, yet irresistible, impelled her forward.  She saw the immense 
volumes of Eternity, and her own hand involuntarily grasped a pen of iron, and 
with a velocity uncontroulable wrote these words: “Without resignation, I have 
prayed for death: from impatience of displeasure, I have desired annihilation: 
to dry my own eyes, I have left . . . pitiless, selfish, unnatural! . . . a Father the 
most indulgent, a Mother almost idolizing, to weep out their’s!” Her head 
would have sunk upon the guilty characters; but her eyelids refused to close, 
and kept them glaring before her.  They became illuminated with burning 
sulphur.  She looked another way; but they partook of the same motion; she 
cast her eyes upwards, but she saw the characters still; she turned from side to 
side; but they were always her object. (875, ellipses in original) 
Rather than sound one affective note as the essence of her heroine’s agency and 
coherence, Burney shows the utterances of Camilla’s “I” literally breaking into 
discrete, disparate affective strands as she responds to the varied demands of the other 
voices.  The “I” is pulled apart, by sentimental standards, but the result ultimately 
appears less an unfortunate disintegration of the self than a beneficial accumulation of 
affective stances.  For if emotional intensity is what Camilla wishes, her growing 
shame, replacing a morbid misery, offers a way both to indulge and repress her desire.  
The self-generated shame of Camilla’s “guilty characters” performs a critical 
realization and effective “repress[ion]” of “strong feelings” that are “uselessly 
torturing” to herself and others, while still involving their own high emotional pitch as 
Camilla proclaims herself “pitiless, selfish, unnatural!”  In its very extremity, 
Camilla’s statement of shame counteracts the “selfish” and irrational indulgence of her 
suffering, placing a limit on sensibility that is fuelled by the force of its own “strong 
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feelings.”  While the pressure of externally imposed “imperious shame” harbors a 
“danger menacing her intellects” and “impetuous sensibility” equally threatens her 
reason, shame here begins to mix critical capacities with the fervent feeling that 
Camilla craves, simultaneously quelling and satisfying parts of her “faulty … desire.”  
 Camilla’s shifting self-expression, with the productive accumulation of mixed 
emotions and reflective insights it entails, formally unfolds over the course of the 
vision through the amassing of separate, quoted statements of the “I”; but the 
developments of the “I” also take place amid the odd choir of free-floating voices that 
Burney adds to the scene.  The inquiring voices suggest traces of the unjust, 
“imperious shame” that hounds Camilla, and indeed much of the charge of the vision 
derives from their eerie incarnation of censorious public opinion.  But just as the 
palpable splintering of Camilla’s voice conveys affective gains, so does the tense 
push-and-pull between her own utterances and the dictates of others that increasingly 
seem to be shaping them.  By the time Camilla pens her “guilty characters,” the voices 
have closed in, moving from commands in “a voice hollow, deep, and distant” to a 
“voice [that] assailed her, so loud, so near, so terrible” and finally “[a] force unseen, 
yet irresistible” that prods her own writing hand.  Yet the content of those “guilty 
characters” reveals not a self possessed by invasive social forces but an individual 
remembering the fair claims of others and beginning to repair the damage of emotional 
self-absorption.  In both content and form, the interplay of Camilla’s first-person 
“characters” and the ambiguously detached voices surrounding them perform a 
delicate balancing of personal desire and self-definition with the affective sensitivity 
to the differences and demands of others that shame can enable.  
 While not nearly so resounding as the booming voices that take Camilla to task 
or her own vibrant replies, a third voice, that of the narrator, hovers about the vision.  
The heroine’s voicing of her shame—reverberating off its articulation by others—
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keeps her from being frozen in a solipsistic posture of pain; the narrator’s presence 
contributes the additional effect of keeping her shame itself from becoming too fixed.  
Camilla’s “guilty characters” contain a scathing self-condemnation, a “glaring” 
scenario of shame lent weight through the heroine’s own words.  Once written, 
however, these words uncannily lift off the page, while Camilla’s head, which “would 
have sunk upon the guilty characters,” instead follows their “illuminated” flickering.  
If still a gripping sight, such imagery suggests a different order of spectacle than that 
of the sentimental continuity of scenario, body, page, and voice that transparently 
relays a heroine’s unchanging interior emotion.  The loosening of shame that is 
implied by such a material display—even as Camilla proclaims her guilt—is partly 
amplified by what she is saying: Camilla’s self-indictment reveals a dawning 
enlightenment that works to mitigate her worst faults of reason and desire through her 
unblinking recognition and statement of them.  The extreme expression of her shame 
thus offers the very means of its dissipation.  But the shameful label is further 
destabilized by how Camilla says it: the narrator specifies that “her own hand 
involuntarily grasped a pen of iron” to write these “guilty characters,” giving an 
involuntary quality to the heroine’s utterance that inflects its content, opening a space 
where Camilla can simultaneously claim and resist her shame.  In staging a shame that 
can be adamantly maintained yet still incompletely accepted by the heroine, Burney 
deviates from the sentimental model of emotional self-definition premised on the 
heroine’s emphatic ownership and display of her feeling.  At the same time, Burney 
bridges the sharp rupture between an oppressive, permanent scenario of shame and 
complete interior rejection of it that constitutes the sole relation to disgrace for a 
heroine like Clarissa.  The vision entertains a spectacular form of humiliation with 
changeable and uncertain content that can allow unlikely self-vindications, as well as 
strong affective investments in faulty—but not hopelessly fallen—versions of the self 
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and in others perceived as able to accept, even want, that flawed self.  Such 
possibilities galvanize Camilla’s subsequent reconnections with others, best captured 
when she finally reunites with her estranged fiancé at the novel’s end: far from 
invoking the once-desired “talisman which can erase from my own remembrance that 
you have thought me unworthy,” she now insists they linger together on the delicious 
detailing of “my imprudencies—my rashness—my so often-erring judgment . . . and 
so apparently, almost even culpable conduct” (900, ellipses in original).  
 In Camilla, Burney conceives a heroine who is neither irreproachable nor 
hopelessly ruined, refining a structure of competing, variously condemning and 
absolving voices that can keep shame present and at play.  The self-consciousness 
with which Camilla’s visionary self-examination transpires as an insistent scene of 
writing suggests that its negotiations between sensibility and shame intersect with a 
number of tensions prominent in Burney’s own craft at this point in her career—
between first- and third-person narration, the gothic and realist mode, sensationalism 
and satirical commentary.  Perhaps the most pressing concern for the novelist, though, 
is simply how to imagine a malleable signifier of shame that could issue from one’s 
own pen: so it would seem in light of Burney’s own reflective account of her literary 
travails in her 1814 preface to The Wanderer.  In the preface, dedicated to her father, 
Burney bemoans the negative “force of denomination” of “the term Novel,” and the 
trend for the novel “necessarily, and in its changeless state, to be branded” as 
shameful, “sunk lowest in literary estimation.”16  The force of such inflexible shame, 
as Burney recalls, had actually driven her to burn the first novel manuscripts she ever 
wrote:  
 
So early was I impressed myself with ideas that fastened degradation to this 
class of composition, that at the age of adolescence, I struggled against the 
                                                
16 Frances Burney, The Wanderer, or Female Difficulties (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2001), 8, 7. 
Further references will appear in the text. 
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propensity which, even in childhood, even from the moment I could hold a 
pen, had impelled me into its toils; and on my fifteenth birth-day, I made so 
resolute a conquest over an inclination at which I blushed, and that I had 
always kept secret, that I committed to the flames whatever, up to that 
moment, I had committed to paper. (8) 
Yet such destructive blazes of all-consuming shame are short-lived for the aspiring 
author: while the sacrificial texts include an epistolary manuscript never to be fully 
recovered—“the imaginary ashes of Caroline Evelyn, the mother of Evelina”—
another rises from the remains: “The passion, however, though resisted, was not 
annihilated: my bureau was cleared, but my head was not emptied; and, in defiance of 
every self-effort, Evelina struggled herself into life” (8).  Burney’s characters manage 
to “struggle” out of their author’s shame, and blushing heroines like Evelina and 
Camilla in turn model transitory, vivifying encounters with possible “degradation” that 
reflect back on the novelist’s own.  Just as Camilla moves past the sentimental fantasy 
that her death—“the early ashes of your erring, but adoring daughter”—must eradicate 
her disgrace, Burney embraces her own proximity to shame that does not require the 
“imaginary ashes” of her literary offspring.   
Such an embrace seems partly enabled, in the preface to The Wanderer, by 
redefining the proper stakes and source of the novelist’s shame: “If then, even in the 
season of my youth, I felt ashamed of appearing to be a votary to a species of writing 
that by you, Sir, liberal as I knew you to be, I thought condemned . . . how much 
deeper must now be my blush,” Burney asks, if she cannot achieve in her novels the 
kind of moral and aesthetic quality that even “an exterior the most frivolous may 
enwrap” (8-9).  Shifting focus from a novel form “branded” in “its changeless state” to 
one defined by its content’s “execution” and effects, Burney conjures a blush that is 
both potent and kept at bay, that marks and motivates the marriage of careful craft and 
emotional nuance she wants to claim for her novels (7).  By exposing to her father 
(and, through the published dedication, to the “alluring, but awful tribunal of the 
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public”) her ongoing yet refigured sensitivity to shame, Burney presents her own 
career as an emotional maturation fueled by the fusion of shame and sensibility: “And 
your fortunate daughter, though past the period of chusing to write, or desiring to read, 
a merely romantic love-tale, or a story of improbable wonders, may still hope to 
retain—if she ever possessed it,—the power of interesting the affections, while still 
awake to them herself, through the many much loved agents of sensibility” (8, 9).  
Burney’s personal account reveals a cultural climate in which novelists like Austen 
might feel the weight of “degradation” crushing their desire to publish, but also might 
find in shame a form of “passion” that could accommodate “resist[ance]” without 
“annihila[tion]” or—in the terms used by the Monthly Magazine—could somehow 
“repress” and still “cherish” the perceived excesses of sensibility and its novelistic 
manifestations. 
 
“MOST GRIEVOUSLY WAS SHE HUMBLED” 
The persistent spectacle of the humiliated heroine has troubled Austen 
scholarship.  Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick suggestively articulates part of this trouble, 
though she does not frame it in relation to shame specifically, when she points out the 
prevalence of the Austenian spectacle of the “Girl Being Taught a Lesson.”17  
Sedgwick locates the challenges posed by this spectacle partially in the texts 
themselves—in “the chains of reader relations constructed by the punishing, girl-
centered moral pedagogy and erotics of Austen’s novels”—but much more so in the 
relations that readers have tended to impose on their encounter with the spectacle 
when accessing it through limiting conceptual frameworks shaped by the repressive 
hypothesis.18  Sedgwick sees the limitations of the repressive hypothesis in the eager 
                                                
17 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, “Jane Austen and the Masturbating Girl,” in Tendencies (Durham: Duke 
Univ. Press, 1993), 125. 
18 Ibid.  
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critical insistence that heroines must repress certain qualities and desires to access 
mature subjectivity, but also in the “avowedly antirepressive” readings that replace the 
heroine with Austen herself as the “girl” being taught a lesson about her own 
repression—readings that depend on “the forcible exaction from her manifest text of 
what can only be the barest confession of a self-pleasuring sexuality.”19   
When critics have specifically addressed the role of shame in the spectacle of 
the “Girl Being Taught a Lesson,” they have found it particularly hard to see 
something other than repression.  Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar exemplify the 
stance of much feminist criticism by reading a pattern of Austen’s heroines being 
“mortified, humiliated, even bullied into sense” as the “necessary accompaniment of 
the surrender of self-responsibility and definition.”20  Austen’s shame can only be 
salvaged, for Gilbert and Gubar, by unearthing an entirely different emotion: a 
“subversive strain,” lurking beneath this “cover story,” in Austen’s “representations of 
a series of extremely powerful women each of whom acts out the rebellious anger so 
successfully repressed by the heroine and the author.”21  Others readers refuse to 
salvage a “cover story” of shame, making it the story.  Marilyn Butler, for example, 
rests much of her assertion of Austen’s conservatism on her two plots: on the one 
hand, the plot of “the Heroine who is Right, [who] acts as a spokesman for 
conservative orthodoxy”; on the other, that of “the Heroine who is Wrong,” and is 
righted through “self-discovery and self-abasement” in “the typical moment of 
éclaircissement towards which all the Austen action tends, the moment when a key 
character abandons her error and humbly submits to objective reality.”22  Susan 
Fraiman indicts shameful submission with similar vigor, focusing on the humiliation 
                                                
19 Ibid., 126. 
20 Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the 
Nineteenth-Century Literary Imagination (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1984), 159, 163. 
21 Ibid., 112, 169. 
22 Marilyn Butler, Jane Austen and the War of Ideas, rev. ed. (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1987), 
166, 176. 
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of Elizabeth Bennet as a disempowering castration that forces her to “largely 
relinquish” her “intellectual confidence and authority.”23  In Fraiman’s account, it 
appears that the steep cost of shame across Austen’s novels can only be countered by 
the reader’s distanced recognition, at the heroine’s expense, “that the female 
protagonist’s humiliation, as much as it advances the romantic plot, also comments 
ironically on this plot and on marriage as a girl’s developmental goal.”24  
While some readers seek to temper the seemingly undeniable repression of 
shame by linking it with subversive anger or ironic distance, Claudia Johnson 
underscores shame’s acute coercions by yoking it to those she sees in sensibility.  In a 
discussion of Austen’s refusal to capitulate to the oppressive literary conventions and 
affective investments of sensibility, especially those related to the suffering and 
demise of a “seduced and abandoned” heroine, Johnson takes pains to defend Austen 
from critics who would view her as “a cold, nasty, ironic woman,” “emotionally 
deficient,” with “a shockingly unladylike failure of feeling.”25  Johnson asserts that 
Austen is, rather, performing “a stunning, deadly serious piece of social criticism” in 
order to disrupt “uncritical acquiescence in the death of ‘lovely woman’” (160).  
Johnson’s defense resonates with the poles of sentimental absorption and “affected 
indifference” that Austen negotiates in her own defense of the novel; however, shame, 
far from offering an alternative affective purchase on the “critical” in Johnson’s 
analysis, emerges only as an extreme punitive form invoked to expose the less 
apparent constraints of sensibility, which are “written into [women’s] own bodies, and 
thus internalized, concealed, and executed from within” (173).  For Johnson sensibility 
is a covert trap—“the affective arena of an ideology oppressive to women”—that 
                                                
23 Susan Fraiman, Unbecoming Women: British Women Writers and the Novel of Development (New 
York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1993), 63. 
24 Ibid., 64.  
25 Claudia Johnson, “A ‘Sweet Face as White as Death’: Jane Austen and the Politics of Female 
Sensibility,” Novel 22, no. 2 (1989): 160, 159.    
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shame’s more histrionic restraints help bring into view: “Because the body of the 
seduced maiden afflicts her for her misdeeds, she need not be punished by any other 
hand, and we need not worry about the inhumanity of the law—the stocks, the 
stonings, or the carts of shame that dragged prostitutes through the streets” (173).  
Johnson additionally casts shame, in its more naturalized guises, as an especially toxic 
component of novelistic disposals of sentimental heroines after their fall, where “the 
deaths of lovely women—through an act of suicide, or, which amounts to a similar 
thing, through a mortal or near-mortal superabundance of remorseful feeling—almost 
always follow this form of disgrace, although death also awaits women of feeling who 
have been wronged by an unfeeling world in less compromising ways” (160).  
Positioning “superabundance of remorseful feeling” as sensibility’s internal, 
psychological equivalent to disciplinary “carts of shame,” one that just as firmly 
clinches violent restraints on women’s bodies and subjectivities, Johnson argues that 
Austen properly refuses “to eroticize female inanition” and “to indulge the hankerings 
of sensibility” (160, 159). 
 Rather than refuse, evade, or condemn shame, though, Austen cultivates a form 
of “momentary shame” that is neither continuous with sensibility, nor set in stark 
opposition to it; instead such shame mediates between problematic extremes of 
sentimental absorption and “affected indifference” across Austen’s oeuvre.  If we 
return, as a case in point, to the recurring humiliations of Catherine Morland when she 
visits Northanger Abbey, which culminate in her climatic “awaken[ing]” through 
“humbl[ing],” we can see how shame offers Austen a way to stage an eroticized 
revision—rather than mere repression—of past errors and indulgences within her 
heroine’s interiority as she undergoes an emotional education.  When Catherine 
encounters Northanger Abbey, her unsuccessful attempts to impose gothic 
conventions on its architecture, objects and inhabitants involve a movement between 
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absorbing interest and shame.  Catherine repeatedly feels she is approaching the re-
creation of the affective intensity of gothic novels in the world surrounding her, only 
to be flustered by the unrelenting banality of her true surroundings—a repeated rebuff 
that immerses her in shameful realizations of her misguided expectations.  One might 
view this constant shaming as simply a repression of Catherine’s desire to translate her 
novelistic investments into a heightened way of experiencing the world.  But we can 
better account for shame, here, as an alternative form of affective intensification.  
Sensations of shame are used by Catherine—and also by Austen—as a valuable way 
of redirecting attention away from gothic delusions to more accessible sources of 
strong feeling, not as a means of absolutely suppressing them.  For example, 
Catherine’s keen surveys of her bedroom at Northanger Abbey suggest a sort of 
interchangeability, or more accurately affinity, in what she seeks—sometimes seeking 
gothic receptacles of horror, sometimes seeking in those same receptacles a revival of 
her shameful miscalculations regarding them, and sometimes moving between one 
motivation and the other.   
At the height of Catherine’s humiliation, after being discovered by Henry 
Tilney in his mother’s room looking for evidence of her murdered or imprisoned body, 
Catherine’s mental lingering on the experience and its consequences reveals an 
interplay between the seemingly absolute conclusion of her previous aims and a 
transformation of them.  The chapter that describes Catherine’s ultimate shaming 
begins with an apparently stark reprimand: “The visions of romance were over. 
Catherine was completely awakened” (136).  But as the passage continues, Catherine’s 
humiliating failure to uncover a degraded victim of a villainous husband’s violence 
morphs into an auto-erotic, self-fashioned spectacle of her own extreme shameful 
exposure.  She redirects many of the gothic elements that have entranced her into a 
hyperbolic perception of “this fatal morning” in which “[h]er folly, which now seemed 
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even criminal, was all exposed to [Henry], and he must despise her for ever” (136-
137).  Turning to the passage in its entirety, and tracing the modulations of voice as it 
progresses, we can see how free indirect discourse, with its layering of voices, 
contributes to the depiction of a seemingly absolute, punitive “awakening” that 
becomes the very material of continued pleasures and interpretive confidence: 
 
The visions of romance were over. Catherine was completely awakened. 
Henry’s address, short as it had been, had more thoroughly opened her eyes to 
the extravagance of her late fancies than all their several disappointments had 
done. Most grievously was she humbled. Most bitterly did she cry. It was not 
only with herself that she was sunk—but with Henry. Her folly, which now 
seemed even criminal, was all exposed to him, and he must despise her for 
ever. The liberty which her imagination had dared to take with the character of 
his father, could he ever forgive it? The absurdity of her curiosity and her 
fears, could they ever be forgotten? She hated herself more than she could 
express. (136-37) 
“The visions of romance were over” appears at first the unambiguous statement of 
oppressive narrative fact.  But the lines that immediately follow register increasingly 
distinctive features of Catherine’s, rather than the narrator’s, voice.  The overwrought 
inflection of “Most greviously was she humbled. Most bitterly did she cry” seems 
firmly located in Catherine’s interiority, which, though visions of romance are 
ostensibly over, seems not to have lost any of its emotive edge.  The ambiguity of 
voice that characterizes free indirect discourse thus creates an ambiguity over who has 
violently pronounced the “visions” “over,” Catherine or the narrator.  Extreme 
statements of violent ends and complete awakenings oscillate, through the contextual 
effects of free indirect discourse, between a punitive shaming voiced by the narrator 
and a shameful reworking of Catherine’s gothic “extravagance” in her own voice.  The 
interpretive demands made by the ambiguity of voice, here, ask the reader to 
distinguish and straddle these positions, as we are invited both to identify and 
variously and unstably to identify with the shamer and the shamed.  Since Catherine 
herself takes on the roles of shamer and shamed, Austen highlights the kind of 
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interpretive finesse that can be attributed to the reader in the process of assigning 
shame, dramatizing how Catherine’s own self-shaming involves her in more active 
forms of interpretive engagement with the novels she has read.  Catherine selectively 
plucks out features of gothic plot, imagery and language, but more appropriately 
applies them to her specific social context than she has previously been able.  She is 
thus defended against the shame assigned by the cultural stereotype of the irrationally 
over-emotive female novel reader, but this defense involves, somewhat paradoxically, 
taking on a shame that asserts her ability selectively and critically to borrow gothic 
tropes of intense female suffering—an ability the narration itself is also showing off. 
Catherine, in effect, picks back up the sentimental letter she had to drop not 
long before.  Austen’s own, earlier defense of the novel centers on a “young lady” 
caught up in her reading who “lays down her book with affected indifference, or 
momentary shame”; Catherine’s explorations of the abbey reenact and round out this 
tableau when she believes she has unearthed something like the coveted “memoirs of 
the wretched Matilda” in her bedroom cabinet.  The scene of discovery begins with 
Catherine making a show of “a most happy indifference,” which is negated by a 
“parting glance round the room” that lands on a promising cabinet, and then a 
“precious manuscript” hidden inside (115, 116).  Catherine, in fact, drops this 
“precious manuscript” twice.  The first instance suggests an overwhelming sensibility: 
when the candle blows out, “Catherine trembled from head to foot,” “[a] cold sweat 
stood on her forehead,” and “the manuscript fell from her hand” (117).  The second 
instance indicates a most unhappy indifference; when Catherine discovers the now 
“detestable papers” are actually devoid of any emotionally engaging content, a mere 
bundle of dry housekeeping records, she accordingly “return[s] them to the same spot 
within the cabinet, with a very hearty wish that no untoward accident might ever bring 
them forward again, to disgrace her even with herself” (118).  Catherine strains to 
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renounce her shame as much as perform her indifference when she lays down these 
disappointingly worthless papers, but her subsequent reveling in her “disgrace,” after 
being discovered by Henry in his mother’s room, reignites the avidly sought spectacle 
of a woman who, if not grieving, is “[m]ost grievously . . . humbled.”    
If Northanger Abbey figuratively revives the discarded sentimental letter 
through Catherine’s climactic shaming, later novels follow in a more literal strain.  
Across Austen’s work, the material letter often functions as the sign of a problematic 
sensibility that the narrative registers, but just cannot let go.  As characters resist and 
reconnect with such letters on shifting affective terms, Austen revises sentimental 
signification into shameful signification that pursues the possibilities of a specifically 
“momentary shame.”  In Austen’s early novels, shameful signification emerges as a 
technique of renarrating the sentimental letter into a spectacle of shame that 
accumulates—and mediates between—other moments of extreme absorption and 
detachment over the course of the plot.  Later works collapse such renarration into an 
even more immediate “momentary shame” through instances of free indirect discourse 
that simultaneously stage the form of a coercive, absolute spectacle of shame and 
loosen any fixed hold of shame, sensibility, or indifference on the heroine, as well as 
the novelist and novel reader.  
In advancing this trajectory of Austen’s work, I treat Northanger Abbey as 
something of a first and last novel.  Its involved publication and revision history—
begun in 1798, posthumously published with Persuasion in 1817, and revised to a 
critically contested extent at various dates along the way—might justify such 
treatment.26  Rather than make firm claims for the dates and types of revision, though, 
                                                
26 Narelle Shaw provides a detailed account of Northanger Abbey’s publication history and the critical 
debates over it, and makes a compelling argument for dating substantial revision as late as 1816 in 
“Free Indirect Speech and Jane Austen’s 1816 Revision of Northanger Abbey,” Studies in English 
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I simply wish to emphasize how Northanger Abbey highlights a particularly explicit 
linking of shame to the novelistic conventions of sensibility that becomes more muted 
as Austen’s career continues, while it also gestures at the centrality of free indirect 
discourse to effects of “momentary shame” more characteristic of Austen’s late 
novels.  Northanger Abbey’s self-reflexive, innovative spectacles of shame vividly 
counter the critical commonplace of dismissing shame as repression in Austen’s work; 
they additionally complicate the approach of critics such as D. A. Miller who have 
insightfully explored a more productive role of shame in Austen’s style.  For Miller, 
the great achievement of “Austen Style” is an “anonymous, impersonal, universal 
narration” that thrives on “catch[ing] . . . out” its characters “in an embarrassing 
peculiarity from which it is, by its very status, free.”27  Miller thus reads Austen’s 
narration as a vital form of shame management—especially of her “failed, or refused, 
but in any case shameful relation to the conjugal imperative”—but it is a management 
that relies on eradicating signs of shame in the realm of narration, keeping them firmly 
fixed to characters who perform the social constraints and inevitable humiliations of 
personhood, particularly that of a female person (27).  Northanger Abbey is 
positioned, in his argument, as a rough patch on the road to a style most perfected in 
Emma: “but even here, where it has not yet attained the full purity of its impersonality, 
Austen Style is already decidedly neuter, as though it were on an exemption from 
‘sex’—in the old-fashioned sense (appropriate for the epoch) of both gender and 
sexuality—that this impersonality is most crucially founded, developed, secured” (33).  
What Miller’s account leaves out, however, and what Northanger Abbey can 
particularly help to retrieve, is how Austen’s narration might eschew most social 
markers of “Woman,” but still persistently announces and affiliates itself with a 
                                                
27 D. A. Miller, Jane Austen, or The Secret of Style (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2003), 27. Further 
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potentially shameful femininity in the form itself.  Austen’s style, by accentuating its 
implication in the shame of a culturally feminized novel form, and more particularly 
that of increasingly denigrated literary conventions of sensibility, consistently reworks 
while refusing to renounce its “embarrassing peculiarity” of gendered style.  Taking 
Northanger Abbey as an exemplary starting point, we can trace in Austen’s scenes of 
shameful letter reading and writing less a neuter style than one where narrator and 
character each insistently inhabit, in order to rehabilitate, forms of feminized shame. 
After Northanger Abbey, it is Sense and Sensibility among Austen’s works that 
most directly raises the question of what place injured bodies and sentimental 
epistles—and the emotional proclivities that they display and incite—have in the 
novel.  Much like Camilla, the narrative of Sense and Sensibility appears to be 
speeding toward a climactic sentimental sacrifice of its heroine, only to stop short at 
the critical juncture.  Prior to her potentially fatal illness, Marianne Dashwood’s 
incarnations of desperate suffering—her poignant letters to Willoughby—yield only a 
shockingly unsentimental letter in response from her lover.  But when the narrative 
refuses Marianne’s next incarnation of pain, the death she invites as her sole 
consolation, Willoughby finally delivers.  As if materializing magically in the void 
Marianne’s incipient recovery leaves at the narrative’s affective core, Willoughby 
suddenly appears, demanding to meet with Elinor immediately after she has been 
assured of her sister’s safety.  He presents a moving—and deeply moved—sight, but 
one that does not quite take the shape a sentimental enthusiast might expect. Arriving 
quite literally to renarrate both the contents and context of his “impudently cruel” 
letter in response to Marianne’s heartfelt notes, he does so most effectively as a 
spectacle of shame.28  
                                                
28 Jane Austen, Sense and Sensibility (New York: Norton, 2002), 130. Further references will appear in 
the text. 
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The effectiveness of shameful renarration is foregrounded by the false starts 
Willoughby makes leading up to it.  For as Willoughby attempts to redeem his past 
behavior by describing his true circumstances to Elinor, his unfeeling response to 
Marianne’s notes takes on different possible forms: first a display of his actual 
sentimental suffering over her appeals, then a revelation that he was only affecting 
indifference to Marianne’s feelings in his letter.  The glaring shortcomings 
emphasized in both forms—extreme sensibility and exaggerated disengagement—
accentuate their problems as affective responses to another’s pain, but even more their 
pitfalls as narrative responses to sentimental convention.  The epistolary product of his 
affected indifference—of what Willoughby calls “fancying myself indifferent” and 
trying to “affect the air of a cool, common acquaintance”—is especially couched as a 
specimen of bad writing, and particularly of bad women’s writing (231).  “[W]hat do 
you think of my wife’s style of letter-writing?—delicate—tender—truly feminine—
was it not?” he sarcastically asks, revealing to Elinor that his wife produced the entire 
contents of the letter.  “I had only the credit of servilely copying such sentences as I 
was ashamed to put my name to.  The original was all her own—her own happy 
thoughts and gentle diction,” he explains (233).  In forging this insensitive pose, 
devoid of sympathy or shame, Willoughby loses access to authentic self-expression, 
condemning himself to “servilely copying”; he additionally perpetuates prose that he 
suggests would be truly deplorable coming from the pen of a woman, insofar as it 
implies a complete break from any “truly feminine” feeling, “tender[ness],” or “style.”  
The remedy for his letter’s flagrant absence of feeling, however, is not a mere 
reinstatement of the sensibility it lacks.  For the sentimental display itself appears 
lacking when, earlier in their conversation, Willoughby tries to convey to Elinor his 
actual reaction to Marianne’s letters, and fumbles to find the right words:  
 
“When the first of her’s reached me, (as it immediately did, for I was in town 
the whole time,) what I felt is—in the common phrase, not to be expressed; in 
   
72 
a more simple one—perhaps too simple to raise any emotion—my feelings 
were very, very painful.—Every line, every word was—in the hackneyed 
metaphor which their dear writer, were she here, would forbid—a dagger to 
my heart. To know that Marianne was in town was—in the same language—a 
thunderbolt.—Thunderbolts and daggers!—what a reproof she would have 
given me! (230) 
Here the performance of sensibility, like that of insensibility, courts failure, and on 
strikingly similar grounds.  Willoughby again risks “servilely copying,” in this case 
sentimental clichés that smack of the inauthentic because simply too conventional, 
“perhaps too simple to raise any emotion.”  His linguistic expression of intense pain 
suffers from the “common phrase” and “hackneyed metaphor”—concerns that 
similarly inflect Austen’s refusal to ground her novel’s effects in the worn-out image 
of a heroine’s grief-stricken corpse.  Willoughby claims Marianne would disapprove 
of his rote usage, but she has shown herself only too ready to embody a sentimental 
cliché of fatal suffering, revealing a lack of reasoned restraint and also, perhaps worse, 
a lack of real imagination.  Even here, despite Willoughby’s professed tribute to 
Marianne’s “taste,” it is her desire to produce piercing emotional effects that prove her 
a “dear writer” and to experience them in turn that seems to lie at the tired “heart” of 
the matter (230).  The source of Willoughby’s impoverished vocabulary is partly its 
overuse, but also his self-defeating investment in its absolute clarity and impact.  
Always canny about sentimental convention, Willoughby overcompensates where he 
was once found wanting, straining now to guarantee his sensibility through his full 
participation in its strict relational ideal, where any deviation from the epistolary 
suffering of the “dear writer” or from fully replicating it in his response would be a 
breach of sentimental decorum.  The impetus of complete emotional legibility thus 
limits him to trite formulations like “my feelings were very, very painful” or variations 
that also remain too “common” or “too simple to raise any emotion.”  In the wake of 
Northanger Abbey, the insufficient letter in Sense and Sensibility condenses a similar 
binary of forced insensibility and indulgent sensibility that might be two sides of the 
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same counterfeit coin.  The starkness of the binary continues to drive Austen’s search 
for a style that could ring true and truly feminine, one that would not capitulate too 
easily to cravings for emotional extravagance or enact an unfeeling withholding that 
itself constitutes bad social and literary form.  
Willoughby struggles for self-expression when adopting sentimental phrases 
and, even more, when “servilely copying such sentences as I was ashamed to put my 
name to” into the text of his callous letter.  However, when he finally articulates the 
shame that did not make its way into the original text, transcribing for Elinor what he 
had really thought about what he was writing, he starts to lay firmer claim to his 
elusive “I”:  
 
“My business was to declare myself a scoundrel, and whether I did it with a 
bow or a bluster was of little importance.—‘I am ruined for ever in their 
opinion—said I to myself—I am shut out for ever from their society, they 
already think me an unprincipled fellow, this letter will only make them think 
me a blackguard one.’  Such were my reasonings, as, in a sort of desperate 
carelessness, I copied my wife’s words, and parted with the last relics of 
Marianne.” (233) 
In the narration of his intense shame Willoughby defines a self of strong feeling, while 
also stressing a break in this self’s emotional coherence as much as its connection to 
others.  If the phrase “said I to myself” figures one part of this self convincing another 
that it is really “ruined” and “shut out for ever,” the resistant strand ultimately gains 
enough traction to motivate Willoughby’s current appeal to Elinor, an appeal that joins 
his past conviction of complete ruin to a plea for qualified exoneration: “And now do 
you pity me, Miss Dashwood?—or have I said all this to no purpose?—Am I—be it 
only one degree—am I less guilty in your opinion than I was before?—My intentions 
were not always wrong.  Have I explained away any part of my guilt?” (234).  Out of 
the past “I” professing to be resigned to full guilt and alienation comes one who can 
enact a lingering, incomplete sense of his shame as the means of remembering and 
reaching out to others.  Letting go of some “part of [his] guilt” along with the 
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sentimental model that invalidates partial or failed displays of overwhelming emotion, 
Willoughby best achieves his “purpose” by forgoing piercing emotional effects for 
those of circumscribed and uncertain “degree” and “part[s].”  Although Elinor 
responds with appropriate reservations (“Yes, you have certainly removed 
something—a little.—You have proved yourself, on the whole, less faulty than I had 
believed you”), such reserve does not withhold but rather cultivates the 
“compassionate emotion” that she “betray[s]” even as she insists, “You are very 
wrong, Mr. Willoughby, very blameable” (234, 233). 
 When Willoughby shows himself to be “less faulty”—neither a paragon of 
sensibility nor an irredeemable villain—Austen suggests his emotional growth and, 
even more importantly, provides a counterpart to his sentimental spectacle in danger 
of falling flat, but also of working too well (234, italics mine).  That Willoughby’s 
shame can elicit, from its witnesses, an emotional response mixed with measured 
distance ultimately appears a greater benefit than any definitive rescue of his 
character. A too complete absolution of his shame, in fact, presents a potential assault 
on Elinor’s critical capacities: while Willoughby worries about exhausted sentimental 
effects, Elinor worries that “his influence over her mind was heightened by 
circumstances which ought not in reason to have weight” as she finds that 
“Willoughby, in spite of all his faults, excited a degree of commiseration for the 
sufferings produced by them, which made her think of him as now separated for ever 
from her family with a tenderness, a regret, rather in proportion, as she soon 
acknowledged within herself—to his wishes than to his merits” (236).  The possibility 
that Willoughby’s spectacular pain might incite irrational susceptibility informs 
Elinor’s subsequent caution when she relates his visit to those more prone to 
sentimental indulgence: 
 
Had Mrs. Dashwood, like her daughter, heard Willoughby’s story from 
himself—had she witnessed his distress, and been under the influence of his 
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countenance and his manner, it is probable that her compassion would have 
been greater. But it was neither in Elinor’s power, nor in her wish, to rouse 
such feelings in another, by her retailed explanation, as had at first been called 
forth in herself. (247) 
During and immediately after Willoughby’s visit, Elinor especially manages her 
“rouse[d]” feelings and balances compassion with proper judgment by remembering, 
without fixing, Willoughby’s faults.  Reflecting after his departure on the moving 
“circumstances” conveyed by “that person of uncommon attraction,” her critical self-
assertion particularly unfolds as a tug of war between pity and blame (236): 
“Willoughby, ‘poor Willoughby,’ as she now allowed herself to call him, was 
constantly in her thoughts; she would not but have heard his vindication for the world, 
and now blamed, now acquitted herself for having judged him so harshly before” (236, 
237).  “[P]oor Willoughby” and his spectacle of suffering could possibly overtake 
Elinor’s “thoughts,” but “now” remain as an “allowed” indulgence offset by the 
constant wavering in the perceived “degree” of his shame that staves off Elinor’s 
inclinations toward overly harsh or lenient assessments.  
Elinor’s response to Willoughby’s attempted “vindication”—that “now 
blamed, now acquitted herself for having judged him so harshly before”—helps keep 
Willoughby from being too fully condemned or easily absolved, but it also raises a 
secondary register of shame: Elinor’s own.   Focused more on the blame or acquittal 
summoned by Elinor’s mode of judgment than Willoughby’s actions, the prospect of 
shame that here hangs over either too detached or indulgent interpretation returns, 
even more directly than in Willoughby’s self-narration, to the problems of properly 
feminine reading and expression.  Cast from the novel’s start as more the heroine of 
sense than of sensibility, possessing a “strength of understanding, and coolness of 
judgment,” Elinor must also be defended from those who would find such femininity 
“[c]old-hearted” (8, 18).  Marianne gives the most scathing voice to this critique when 
she responds to Elinor’s careful praise of Edward Ferrars: “‘Esteem him! Like him! 
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Cold-hearted Elinor! Oh! worse than cold-hearted! Ashamed of being otherwise’” 
(18).  The novel’s mouthpiece of sensibility conceives of shame as a necessary foe, a 
powerful instigator of her sister’s affected detachment worse than actually being 
“cold-hearted.”  Far from the force of excessively repressed feeling, however, Elinor’s 
keen sensitivity to shame—both others’ and her own—enables the revival of her 
interest in cases, like that of Willoughby, where sense and reason might otherwise 
dictate the suppression of any emotional softening.  Functioning as a surrogate reader 
throughout much of the novel, as she does during Willoughby’s self-account, Elinor 
models the productive possibilities of witnessing another’s shame while not losing 
sight of one’s own.  As Sense and Sensibility thematizes and tackles the problem of 
affected indifference and affective indulgence, Austen posits that sense, as much as 
sensibility, might find its best form in concert with shame, providing a mode of 
impassioned critical reading.  
The blame that subtly shifts, in Sense and Sensibility, from Willoughby’s 
emotional displays to Elinor’s ways of reading them anticipates a more decisive 
emphasis in Austen’s following novels on heroines who simultaneously embody and 
evaluate the spectacle of shame.  By collapsing the positions of spectacle and witness 
into her humiliated heroines, Austen continues to approach shame as a feeling with 
particular potential for the feminine performance of emotion and also pursues the 
possibilities of shameful reading only hinted at through Elinor.  Elizabeth Bennet’s 
rereading of Darcy’s letter in Pride and Prejudice, which spurs reevaluations of 
others’ shame but most powerfully a “mortifying” review of her own, provides an 
especially self-conscious example of Austen exploring how shame can not only 
command a reader’s attention but also motivate a thoughtful revision of one’s 
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interpretive practices.29  Another heroine of avowed sense, Elizabeth possesses a quick 
wit and “liveliness of … mind,” but also evinces Elinor’s brand of “coolness of 
judgment” that risks verging on the “[c]old-hearted” (288).  In interpreting 
correspondence, Elizabeth proves herself especially attuned to—and repulsed by—
false emotional notes: when she hears the “high flown expressions” of Caroline 
Bingley’s letter to Jane, for example, the declarations of “the pain of separation” 
requiring a “very frequent and most unreserved correspondence” only yield, in the 
shrewd heroine, “all the insensibility of distrust” (79-80).  Such ready “insensibility” 
might be well-adopted in Caroline’s case, but Austen also explores the affective and 
indeed intellectual dangers of erecting an overly severe guard against emotional 
vulnerability.  For instance, when Jane recounts in a letter to Elizabeth her own 
eventual recognition of Caroline’s hurtful hypocrisy, “[t]his letter gave Elizabeth some 
pain; but her spirits returned as she considered that Jane would no longer be duped”: 
the cold comfort of critical insight appears to compromise, to some extent, even 
Elizabeth’s sympathy for her sister’s genuine epistolary displays of pain (100).   
It is Elizabeth’s determination not to herself be “duped” by Darcy—her 
concerted, if not fully successful, efforts to sustain “all the insensibility of distrust” 
toward him early in their acquaintance—that especially gets her into interpretive 
trouble.  Even when Darcy’s proposal and his subsequent letter begin to chip away at 
her adamant impassivity and the mistaken condemnations of him that it fuels, 
Elizabeth resists any sympathetic inclinations, and she does so especially by refusing 
to see in Darcy anything but shame.  When reflecting on Darcy’s “gratifying” 
declaration of love after his first, failed proposal, Elizabeth bolsters herself against 
nascent “pity” by dwelling on the unremitting culpability she has mistakenly assigned 
                                                
29 Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice, 3d ed. (New York: Norton, 2001), 135. Further references will 
appear in the text. 
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to him: “But his pride, his abominable pride, his shameless avowal of what he had 
done with respect to Jane, his unpardonable assurance in acknowledging, though he 
could not justify it, and the unfeeling manner in which he had mentioned Mr. 
Wickham, his cruelty toward whom he had not attempted to deny, soon overcame the 
pity which the consideration of his attachment had for a moment excited” (128).  In 
trying to ward off the mortification of finding herself “duped,” Elizabeth affects a 
detachment that, Austen suggests, actually fixates on keeping all shame firmly pinned 
on the “shameless” and “unpardonable” Darcy, while rejecting any that should rightly 
land on herself.  When Elizabeth is next confronted with Darcy’s letter and its 
undeniable impact—the “contrariety of emotion [it] excited”—she again employs the 
tactic of trying to reduce Darcy’s words to a text of his thoroughgoing shame: 
“steadfastly was she persuaded that he could have no explanation to give, which a just 
sense of shame would not conceal” (134).  In her detailed presentation of the 
rereadings and reassessments of the letter that follow, however, Austen revises her 
heroine’s aversion to shame, suggesting that it is not a rebuff but a redistribution of 
shame that can enable a savvy reader like Elizabeth to better achieve the critical 
insight and authority she seeks.   
Elizabeth’s barrier of “insensibility” to Darcy’s letter first breaks down, 
though, not through her own shame, but instead through a sharp stab of emotional 
pain: during her first reading of the letter, as she proceeds from Darcy’s discussion of 
Jane to that of Wickham, Elizabeth ricochets from a determined cultivation of 
indifference into extreme suffering reminiscent of Willoughby’s similarly abrupt 
oscillation in Sense and Sensibility, and even conveyed in strikingly similar terms: 
“her feelings were yet more acutely painful and more difficult of definition.  
Astonishment, apprehension, and even horror, oppressed her” (135).  Feelings 
“acutely painful” might jolt Elizabeth out of an unjust implacability toward Darcy, but 
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at the risk of “oppress[ing]” and overwhelming her.  The narration further evokes the 
threat of its own overwhelming, as its language hearkens back to Willoughby’s 
floundering display of sensibility, positioned as a tired sentimental retread of “the 
common phrase, not to be expressed” and “a more simple one—perhaps too simple to 
raise any emotion—my feelings were very, very painful.”  Attempting to infuse new 
emotion into the narrative, as much as the heroine, Austen’s style registers anxiety that 
this form of pain could imperil not just the character’s rational agency, but her own 
distinctive narrative voice.  Austen, as much as Elizabeth, appears eager to resist the 
passivity of “acutely painful” feelings by quickly pushing the letter out of sight: “She 
wished to discredit it entirely . . . and when she had gone through the whole letter, 
though scarcely knowing any thing of the last page or two, put it hastily away, 
protesting that she would not regard it, that she would never look in it again” (135).  
Yet following the pattern of the “young lady” who “lays down her book with 
affected indifference” established in Northanger Abbey, the forcefully discarded letter 
does not stay put for long, and shame prompts its resuscitation.  Here the attempt to 
spurn the letter is particularly short-lived, for “it would not do; in half a minute the 
letter was unfolded again, and collecting herself as well as she could, she again began 
the mortifying perusal of all that related to Wickham, and commanded herself so far as 
to examine the meaning of every sentence” (135).  As mortification edges out acute 
pain as her dominant response, Elizabeth emerges from  “oppress[ion]” to a 
developing, if incomplete, “command” of her still highly emotional analysis of the 
letter.  Yet in edging out the predominance of pain, shame does not erase it, nor any of 
the other feelings that variously wax and wane under the auspices of a “mortifying 
perusal” of the letter.  Elizabeth’s increasing vulnerability to her own shame 
constantly recalibrates her perspectives on the letter’s content and the characters of 
those with which it is concerned; as the “mortifying perusal” circulates the shame once 
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affixed to Darcy—now to herself as well as Wickham—she recognizes her implication 
in an emotional and analytic inflexibility, one of the type Elinor avoids through her 
sensitivity to the waverings of both Willoughby’s and her own shame.  While Elinor 
“now blamed, now acquitted herself for having judged [Willoughby] so harshly 
before” to avoid the repetition of such harshness, Elizabeth is revealed to have 
distributed the extreme of each pole—of blame and acquittal—to Darcy and 
Wickham, respectively, at the expense of seeing either—or herself—clearly.  Beyond 
keeping Elizabeth from reading Darcy correctly, her careful postures of “insensibility” 
in fact have aggravated her emotional susceptibility to Wickham in the guise of 
injured innocence, a lapse in judgment emphasized when Elizabeth realizes that “[s]he 
could see him instantly before her, in every charm of air and address; but she could 
remember no more substantial good than the general appropriation of the 
neighborhood” (136).  Spurring a new consciousness of how uncritically she had let 
herself fall into both extremes, mortification also offers Elizabeth the possible means 
to mediate between them. 
If Elizabeth’s growing sense of shame puts her feelings about others into a 
productive flux, it also verges, at points, on fixing herself in their place.  The 
“mortifying perusal” of Darcy’s letter risks ending in a retraction of her excessive 
condemnation of him, only to plant it too “absolutely” on herself: “She grew 
absolutely ashamed of herself.—Of neither Darcy nor Wickham could she think, 
without feeling that she had been blind, partial, prejudiced, absurd” (137).  However, 
when these thoroughly “mortifying” feelings appear poised to “oppress” the heroine as 
much as her earlier “acutely painful” ones, the narration suddenly shifts into a style 
that once again announces an affinity to sentimental convention, but in a much less 
anxious vein.  The bulk of the narration of Elizabeth’s varied responses to Darcy’s 
letter takes third-person omniscient form; when Austen reaches the height of 
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Elizabeth’s shame, though, she renders it in a first-person voice that comes closest to 
sentimental epistolary form:  
 
“How despicably have I acted!” she cried.—“I, who have prided myself on my 
discernment!—I, who have valued myself on my abilities! who have often 
disdained the generous candour of my sister, and gratified my vanity, in 
useless or blameable distrust.—How humiliating is this discovery!—Yet, how 
just a humiliation!—Had I been in love, I could not have been more 
wretchedly blind. But vanity, not love, has been my folly.—Pleased with the 
preference of one, and offended by the neglect of the other, on the very 
beginning of our acquaintance, I have courted prepossession and ignorance, 
and driven reason away, where either were concerned. Till this moment, I 
never knew myself.” (137) 
 By departing from key elements of sentimental style—even as its privileged form of 
passionate self-narration is invoked—Austen enacts a revision of the sentimental ideal 
of absolute emotional coherence and possession as the means of self-definition.  The 
insistent repetition of Elizabeth’s “I” stages a different structure of interiority, where 
parts of a mutable self can be brought into productive relation through shame.  While a 
heroine like Clarissa Harlowe must mourn when she feels split by shame that “I, my 
best self, have not escaped!” Elizabeth can proclaim at the “moment” of mortification 
“Till this moment, I never knew myself.”   
This famous phrase encapsulates the particular form of shame that Austen 
embraces across her oeuvre as a mode of self-knowledge, rather than debilitating self-
abasement—a form of shame that does not fully determine interior content and that 
distinguishes between aspects of the self without severing them from each other.  
Austen conveys this form of shame through Elizabeth’s pairing of a present-tense “I,” 
emerging from a dawning sense of shame, with a “myself” of the past that is now 
revealed to have been devoid of shame until this enlightening “moment.”  The 
passage’s culminating assertion of an “I” with newfound knowledge of “myself,” to 
which that past self was “never” privy, marks the final incarnation of this formal 
strategy placing the present “I” next to—neither fully identical with nor alienated 
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from—the temporally and affectively receding version of “myself.”  Through the 
interplay of these selves, Austen creates a formal space of self-examination where the 
shamed and shameless versions of the self coexist, so that neither is ever fully fixed as 
absolutely shameful.  Turning her critical eye from others onto herself, Elizabeth’s 
shamed “I” casts “myself” as something of an other, and her first inclination is to 
adamantly pronounce herself “despicable.”  As the incriminating evidence unfolds, 
however, the real culprit becomes harder to define.  Elizabeth’s “I,” on the one hand, 
is distanced from shame even as it catalogues its many “humiliating” faults, for in so 
doing the “I” starts to display a “discernment” over which it might now justifiably 
show some “pride,” and “abilities” on which it might now properly place some 
“value.”  If the emerging “I” is thus strangely shielded from some of the circulating 
shame by its very recognition of it, Elizabeth’s once-shameless “myself” might, on the 
other hand, appear positioned to now take more of shame’s brunt.  But to the extent 
that the excesses of “myself” invite a long-overdue shaming, they also offer a sort of 
protection from it.  As Elizabeth lingers on an overly “gratified . . . vanity” and a 
complete “prepossession and ignorance” rendered truly shameless by being kept intact 
and impervious to shame for so long, she embeds within the “moment” of intense 
shame the vivid memory of parts of “myself” particularly resistant to its force.   
The form of Elizabeth’s shame thus enables a critical detachment that 
recognizes and addresses her past “folly” without ushering in the “oppression” of 
fixed shame or overwhelming alienation from oneself and others.  This particular 
stance allows Elizabeth to continue gleaning “knowledge” from her “folly,” along 
with some of its cherished indulgences.  The possibilities for both new knowledge and 
continued pleasures contained in “this moment” of Elizabeth’s “humiliation” evoke 
the structure of enhanced memory that Fisher finds in the rich “moment” of shame.  
As we have seen, the “moment” of shame, for Fisher, can move one away from an 
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extreme of extrasocial self-absorption, even as it avoids subsuming the individual in a 
“universalized and pervasive social existence.”  Shame does this by forcing one to 
remember the demands of others and the restrictions of “social consciousness” more 
generally, while also allowing one to remember what it was like briefly to forget them.  
Shame thus contains a “moment” of potentially pleasurable yet distanced retrospection 
that also exposes a solipsistic spectacle of the past self with “an almost theatrical 
visibility to any and all who happen to be nearby”—a spectacle made newly 
conspicuous, for the shamed individual at least, at the instant that its fascinating self-
absorption dissipates into shameful self-consciousness.  In staging such a “moment” 
for Elizabeth, Austen especially emphasizes the autoerotic frisson of not just knowing 
but seeing “myself” anew through the illuminating hindsight of shame.  For only at the 
instant of shameful recognition does Elizabeth fully apprehend the “prepossession and 
ignorance” she had unwittingly, yet assiduously “courted” as she had “driven reason 
away” like an unwanted suitor.  The imagery treats Elizabeth’s past “vanity,” now 
fully exposed, as something of a lost “love” toward which she casts a longing, 
departing look. 
 Far from a last look, however, Darcy’s letter and the versions of past selves 
refracted through it are reviewed once again by Elizabeth and Darcy at the successful 
end of their courtship.  At the point of romantic closure, when Elizabeth finally 
accepts Darcy’s marriage proposal, the narrative also revives the “mortifying” letter as 
a source of pleasurable indulgence as much as shameful memory.  From Darcy’s 
perspective the resurgent letter looks an intractable memento of “unpardonable” words 
and “conduct” that are “inexpressibly painful” for him to recall: “I hope you have 
destroyed the letter,” he declares (239, 240).  While Elizabeth concurs that she is 
“most heartily ashamed” of events surrounding the letter, she does not concede to 
Darcy’s solution (240).  After facetiously answering that “[t]he letter shall certainly be 
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burnt,” she counters with a proposal for its deliberate revision rather than destruction:  
 
“But think no more of the letter. The feelings of the person who wrote, and the 
person who received it, are now so widely different from what they were then, 
that every unpleasant circumstance attending it, ought to be forgotten. You 
must learn some of my philosophy. Think only of the past as its remembrance 
gives you pleasure.” (240)   
At first a seemingly grand gesture of purging the past of “every unpleasant 
circumstance” by completely erasing memories of pain and shame, Elizabeth’s 
“philosophy” in fact imagines a form of “remembrance” in which the traces of shame 
are part of what “gives . . . pleasure.”  Elizabeth’s previous “moment” of shame has 
checked, yet still sustained self-indulgent extravagance by refusing to entirely forget 
its possibility; this “philosophy” of pleasure further loosens the hold of shame itself, 
while clinging to the memory of possible shame that animates the very intensity of 
present pleasure.  Insofar as Elizabeth’s conjuring of pleasurable “remembrance” 
thrives on recognizing differences—on detailing how “[t]he feelings of the person who 
wrote, and the person who received it, are now so widely different from what they 
were then”—the differentiating force of shame is a significant contributing factor, 
even if the distance to be marked is from an excessively shameless version of the self 
and one overly susceptible to shame.  Rather than desiring to return to her previous 
state of blissfully shameless “blind[ness]” and “ignorance,” Elizabeth knowingly 
relishes the imaginative agency of a self-conscious and willful, and hence necessarily 
partial, fantasy of forgetting “every unpleasant circumstance” that could impinge on 
the authority of the self.  Indeed the letter appears to be reintroduced and further 
revised at this late point in the narrative to signal how far one can come from the 
prospect of an overpowering, destructive humiliation without losing connection to its 
form—a self-conscious novelistic remaking of shame that for Austen, much like 
Burney, has implications for novelist and novel reader, “[t]he feelings of the person 
who wrote, and the person who received it.” 
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 As Austen’s humiliated heroines eagerly take up letters in the novels that 
follow Pride and Prejudice, Austen takes up and elaborates the concern with which 
Pride and Prejudice ends: that the intensity of pleasure, as much as pain, can 
constitute an engrossing sensibility.  In The Mysteries of Udolpho Radcliffe articulates 
the widely held view that sensibility’s “dangerous quality” is “continually extracting 
the excess of misery, or delight, from every surrounding circumstance” so that “we 
become the victim of our feelings, unless we can in some degree command them” (79-
80); in Mansfield Park Fanny Price becomes just such a “victim” of inordinate 
“delight” in a scene of reading that links the heroine’s attempt to balance desire and 
“duty” to particularly self-reflexive ruminations on the novelist’s temptations and 
limitations.30  Shortly after Edmund Bertram leaves Fanny with the welcome gift of a 
necklace and an unfinished note from him to accompany it, but also the unwelcome 
news that she is only one of his “two dearest objects . . . on earth,” Fanny braces 
herself with the “intention, as she felt it to be her duty, to try to overcome all that was 
excessive, all that bordered on selfishness in her affection for Edmund” (181).  But the 
tokens of Edmund’s own affection, especially in the form of a letter, quickly upset “all 
these good resolutions on the side of self-government”:  
 
[S]he seized the scrap of paper on which Edmund had begun writing to her, as 
a treasure beyond all her hopes, and reading with the tenderest emotion these 
words, “My very dear Fanny, you must do me the favour to accept”—locked it 
up with the chain, as the dearest part of the gift.  It was the only thing 
approaching to a letter which she had ever received from him; she might never 
receive another; it was impossible that she ever should receive another so 
perfectly gratifying in the occasion and the style.  Two lines more prized had 
never fallen from the pen of the most distinguished author—never more 
completely blessed the researches of the fondest biographer.  The enthusiasm 
of a woman’s love is even beyond the biographer’s.  To her, the hand-writing 
itself, independent of any thing it may convey, is a blessedness.  Never were 
such characters cut by any human being, as Edmund’s commonest hand-
writing gave!  This specimen, written in haste as it was, had not a fault: and 
                                                
30 Jane Austen, Mansfield Park (New York: Norton, 1998), 181.  Further references will appear in the 
text. 
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there was a felicity in the flow of the first four words, in the arrangement of 
“My very dear Fanny,” which she could have looked at for ever. (181-182) 
If Fanny finds in Edmund’s letter a form “perfectly gratifying in the occasion and the 
style,” its impact appears to derive heavily from the “gratifying” fantasy of a perfect 
match between form and content.  Such an ideal, as we have seen, drives sentimental 
signification: a heroine like Clarissa ardently cultivates—and proffers for her readers’ 
emulation—the unadulterated signification of her interior suffering, while a 
sentimental reader like Adeline avidly submits to textual signs of another’s unrelenting 
misery that just as completely designate the emotional content of her responsive 
interiority.  In a similar fashion, Fanny “seize[s]” on a signifier that can define her—
“My very dear Fanny”—and which she is eager to absolutely claim.  The phrase offers 
a “specimen” that “had not a fault” partly to the extent that it delineates a version of 
herself that could faultlessly submit to her passionate “affection” for its writer, while 
considering herself, with unmitigated delight, equally “dear” to him.  The compelling 
material quality of the “hand-writing,” the fascinating “cut” of the “characters,” thus 
seems to emerge less from the ostensibly irrelevant nature of the content (from a form 
“independent of any thing it may convey”) than from a signifying form so well-cut to 
fit Fanny’s desire and to fabricate her uncompromised pleasures that she fervidly 
overlooks any gaps between form and content.  
As Fanny reads her “prized” letter, the delights and more implicit problems of 
her susceptible sensibility are cast in an increasingly linguistic, even literary vein.  The 
narrator contrasts the qualities of a private letter with those of a published text: “Two 
lines more prized had never fallen from the pen of the most distinguished author.”  But 
the distinct effects that the narrator attributes in this passage to something 
“approaching to a letter” also resonate with those of the novelistic sentimental 
epistolary form that both troubles and entices Austen.  The narration teems with a 
longing, approaching envy, for a style that would be experienced by a reader as 
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“perfectly gratifying,” having a transparency and immediacy of signification that 
incites investments analogous to “the enthusiasm of woman’s love.”  But insofar as 
such “enthusiasm” involves the suspension of critical judgment—here Fanny’s refusal 
to recognize the obstacles complicating this perfect signifier’s suggestion that she is 
singularly “very dear”—it is a fantasy of faultlessly gratifying reading that both Fanny 
and the narrator will only indulge for so long.  Fanny subsequently leaves the room of 
her private reading and “resume[s] her usual employments” at Mansfield Park 
“[h]aving regulated her thoughts and comforted her feelings by this happy mixture of 
reason and weakness” (182).  If Fanny’s “reading [of Edmund’s note] with tenderest 
emotion” is her moment of “weakness,” the shameful reading of herself that leads up 
to it appears to add the dose of “reason” to the mix.  However, this depiction of 
Fanny’s humiliating self-review before she “seize[s] the scrap of paper” achieves its 
own “happy mixture of reason and weakness” in the moment of shame, which itself 
blends aspects of sentimental gratification with the exercise of self-conscious 
reflection and restraint.  
 Immediately before plunging herself wholeheartedly into Edmund’s 
wonderfully flawless note, Fanny reads herself and her real relation to Edmund with a 
more discriminating eye, undertaking a careful process of precise self-narration.  The 
interior content that emerges within the “confines of her imagination” appears to 
require signifiers much more shameful than “dear”: 
 
It was her intention, as she felt it to be her duty, to try to overcome all that was 
excessive, all that bordered on selfishness in her affection for Edmund.  To call 
or to fancy it a loss, a disappointment, would be a presumption; for which she 
had not words strong enough to satisfy her own humility.  To think of him as 
Miss Crawford might be justified in thinking, would in her be insanity.  To her, 
he could be nothing under any circumstances—nothing dearer than a friend.  
Why did such an idea occur to her even enough to be reprobated and 
forbidden? It ought not to have touched on the confines of her imagination.  
She would endeavour to be rational, and to deserve the right of judging of Miss 
Crawford’s character and the privilege of true solicitude for him by a sound 
intellect and an honest heart. (181) 
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Looking for “words strong enough to satisfy her own humility,” Fanny undertakes a 
vigorous self-abasement, grappling with seemingly irrefutable signs of her shame.  A 
space of indulgent excess also appears, though, different from the delights of reading 
herself in Edmund’s “prized” letter: here this space contains the pleasures of 
entertaining an ostensibly self-defining signifier that is not completely owned, that 
never quite affixes itself to one’s interiority with full force.  While Fanny conjures 
words meant to capture her “own humility,” they instead reveal the extent to which her 
sense of shame is compromised, not just leaving room for but even producing 
shameless resistance.  When Fanny pushes the designation of her “presumption” to the 
more scathing label of “insanity,” for example, the passage’s castigating diction starts 
to court its own extravagance, and also illuminates the fleeting appearance of a 
transgressive “idea” (that she could be something “dearer than a friend”) that should 
be completely “reprobated and forbidden” from her mind, yet clearly is not.  By 
filtering Fanny’s shame through what appears to be the character’s own carefully 
chosen yet constantly shifting words, Austen accentuates how Fanny can 
simultaneously, incompletely impose and escape the dictates of her social “duty” 
though the self-conscious invocation of stark yet capacious forms of shame. 
 Austen’s use of free indirect discourse raises the further possibility that even 
some of these words signifying Fanny’s shame might not be her own.  The ambiguity 
of voicing in free indirect discourse is especially highlighted, in this instance, by the 
suggestion that Fanny nurses a “presumption; for which she had not words strong 
enough to satisfy her own humility.”  The subsequent labeling of her shame, 
particularly the stamp of her “insanity” and proclamation that certain shameless 
thoughts “ought not to have touched on the confines of her imagination,” thus flirts 
with the force of the narrator’s authority to mark her as unequivocally shameful, while 
the constant swells and ebbs of Fanny’s idiolect destabilize any simple, complete 
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representation of her extreme shame as an established narrative fact.  The layering of 
voices allows Austen to “satisfy” various shaming functions at once—to evoke the 
form of a punitive, definitive humiliation that still seems to waver in the degrees of its 
actual interior emotional content.  Harnessing an effect of renarration similar to that 
spread over pages in Sense and Sensibility and squeezed into the phrasal relation 
between “I” and “myself” in Pride and Prejudice, free indirect discourse condenses 
such renarration of a character’s possible selves into single signifiers of emotional 
states that are variously inflected by the different plausible sources of their 
articulation.   
While the narrator’s vocal presence thus disrupts the emotional consistency 
characteristic of sentimental self-narration, it does not deaden the impact of Fanny’s 
emotional display.  The imagery of the passage figures the “confines of [Fanny’s] 
imagination” as a material expanse, one vulnerable to being “touched” along its 
shifting “border[s].”  The spectacle is particularly animated by the prospect of shame 
that exposes interiority and especially “all that was excessive, all the bordered on 
selfishness.”  Shame thus accentuates, for Fanny and for the reader, the sight of 
trespassing words and ideas that, unlike those of the sentimental spectacle, flicker 
most tangibly at the moment they are being “reprobated,” “forbidden,” and expelled 
from the “confines of her imagination.” Austen’s use of free indirect discourse further 
materializes the contents of Fanny’s mind by asking the reader to demarcate, much 
like Fanny herself, the exact “confines of her imagination.” The presence of the 
narrator’s voice thus constructs a personal voice for the heroine that invites rapt 
attention not through its direct address and transparent immediacy, but through a 
“quality of now-you-see-it, now-you-don’t” that, as Dorrit Cohn aptly describes, 
“exerts a special fascination” because the “dubious attribution of language to the 
figural mind” combined with the “fusion of narratorial and figural language charge[s] 
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it with ambiguity.”31  By staging shame in this narrative form, as she often does in her 
later novels, Austen heightens the compelling quality of the spectacle of shame while 
further destabilizing its emotional contents, enabling her to retain yet significantly 
rework the coveted emotional impact of something “approaching to a letter.”  Austen’s 
persistently humiliated heroines offer a hermeneutic model of reading with a “happy 
mixture of reason and weakness,” while also providing the spectacle of a shamed 
interiority that is vividly but incompletely exposed and defined and thus entices 
readers to look closely and think critically as they negotiate ambiguous attributions of 
shame. 
While Fanny finds a “mixture of reason and weakness” within her moment of 
shameful self-reflection, she still eagerly “seize[s] the scrap of paper” afterwards as if 
a deserved indulgence, a fair reward for her exertions.  The heroines of Emma and 
Persuasion similarly work through stretches of shame, rendered to a great extent in 
free indirect discourse, to gain, at the end, a deeply gratifying letter.  For all the 
marked differences between Emma Woodhouse and Anne Elliot, the affective 
trajectories of their stories coincide at this point.  Emma discovers in Frank 
Churchill’s final letter, which clarifies his past actions and the details of his secret 
engagement, a text that “must make its way to Emma’s feelings . . . As soon as she 
came to her own name, it was irresistible; every line relating to herself was interesting, 
and almost every line agreeable.”32  Anne finds in Frederick Wentworth’s declaration 
of love “a letter [that] was not to be soon recovered from” that brings “an 
overpowering happiness.”33  In her final novels Austen seems ready to grant pride of 
place to the delightful letter within the affective structure of the narrative, invoking it 
                                                
31 Dorrit Cohn, Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction 
(Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1978), 107. 
32 Jane Austen, Emma, 3d ed. (New York: Norton, 2000), 291. Further references will appear in the text.   
33 Jane Austen, Persuasion (New York: Penguin, 2003), 223. Further references will appear in the text.   
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as a means of resolution more than a problem to be solved.  But in so doing, the 
narrative “seize[s]” on the pangs of shame each letter faintly revives almost as eagerly 
as its pleasures.  In Persuasion, Wentworth’s love letter is positioned to eradicate all 
traces of Anne’s sustained “silent, deep mortification” over their relationship—
especially the devastating mortification of learning that Wentworth had called her 
“[a]ltered beyond his knowledge” (57).  Such complete erasure of shame is entertained 
and resisted, however, when Wentworth reiterates to Anne that “to my eye you could 
never alter” shortly after she has read his letter: “Anne smiled, and let it pass,” but 
rather than let the prevarication fully stand, the heroine and narrator linger on the 
pleasure that is augmented by the resurgence of shameful memories now blended with 
the moment of newfound bliss: “It was too pleasing a blunder for a reproach.  It is 
something for a woman to be assured, in her eight-and-twentieth year, that she has not 
lost one charm of earlier youth; but the value of such homage was inexpressibly 
increased to Anne, by comparing it with former words, and feeling it to be the result, 
not the cause of a revival of his warm attachment” (228).   
In a similar manner, Emma finds Frank Churchill’s letter “irresistible” on first 
reading, despite its being “a most mortifying retrospect” for its writer that also touches 
on numerous shameful lapses in Emma’s past behavior and judgment (289); upon 
subsequent review, though, when Knightley reads the letter and comments aloud to 
Emma on its most striking parts, the vestiges of shame attract particular notice.  
“Frank Churchill’s confession of having behaved shamefully was the first thing to call 
for more than a word in passing,” followed by the imminent reemergence of Emma’s 
own mortifications: “Emma knew that he was now getting to the Box-Hill party, and 
grew uncomfortable. Her own behaviour had been so very improper! She was deeply 
ashamed, and a little afraid of his next look. It was all read, however, steadily, 
attentively, and without the smallest remark; and, excepting one momentary glance at 
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her, instantly withdrawn, in the fear of giving pain—no remembrance of Box-Hill 
seemed to exist” (293).  Knightley ends with a focus on the phrase “Happier than I 
deserve”—a state that seems to resound for these readers, bound by the “momentary 
glance” of shame, as much as for the original author (294).  Of all of Austen’s scenes 
of shameful renarrating and rereading, Emma’s circulation of the “mortifying” letter 
between varied readers who each reinflect the text to illuminate the fluctuating shame 
and “happi[ness]” of others and themselves perhaps best captures the dynamics of 
Austen’s novelistic shaming “glance.”  In scope it takes in the ostensible spectacle of 
shame, the humiliated protagonist, and through this spectacle opens onto others—her 
readers, her literary predecessors and contemporaries, and even herself; in form it 
reimagines the bounds of convention to transmute the look of someone “pain[ed]” or 
“deeply ashamed” into the “momentary glance” of shame “instantly withdrawn” yet 
leaving a palpable, reanimating mark.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
“HALF ASHAMED OF BEING CAUGHT IN THE MELTING MOOD”:  
SHAME AND SENTIMENTALITY IN VANITY FAIR 
 
 
The author indulges in no sentimentalities—inflicts no fine writing 
on his readers. Trusting to the force of truth and humour, he is the 
quietest of contemporary writers,—a merit worth noting in a literary 
age which has a tendency to mistake spasm for force. . . . Mr. 
Thackeray grows serious and pathetic at times—but almost as if he 
were ashamed of it, like a man caught in tears at the theatre. 
 
—George Henry Lewes, review of Vanity Fair in The Athenæum (1848) 
 
SHAMEFUL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 
Does Vanity Fair have an emotional problem?  The acute self-consciousness of 
William Makepeace Thackeray’s novel, generally lauded as its great aesthetic merit, 
nonetheless appears to come at a steep emotional cost.  George Levine, for example, 
dubs Vanity Fair “one of the most self-conscious books written in the period,” with 
the result that “the satire edges toward contempt” and adopts a commonly “ironic, one 
might almost say, embittered, tone.”1  In recent readings of Vanity Fair, the novel’s 
“self-consciousness” proves malleable, connoting a wide-ranging, heightened critical 
awareness of social and, especially, literary conventions.  But across such readings, 
self-consciousness consistently entails emotional detachment, whether in the form of a 
contempt that repulses connections—with individuals, the text, or the social world, 
more broadly—or of a more thoroughgoing waning of any emotional interest.  
Contempt, at least, provides some affective charge, especially when set next to the 
nearly complete diminishment of emotion that other readers attribute to the novel’s 
self-consciousness, especially that of its ironic and extremely intrusive narrator.  For 
Barbara Hardy, the narrator consistently “criticizes everyone, including himself, for 
                                                
1 George Levine, How to Read the Victorian Novel (Malden: Blackwell, 2008), 60, 65. 
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vain feeling,” such that “all emotions are contaminated in Vanity Fair.”2  Robyn 
Warhol makes Vanity Fair exemplary of her concept of distancing narrating strategies 
(a mode opposed to engaging strategies), based on the novel’s “ironic distance . . . 
between the actual reader and the contents of the text,” a distance which she attributes 
to extreme “self-conscious artifice” and the ways in which “the narrator obviously 
disavows any faith in straight-faced, earnest sentimentality.”3  As Warhol’s analysis 
suggests, emotional investment, on its side, tends to take the specific form of 
sentimentality, such that critics view Vanity Fair as pitting its critical and detached 
self-consciousness against an excessively emotive and attached sentimentality.  As 
Wolfgang Iser declares in his influential 1974 reading of the novel, the reader is made 
“perfectly miserable” by Vanity Fair, and Thackeray, withholding the “flood of 
sympathy” incited by an author like Charles Dickens, only alleviates such misery 
through a “predominantly intellectual appeal to the mind of the reader.”4  This 
pervasive sense of the novel’s stark opposition between foolish feelings and detached 
analysis has left us miserable ever since.  
If Vanity Fair has an emotional problem, it has been felt perhaps most sharply 
as a concomitant problem of gender ideology.  Contextualizing the novel within 
Victorian debates on reading, Kate Flint connects its gendered rupture between critical 
detachment and sentimental over-identification to a binary understanding of masculine 
rationality and feminine emotional susceptibility at work in the culture at large.  
                                                
2 Barbara Hardy, Forms of Feeling in Victorian Fiction (London: P. Owen, 1985), 85-6. 
3 Robyn R. Warhol, Gendered Interventions: Narrative Discourse in the Victorian Novel (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1989), 90, 41, 93. 
4 Wolfgang Iser, The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communication in Prose Fiction from Bunyan to 
Beckett (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1974), 116, 113.  Iser takes the term misery from an 
instance of the narrator’s direct address in Vanity Fair: “Are there not moments when one grows sick of 
grinning and tumbling, and the jingling of cap and bells? This, dear friends and companions, is my 
amiable object—to walk with you through the Fair, to examine the shops and the shows there; and that 
we should all come home after the flare, and the noise, and the gaiety, and be perfectly miserable in 
private” (190). William Makepeace Thackeray, Vanity Fair (New York: Norton, 1994).  Further 
references will appear in the text. 
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Vanity Fair, she concludes, ultimately accords little analytic prowess or interpretive 
agency to emotive, feminized characters and narratees: “to read well, for Thackeray, 
was to read as a man.”5  The novel’s self-conscious narration thus perpetuates a 
culturally potent Victorian gender division: Flint argues that, for Thackeray, “it is men 
who . . . have the capacity to develop the arts of self-irony and self-criticism, and to 
adopt the varied perspectives which the narrative tone of Vanity Fair encourages 
throughout.”6  She further asserts, “the mode of reading which Thackeray most 
admires and wishes to promote is one which does not deny readerly pleasure, but 
which goes hand in hand with a capacity to stand back from too close, too emotional 
an involvement with fictional characters and situations.”7  While Flint allows for some 
“readerly pleasure” in Thackeray’s model of masculine reading, she also echoes other 
critics’ alignment of self-conscious narration with disrupted affective interest, linking 
“a degree of literary self-consciousness” in the narrator’s intrusions to an “air of 
knowing, if fatigued, wisdom tinged with nostalgia” and “world-weary questions.”8   
Thus, by many recent critical accounts, as the extreme self-consciousness of 
Vanity Fair responds to the charged affective interest associated most specifically with 
feminized sentimentality, it either creates the emotional detachment of contempt, or it 
deflates any substantial emotional investment.  But what if we consider self-
consciousness as itself a highly charged affective mode, one with the potential to 
mediate between critical detachment and sentimental absorption?  In common usage, 
after all, one indeed feels self-conscious.  If we understand self-consciousness as 
emotion, rather than its necessary antagonist, then shame—as a central feeling, if not 
the definitive feeling, of self-consciousness—becomes particularly relevant to our 
                                                
5 Kate Flint, “Women, Men, and the Reading of Vanity Fair,” in The Practice and Representation of 
Reading in England, eds. James Raven, Helen Small, and Naomi Tadmor (New York: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 1996), 262.  
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid.  
8 Ibid., 248-49. 
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understanding of Thackeray’s self-conscious style.  The heightened self-consciousness 
of shame evinces an awareness of the self recognizing and relating to the conventional 
as it comes into conflict with it—an affective form that might disrupt absolute 
identification with others, but that does not necessarily sever emotional ties.  Yet the 
critical self-consciousness of social and literary conventions commonly attributed to 
Vanity Fair has been most often understood in opposition to emotion, or at least to 
emotional attachments.  While Thackeray’s readers have productively explored the 
significant tension between critical detachment and sentimental indulgence in his 
oeuvre, a neglected connection, between self-consciousness and shame, also 
importantly shapes his work.  In the discussion that follows, I pursue this connection, 
arguing that Vanity Fair’s oft-noted social and literary self-consciousness is infused 
with the affective intensities of embodied self-consciousness figured as shame, 
particularly as feminized shame.      
Recognizing Thackeray’s fixation on feminized shame complicates perceptions 
of his work as dismissively rejecting feminized emotion’s analytic and aesthetic 
potential.  Vanity Fair does indeed problematize sentimentality, associating it with 
both dangerously absorbing feminine spectacle and a feminized mode of unreflective, 
overpowering affective engagement.  The novel’s depiction of intense, feminized 
emotion is not limited to sentimentality, however.  Thackeray explores shame as a 
feeling that, though it can be deployed sentimentally, also offers the potential to 
negotiate sentimentality’s most troubling aesthetic and affective features.  The 
shameful woman especially figures shame’s risks and possibilities in Vanity Fair.  
Within the world of the novel, shame facilitates moments of emotional reconnection 
and re-evaluation, mediating between characters’ tendencies toward sentimental 
delusion and critical disengagement.  Thackeray portrays shame as a form of 
heightened self-awareness that does not necessarily dissolve emotional ties, whether to 
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aesthetic objects, to specific individuals, or to society; and such shameful self-
consciousness extends beyond characterization within the plot, figuring emotive yet 
analytic registers of narration and readerly engagement as well.  Thackeray’s narrator 
suspects sentimental spectacles, but rather than violently distance himself from the 
emotive woman, he finds in shameful spectacles a more appealing model for his own 
desired rhetorical effects—revisionary effects, designed to produce intense and 
immediate emotional impact and draw on accumulated interpretive insight.  The 
shamed woman in Vanity Fair thus figures both effective narration and desired reader 
response.  The novel’s famously self-conscious narrative strategies, particularly direct 
address to the reader that draws attention to the conventions of literary production and 
reception, function stylistically to expose a shameful narrator and reader.  We might 
therefore better describe the mode of literary engagement valorized by the novel not as 
“to read as a man,” but to read as a woman—specifically a shameful woman. 
Shameful self-consciousness complicates the binary understanding of 
sentimentality and critical detachment pervasive not only in criticism of Vanity Fair, 
but in recent debates on sentimentality more generally.  Feminist criticism has been 
particularly active in reclaiming sentimentality as an affective and aesthetic mode that 
both warrants critical attention and can itself offer a valuable mode of critical analysis.  
Yet while sentimentality has been a major topic of debate in readings of nineteenth-
century American literature and culture, studies of its nineteenth-century British 
context have been relatively few, with discussion of the sentimental tending to focus 
on eighteenth-century British sensibility.9  Critics continue to highlight the need for 
                                                
9 June Howard provides a useful overview of studies of sentimentality in nineteenth-century America in 
“What Is Sentimentality?” American Literary History 11, no. 1 (1999): 63-81.  Studies of sensibility, 
sentimentality and sentimentalism in eighteenth-century Britain include: G.J. Barker-Benfield, The 
Culture of Sensibility: Sex and Society in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 
1992); Barbara M. Benedict, Framing Feeling: Sentiment and Style in English Prose Fiction, 1745-
1800 (New York: AMS Press, 1994); Claudia L. Johnson, Equivocal Beings: Politics, Gender, and 
Sentimentality in the 1790s: Wollstonecraft, Radcliffe, Burney, Austen (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago 
Press, 1995); and Janet M. Todd, Sensibility: An Introduction (New York: Methuen, 1986).  
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greater attention to British Victorian sentimentality, in terms of both its historical 
specificity and its relevance to sentimentality as a broader modern phenomenon.10  My 
reading of Thackeray’s negotiation of sentimentality through shame attempts to meet 
this need by expanding our conception of significant Victorian emotions beyond 
sympathy and sentimentality to shame.  When shame surfaces in discussions of 
sentimentality—as it invariably does, though usually in passing—it is normally 
aligned with the critical contempt against which the writer wishes to defend 
sentimentality.11  Rather than defend sentimentality against shame, I propose a defense 
                                                
10Miriam Bailin argues that “the critical organizing principles that have provided common points of 
departure in discussions of eighteenth-century British or nineteenth-century American sentimental 
fiction do not adequately account for the Victorian British variety” in “‘Dismal Pleasure’: Victorian 
Sentimentality and the Pathos of the Parvenu,” ELH 66, no. 4 (1999): 1015.  A 2007 special issue on 
“Rethinking Victorian Sentimentality” highlights the continuing need for studies of sentimentality 
focused on Victorian British culture, with Nicola Brown arguing “to open up public discussion of an 
aspect of Victorian culture that is too often ignored or maligned (even if surreptitiously enjoyed in 
private)” in “Introduction: Crying Over Little Nell,” 19: Studies in the Long Nineteenth Century 4 
(April 2007): 2.  For additional studies of Victorian sentimentality, see Philip Davis, “Victorian Realist 
Prose and Sentimentality,” in Rereading Victorian Fiction, eds. Alice Jenkins and Juliet John (New 
York: St. Martin’s, 2000); Howard Fulweiler, “‘Why, Tears! Is It? Tears’: Gerard Manley Hopkins and 
Victorian Sentimentality,” Thought: A Review of Culture and Idea 65 (1990): 486-93; Fred Kaplan, 
Sacred Tears: Sentimentality in Victorian Literature (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1987); Laurence 
Lerner, Angels and Absences: Child Deaths in the Nineteenth Century (Nashville: Vanderbilt Univ. 
Press, 1997); and Winfield H. Rogers, “The Reaction Against Melodramatic Sentimentality in the 
English Novel, 1796-1830,” PMLA 49, no. 1 (1934): 98-122.  
11 Robert C. Solomon’s “In Defense of Sentimentality” positions itself most directly against contempt 
and disdain of sentimentality, arguing that the widespread current contempt of sentimentality—in 
philosophy as well as in the culture at large—is “an extension of that all-too-familiar contempt for the 
passions in Western literature and philosophy. Our disdain for sentimentality is the rationalist’s 
discomfort with any display of emotion, warranted as well as unwarranted, appropriate as well as 
inappropriate” (226).  However, his essay exemplifies how a defense of sentimentality that is ostensibly 
against contempt can easily slide, at times, into a defense against shame and embarrassment, seen as 
necessary extensions of such contempt. He argues, for example, that “the fact that [sentimentality] may 
make for some very bad art and literature should not be used to encourage our embarrassment at 
experiencing these quite natural sentiments or to discourage those sentiments themselves” (243).  
Deborah Knight makes a similar elision between what she sees as a “near universal condemnation” of 
sentimentality and its evocation of embarrassment and disgrace: “But as we continue with the standard 
philosophical story, we find that sentimentality is not just unseemly; it is disgraceful.  Any public or 
excessive display of emotion should, it seems, embarrass us” (411, 414).  Some of the critics who have 
focused on revaluing Victorian sentimentality, more specifically, similarly align condemnation and 
shame, casting shame as a primarily repressive force that blocks our full critical appreciation of and 
access to sentimentality. Nicola Brown, for example, argues that “Victorian sentimentality is easy to 
identify, and just as easy to condemn. It has been harder, though we may fall prey to its lures in our own 
reading and viewing, to speak about it critically yet sympathetically” (1).  When Brown turns to a 
reading of Little Nell’s death scene, shame is squarely set in opposition to sentimental feeling: “its 
power lies in its ability to make us feel, and if it does not do that, it is not doing what Dickens has set 
out to do. He wanted to make his readers cry, and I have little doubt he wept himself. There is no 
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of sentimentality through shame.  The complex aesthetic interaction of shame and 
sentimentality in Vanity Fair demands a more thorough theorization of why shame so 
insistently hovers around sentimentality, one that distinguishes shame’s function from 
that of dismissive contempt.  In the following readings of the shame, sentimentality, 
and literary self-consciousness at work in Thackeray’s essays of the 1840s 
(particularly “Going to See a Man Hanged”) and, especially, in Vanity Fair (1847-48), 
I hope to show how such distinctions can enrich studies of Victorian emotions and 
aesthetics as well as broader, interdisciplinary considerations of sentimentality’s 
fraught status.  
 
“SPOKEN FACE TO FACE WITH THE READER”  
 
Granted, that there is a something faulty, which we seek to denote 
by the term, it may be worthwhile to endeavour to define the 
accusation, before considering whether the works in question are 
bound to plead guilty to it, or not. Sentimentality is not simply an 
excess of passionate feeling, for its chief characteristic is feebleness 
rather than strength of any kind. . . . On the whole, difficult as it is 
to seize the precise meaning of “winged words,” it would perhaps 
be tolerably near the mark to say, that sentimentality is not merely 
an exaggeration of feeling, unregulated by reason, and ludicrously 
incommensurate with the triviality of its object; but, further—and 
this is an essential part of it—that it is an indulgence of feeling for 
feeling’s sake; that lives in an atmosphere of fancy, and collapses 
instantaneously, if brought into contact with the actual; in a word, 
that it is a caricature of really strong deep feeling.  
 
—Anonymous reviewer, North British Review (1851) 
 
While “sentimentality” entered British usage in the late eighteenth century in 
response to the “cult of sensibility,” the term continued to accrue cultural relevance, 
                                                                                                                                       
shame, in my view, in finding this passage extremely moving: it is sentimental and it should make its 
readers feel sentimental feelings” (11).  Brown further implies an opposition between embarrassment 
and the capacity to like or enjoy sentimentality when she asks: “Do you ever find yourself coming over 
all sentimental? And if you do, do you like it, or do you feel embarrassed by your sentimental 
proclivities?  Is sentimentality a pleasurable indulgence, a minor vice, or a lapse of aesthetic and moral 
taste?” (1).  See Robert C. Solomon, “In Defense of Sentimentality,” in Emotion and the Arts, eds. 
Mette Hjort and Sue Laver, eds. (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1997); and Deborah Knight, “Why 
We Enjoy Condemning Sentimentality: A Meta-Aesthetic Perspective,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 57, no. 4 (1999): 411-20. 
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and a sharp pejorative edge, well into the next century.12  As with “sensibility” in the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and “sensationalism” later in the nineteenth 
century, in the term “sentimentality” there coalesced diverse and indeterminate mid-
nineteenth-century anxieties over feminized emotional extravagance and 
susceptibility.  As the anonymous reviewer suggests in the pages of the North British 
Review quoted above, though it generally might be “granted” at the time “that there is 
a something faulty” hovering around sentimentality, the nature of these faults was not 
nearly so clear.13  Working prolifically as a journalist in the 1840s, Thackeray engaged 
in the search for those “bound to plead guilty” to sentimentality, displaying his own 
sense of sentimentality’s most troublesome infractions of style and ethics.  In his 1845 
essay “Picture Gossip,” in Fraser’s Magazine, Thackeray’s art-critic persona Michael 
Angelo Titmarsh assigns guilt with “the prize of a new silver teaspoon.”14  Bemoaning 
“illustrious examples” at the London art exhibition of  “a love for lollipops with a 
vengeance, a regular babyhood of taste” and “drivelling hysterical sentimentality,” he 
pits two rival “champion[s] of suffering female innocence” against each other for his 
“namby-pamby” award (451, 452, 453, 452).  His critique of the painters focuses on 
manipulatively formulaic depictions of miserable women, whose emotive physical 
gestures are paired with obtrusive pathetic signals (such as “a most tremendous black-
edged letter” and “‘Home, sweet home!’ . . . open in the music-book”) (452).  
Disturbed by the forced and unambiguous emotional legibility of these scenarios, he 
asks, “Is not there something naïve and simple in this downright way of exciting 
compassion?” (452).  And yet, he notes, “I saw people looking at this pair of pictures 
with yearning hearts. The great geniuses who invented them have not, you see, toiled 
                                                
12 See Todd, 8.  
13 “Recent Works of Fiction,” North British Review 15 (1851): 419-20. 
14 William Makepeace Thackeray, “Picture Gossip,” Fraser’s Magazine 31 (June 1845), in Ballads and 
Miscellanies (New York: Harper, 1899), 451.  Further references will appear in the text.   
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in vain. They can command the sympathies of the public” (452).  Thackeray’s 
suspicion of trite yet moving artistic convention contains a fear of the excessive 
vulnerability of a “yearning” and “melt[ing]” viewer, subject to the artist’s 
“command”: 
 
I have said before I am growing more inclined to the pathetic daily, but let us 
in the name of goodness take a stand somewhere, or the namby-pamby of the 
world will become unendurable; and we shall melt away in a deluge of 
blubber. This drivelling hysterical sentimentality, it is surely the critic’s duty to 
grin down, to shake any man roughly by the shoulder who seems dangerously 
affected by it, and, not sparing his feelings in the least, tell him he is a fool for 
his pains, to have no more respect for those who invent it, but expose their 
errors with all the downrightness that is necessary. (452-53) 
At stake, here, are the emotional contours of the “critic’s duty,” presented as an 
aggressive assault on sentimental excess.  The “critic’s duty” is not, however, to reject 
outright the feelings in question—compassion, sorrow, and pity—or the paintings’ 
subject matter.  Thackeray contrasts the “namby-pamby” pictures with “pictures 
indicating a fine appreciation of the tragic sentiment,” in response to which “the 
spectator gives his compassion the more readily because the unfortunate object makes 
no coarse demands upon his pity” (454).  For Thackeray, fulfilling the “critic’s duty” 
depends upon recognizing when a work of arts’ “demands” on the viewer are “coarse” 
and attempt to elicit an overly docile response in the consumer.  
 While Thackeray easily lambasts “drivelling hysterical sentimentality” in 
“Picture Gossip,” his attitude toward sentimentality becomes more defensive and 
ambivalent when he adopts—also in the pages of Fraser’s—a position vulnerable to 
just such an attack.  Thackeray’s personal account of witnessing a public execution in 
his 1840 essay “Going to See a Man Hanged” culminates in the confession “that the 
sight has left on my mind an extraordinary feeling of terror and shame” and the wish 
“that it may soon be out of the power of any man in England to witness such a hideous 
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and degrading sight.”15  Anticipating charges of sentimentality, Thackeray recognizes 
that “many persons, and well-informed newspapers, say that it is mawkish sentiment 
to talk in this way, morbid humanity, cheap philanthropy, that any man can get up and 
preach about” (157).  He even ventriloquizes the potential insult of “Away with your 
foolish sentimentalists” (157).  The “critic’s duty” shifts, in this case, toward 
defending a sentimentality that is set in opposition to the “tremendous sarcasm” and 
insensitivity that he notes in other newspaper accounts of the event (157).  At the same 
time, Thackeray attempts to ward off the taint of the “mawkish,” “morbid,” and 
“cheap” in his approach, even as he acknowledges them as specters haunting any 
sentimental scene.  Thackeray finds himself unable to rest securely in the position of 
rational “critic,” recognizing his additional roles as emotively responsive viewer and 
linguistic re-creator of the tragic spectacle in his detailed report of the hanging.   He 
may wish to remove such an execution from public view, doubting the claim that it is 
socially “beneficial,” but he also raises the possibility of its beneficial linguistic 
representation for the public, suggesting gingerly that “the next useful thing must be a 
full description of such a ceremony, and all its entourages, and to this end the above 
pages are offered to the reader” (156).  Providing a “full” and “useful” account of the 
execution means, for Thackeray, emphasizing individualized emotional response.  A 
list of questions follows that apply to Thackeray’s personal experience, but also to the 
reader’s textually mediated access to the violent spectacle: “How does an individual 
man feel under it—In what way does he observe it,—how does he view all the 
phenomena connected with it,—what induces him, in the first instance, to go and see 
it,—and how is he moved by it afterwards?” (156).  For Thackeray, sentimentality 
raises the issue of not just what should occur, but how one should respond to and 
                                                
15 William Makepeace Thackeray, “Going to See a Man Hanged,” Fraser’s Magazine 22 (1840): 156. 
Further references will appear in the text. 
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represent experience—issues that inflect Thackeray’s literary realism as well.  
 Before turning my attention to Vanity Fair, then, I want briefly to explore 
Thackeray’s sentimentality in “Going to See a Man Hanged,” in order to highlight the 
main emotional and formal features that Thackeray ascribes to a sentimental spectacle, 
and to pinpoint those features that especially trouble him.  “Going to See a Man 
Hanged” pointedly illustrates what will be even more pertinent to our focus on shame 
in Vanity Fair: how invoking shame allows Thackeray to negotiate the risks of 
sentimentality—its “mawkish,” “morbid,” and “cheap” strands—instead of merely 
dispensing with it completely.  If sentimentality works as an affective mode of 
spectacular identification that produces intense, immediate emotional effect, in 
Thackeray’s essay the value of such effect is weighed against an array of potential 
problems, social and aesthetic, arising from it—problems related especially to 
individualized subjectivity, aesthetic convention, and reflective narrative temporality.  
Thackeray seeks to stave off the extreme of “drivelling hysterical sentimentality” by 
portraying the public execution as a “sight [that] has left on my mind an extraordinary 
feeling of terror and shame,” and by representing the sight with a similar affective aim 
on the reader (italics mine).  Shame emerges as an alternative affective mode that 
productively interacts with sentimentality—associated here with terror-fueled pity—
and mediates between excessive sentimentality and callous detachment.  
Early in the essay, long before the execution itself is described, Thackeray 
recalls the “gallows-shock” of simply confronting the instrument of death (151).  The 
gallows looms as an instrument of death but also an instrument of affect, and 
Thackeray incorporates it as such into his own text, which combines description and 
visual illustration to reproduce the experience of his arrival at the execution site:    
 
 It is twenty minutes past four as we pass St. Sepulchre’s: by this time many 
hundred people are in the street, and many more are coming up Snow Hill. 
Before us lies Newgate Prison; but something a great deal more awful to look 
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at, which seizes the eye at once, and makes the heart beat, is 
 
 There it stands black and ready, jutting out from a little door in the prison. 
As you see it, you feel a kind of dumb electric shock, which causes one to start 
a little, and give a sort of gasp for breath. The shock is over in a second; and 
presently you examine the object before you with a certain feeling of 
complacent curiosity.  (151) 
The gallows and their attendant “gallows-shock” starkly embody sentimentality’s 
mode of spectacular identification—an identification that has two facets. The first 
facet is an affective response of emotional equivalence that is registered on the body.  
The dramatic visual spectacle of the gallows—“which seizes the eye at once, and 
makes the heart beat”—produces in the spectator an emotional identification with the 
future victim’s terror and pain so complete that one “give[s] a sort of gasp for breath,” 
as if also being hanged.  The spectator’s complete emotional identification with the 
victim relies on the ability easily and unambiguously to identify the victim’s feelings.  
Accordingly, the second facet of sentimentality’s spectacular identification is a system 
of signification that makes its emotion clearly identifiable: as in the spectator’s terror-
charged “gasp for breath,” interior emotion is given a corresponding, highly legible 
form, often the overwrought spectacle of a transparently emotive body placed within a 
broader affective scenario that further reveals and reinforces the emotion.  The 
spectator’s responsive body becomes an additional corresponding and transparent 
form, proof of proper identification of and with the victim’s interior feelings. 
 Sentimentality’s privileged mode of spectacular identification overlaps with 
that we have seen in conceptualizations of sympathy and sensibility.  Much like Adam 
Smith’s paradigmatic example of “our brother . . . upon the rack,” used to model 
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sympathy at the height of its effect, the gallows here allows for little representational 
and responsive wiggle room, violently forcing an alignment between the affective 
scenario, signifying bodies, and interior emotional content.16  Where Smith’s 
hyperbolically constrictive structure of the rack provides a scenario that pins the 
victim’s signifying body into an extremely visible and legible place with a limited 
range of likely emotional responses, virtually ensuring terror and suffering as both the 
victim’s and spectator’s near-identical responses, Thackeray’s gallows goes further, 
envisioning an affective structure so clear and coercive that the victim’s signifying 
body need not even be present for the scenario to grab the spectator’s eyes, heart and 
throat.  His illustration’s strikingly empty and minimally detailed gallows reinforces 
the sense of automatic and universal effect, as if any body easily could be inserted into 
the barest outline of its emotional grasp.17  Thackeray’s representation of the gallows 
forcefully conveys that, like sympathy, sentimentality presents an overwhelming 
affective demand on the individual.  In “Going to See a Man Hanged,” the rational self 
is imagined as invaded by a “dumb electric shock,” defying language and thought, 
while the individualized self seems doomed to blend indistinctly into the scenario’s 
universalizing spectacle and the other spectators forming a similarly responsive crowd.  
Throughout the essay, Thackeray’s attention is divided between the towering gallows 
and the “dense” mob of spectators, ominously increasing in size and closing in around 
him as the time of the execution approaches.   
                                                
16 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002), 11. 
17 Alison Byerly points out that the illustrated gallows is “not an elaborate, cross-hatched engraving like 
most of Thackeray’s illustrations, but a dark, geometric blot that arrests the reader’s eye just as its 
original had arrested Thackeray’s” to “bring us into the text with him” (56).  While Byerly reads the 
gallows and execution as a broader figure for aesthetic spectacle, she focuses on a binary distinction 
between theatricality and antitheatricality that she traces through Thackeray’s works, arguing that 
Thackeray’s stark revelations of deceptive theatricality in culture undercut its illusions, creating a 
“tension between aesthetic spectacle and harsh reality” that makes “his readers feel befouled by the 
sense that they are participants in the spectacle they have just witnessed” (56, 85). Alison Byerly, 
Realism, Representation and the Arts in Nineteenth-Century Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 1997). 
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While sentimentality shares sympathy’s aura of a dangerous loss of self in 
one’s sensitivity to others’ feelings, it more distinctively presents another anxiety, one 
that arises in response to an excessive presence of the self, in the form of emotional 
self-indulgence at others’ expense.  Thackeray’s “gallows-shock” registers this aspect 
of sentimentality through an after-shock most striking in its evacuation of affective 
affinity as completely and suddenly as its initial incitement: “The shock is over in a 
second; and presently you examine the object before you with a certain feeling of 
complacent curiosity,” he writes.  When a capacity for critical reflection—to not only 
feel but “examine”—enters the sentimental scene, sentimental susceptibility rubs 
uncomfortably close to self-serving complacency that could become a self-indulgently 
detached “curiosity” regarding “the object.”  Thackeray’s repeated staging of such 
disturbing oscillations, within himself and the larger crowd, between sentimental 
submission and a potentially callous detachment resonates with discussions of 
sentimentality—past and present, castigating and recuperative—which invariably tend 
to hinge on the issue of self-indulgence.  We see this issue at work in the effort to 
define sentimentality’s faults in the North British Review, which generates a string of 
complaints—“exaggeration of feeling, unregulated by reason, and ludicrously 
incommensurate with the triviality of its object”—building up to the “essential part” of 
“an indulgence of feeling for feeling’s sake.”  More recently, Miriam Bailin’s 
examination of sentimentality in Victorian culture usefully borrows a term from 
Dickens to cast the problem as a “selfish reference” that constantly imperiled the 
Victorian ideal of absolute and pure sympathetic identification.  Bailin finds in 
sentimentality “the stringency of the Victorian standard for univocal feeling and 
vigilant censorship required to achieve it,” exemplified when the narrator in The Old 
Curiosity Shop insists on the selflessness and purity of Little Nell’s sympathy with 
two reunited sisters: “Let us not believe that any selfish reference—unconscious 
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though it might have been—to her own trials awoke this sympathy.”18  The moment 
captures, for Bailin, the widespread “exertions of denial” directed against “selfish 
reference” and employed in “a struggle to suppress or transvaluate supervening 
obstacles to sympathetic identification (anger, hatred, and resentment, for instance) 
whose traces can still be felt in the outpouring of emotion that is meant to signal their 
absence.”19     
“Selfish reference,” under various names, continues to haunt contemporary 
critiques and defenses of sentimentality.  Deborah Knight partially attributes the “near 
universal condemnation” of sentimentality in contemporary philosophy and aesthetic 
theory to its perceived “self-directedness”: “For according to the standard view, what 
marks sentimentality as a perversion of the rational self is the pleasure derived by the 
sentimentalist in her indulgence of her own emotions. The perversity is the self-
directedness of her response, the idea that whatever the situation that prompts the 
response—the response thus prompted is one that indulges or pleases the 
sentimentalist.”20  Such self-directed emotional indulgence becomes associated with an 
emotional hardening where others are concerned.  As Knight notes, “In the end, 
according to the standard view, sentimentality desensitizes: it transforms the aesthetic 
into the anesthetic.”21  
Robert C. Solomon’s “In Defense of Sentimentality” makes “self-
consciousness” an operative term, which he invokes to negotiate the two-pronged 
attacks on sentimentality—common both in the philosophical tradition and in broader 
cultural discourse—as excessively self-effacing and self-indulgent.  On the one hand, 
he attempts to infuse sentimentality with a level of self-consciousness that positions it 
                                                
18 Bailin, 1021.  
19 Ibid., 1020, 1022. 
20 Knight, 411-20.       
21 Ibid., 417. 
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as more active, rational, and self-reflexive than is often allowed.  But he acknowledges 
how, on the other hand, this self-preserving analytic awareness can give sentimentality 
a self-referential quality that opens it up to accusations of self-indulgence and false 
emotion.  Solomon quotes Milan Kundera’s powerful articulation of such imputation 
in The Unbearable Lightness of Being: “Kitsch causes two tears to flow in quick 
succession. The first tear says: how nice to see children running on the grass! The 
second tear says: how nice to be moved, together with all mankind, by children 
running on the grass! It is the second tear that makes kitsch kitsch.”22  Responding to 
such charges, Solomon conceptualizes sentimentality as having a level of self-
conscious reflection that can be kept distinct from necessary self-indulgence.  He asks, 
“Is the ‘second tear’ self-indulgence, or is it, in philosophical circles, what would 
normally be called simple ‘reflection,’ the precondition of ‘the examined life’? Why 
should reflection be tearless, unless we are wedded to an indefensible divorce between 
reason and the passions, the latter wholly self-absorbed and without reason, the former 
a merely ‘ideal spectator,’ wholly dispassionate and wholly without feeling?”23  
Solomon tenuously balances these two strands of his defense of sentimentality—
sentimentality conceptualized as analytically self-reflective, but not necessarily 
solipsistically self-reflective—and in so doing, highlights the value of an emotion that 
would combine emotional self-consciousness with an irrepressible responsiveness to 
others.  As we will see, this is a value that shame, in its aesthetic interactions with 
sentimentality, offers in Thackeray’s writing. 
 The air of the cheap and fake that lingers about sentimentality emanates in part 
from a suspicion of self-indulgence masquerading as selfless identification, but it also 
                                                
22 As qtd. in Solomon, 225.     
23 Ibid., 238. Solomon makes a similar argument, using his dual inflection of “self-consciousness” to 
characterize sentimentality, when he notes that  “excessive self-consciousness of one’s emotions may 
well lead to the suspicion that an emotion is overly controlled or ‘faked,’ but as I pointed out (with 
reference to Kundera), emotional self-consciousness is not itself fraudulent but rather an important 
philosophical virtue” (239). 
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responds to the conventionality required to produce sentimentality’s spectacular 
identification.  The sudden shift in Thackeray’s “gallows-shock,” from terrified 
recognition to “complacent curiosity,” highlights the instability of an affective 
structure of signification whose refined codification might just as easily strain as 
guarantee its effect.  An anecdote makes clear that the crowd’s persistent movements 
between terror and unresponsiveness reflect an anxiety over the effects of repetitive 
and potentially rote aesthetic conventions:  
 
J.S.—, the famous wit, now dead, had, I recollect, a good story upon the 
subject of executing, and of the terror which the punishment inspires. After 
Thistlewood and his companions were hanged, their heads were taken off, 
according to the sentence, and the executioner, as he severed each, held it up to 
the crowd, in the proper orthodox way, saying, “Here is the head of a traitor!” 
At the sight of the first ghastly head the people were struck with terror, and a 
general expression of disgust and fear broke from them.  The second head was 
looked at also with much interest, but the excitement regarding the third head 
diminished. When the executioner had come to the last of the heads, he lifted it 
up, but by some clumsiness, allowed it to drop. At this the crowd yelled out, 
“Ah, Butter-fingers!” the excitement had passed entirely away. The punishment 
had grown to be a joke—Butter-fingers was the word—a pretty commentary, 
indeed upon the august nature of public executions, and the awful majesty of 
the law.  (155) 
Here, the codification of objects (the decapitated head), gestures (the head raised aloft) 
and words (the verbal accompaniment, in the “proper orthodox way,” of “Here is the 
head of a traitor!”) makes the intended emotional effect instantly legible but also 
threatens to make it feel overly contrived and manipulative.  Thus the crowd’s pliable 
emotive response of terror quickly—seeming inevitably—degenerates into not just 
unconcern but active contempt—the collective call of “Butter-fingers.”  Thackeray’s 
anecdote points up the formal challenge for a narrative invested in sentimental 
signification: how to incite both knowing recognition of conventions and an 
affectively charged investment in them, all the while avoiding aesthetic “clumsiness”?   
The problem of sentimental convention relates to a broader challenge that 
inflects Thackeray’s engagement with sentimentality, that of sustaining the effects of 
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the sentimental spectacle over time.  Sentimentality is often characterized by an 
embodied immediacy which can produce—for better or worse—an intense, visceral 
sense of relationality.  Many recent critics view this embodied immediacy as one of 
sentimentality’s greatest assets, as when June Howard emphasizes sentimentality’s 
function “as embodied thought that animates cognition with the recognition of the 
self’s engagement; as sympathy, firmly based in the observer’s body and 
imaginatively linking it to another’s.”24  Thackeray approaches the possibilities of such 
immediate, bodily effect from the perspective of the creator as well as the witness of a 
sentimental spectacle, recognizing it as a powerful moral and aesthetic tool.  But 
sentimentality’s immediacy also aggravates the conceptual difficulty of reconciling 
sentimentality with active, sustained thought and retrospective reflection.  Thinking, it 
would seem, takes time: Kundera and Solomon, accordingly, both imagine the 
sequential temporality of the “second tear” of self-consciousness, whether it is 
considered indulgent or simply reflective.  The instant acuteness of sentimentality also 
threatens to make it short-lived: Thackeray’s fine-tuned “gallows-shock” thus comes 
with the expiration date of a mere “second.”  The difficulty of sustaining sentimental 
effect over time stems partially from the incompatibility of mixed, accumulating or 
wavering feelings with the rigorous formal and relational requirements of spectacular 
identification.  By such rigid standards, sentimental identification, once disrupted, 
seems gone; hence the unnerving temporal proximity of terrified pity and its complete 
absence throughout the essay.  Thackeray focuses on the difficulty of not just 
sustaining but repeating sentimental effect, since its signifying conventions facilitate 
repetition through an emotional clarity which could repel the spectator, especially if its 
codified workings are laid too bare.   
While the essay’s first instance of “gallows-shock” invokes sentimentality’s 
                                                
24 Howard, 77. 
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moving effect and its affective and formal complications, both become more pressing 
when the time of the execution—and thus Thackeray’s task to represent it—arrives.  
Thackeray depicts a feminized frenzy collectively gripping the crowd as all expect the 
appearance of Courvoisier, the man to be hanged: “As the clock began to strike, an 
immense sway and movement swept over the whole of that vast dense crowd. They 
were all uncovered directly, and a great murmur arose, more awful, bizarre, and 
indescribable than any sound I have ever heard before. Women and children began to 
shriek horridly” (156).  Against this crowd, the “scaffold . . . tenantless and black” juts 
back into view, with its physically and affectively menacing “black chain . . . hanging 
down ready from the beam” (156).  However, when the structure actually ensnares 
Courvoisier, Thackeray does not succumb so completely, and shame permeates the 
distance established between both himself and the sentimental spectacle of the 
hanging, and himself and the “sway” of the “vast dense” crowd.  Thackeray pairs 
Courvoisier’s advance toward the gallows with his own turn away:   
 
He went and placed himself at once under the beam, with his face toward St. 
Sepulchre’s. The tall grave man in black twisted him round swiftly in the other 
direction, and, drawing from his pocket a night-cap, pulled it tight over the 
patient’s head and face. I am not ashamed to say that I could look no more, but 
shut my eyes as the last dreadful act was going on which sent this wretched 
guilty soul into the presence of God. (156) 
Sentimentality’s mode of spectacular identification collides, here, with a different 
affective mode of spectacularly disrupted identification.  By closing his eyes, 
Thackeray interrupts sentimentality’s visual mechanism of direct, mimetic emotional 
transmission.  The closed eyes, though, interrupt without rupturing his emotional 
connection to the victim, still bespeaking an intense, lingering investment that refuses 
to render Courvoisier a mere “object” of “complacent curiosity.”  Thackeray’s 
suddenly blackened view, resembling, yet distinct from, the victim’s own, provides an 
alternative form of embodied affinity with the victim’s experience: unlike 
   
112 
Courvoisier’s passive submission to the “night-cap,” Thackeray actively shuts his eyes 
in a gesture of simultaneous sympathy and differentiation.  His disrupted identification 
with Courvoisier has its own spectacular quality.  Asserting “that I am not ashamed to 
say that I could look no more,” he broaches his own potentially shameful exposure as 
one who stands out in a crowd of rapt onlookers.   Shame circles around acts of 
looking and telling—what Thackeray is and is “not ashamed to say”—marking his 
narration of not looking as a further self-exposure that replaces the withheld sight of 
the execution for his readers.  Shame, here, extends a more malleable grasp than the 
coercive sentimental pull of the gallows, as Thackeray recognizes that he 
approximates a spectacle of shame yet maintains distance from it, claiming that he is, 
in fact, “not ashamed.” 
 Thackeray more fully embraces shame when his narrative subsequently 
switches focus from his experience of the public execution to his memory of it.  While 
“not ashamed to say that I could look no more” at the moment of execution, 
Thackeray “must confess,” almost immediately following the statement, that “the sight 
has left on my mind an extraordinary feeling of terror and shame” (156).  Blending 
“terror and shame” into “an extraordinary feeling” enables an intermingling of the 
visceral impact of the “sight” with the workings of the “mind” over time—workings 
that can accommodate mixed feelings, accumulating reflections, and lasting 
impressions.  Thackeray positions shame as alleviating full-fledged terror without 
transforming it into unfeeling detachment.  In the essay’s concluding paragraph, 
shame further bridges the temporal gap between experience and reflective 
representation and the affective gap between “mawkish sentiment” and callous 
analysis: 
 
This is the 20th of July, and I may be permitted for my part to declare that, for 
the last fourteen days, so salutary has the impression of the butchery been upon 
me, I have had the man’s face continually before my eyes; that I can see Mr. 
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Ketch at this moment, with an easy air, taking the rope from his pocket; that I 
feel myself ashamed and degraded at the brutal curiosity which took me to that 
brutal sight; and that I pray to Almighty God to cause this disgraceful sin to 
pass from among us, and to cleanse our land of blood. (158) 
On the one hand, Thackeray gestures at completely disavowing the “brutal sight”—a 
violent disavowal motivated by his sense of degradation and “disgraceful sin.”  But, 
on the other hand, the sense of shame that he espouses—and models for the reader’s 
own temporally and textually mediated experience of the sight—allows him 
tentatively to gesture at the linguistic re-circulation of the sight as actually have some 
use.  When Thackeray earlier reports on asking the “philosopher in the ragged elbows” 
in the crowd, who has seen many executions, “whether the sight of them did any 
good,” the response emphasizes less the spectacle itself than its emotional aftermath: 
“For the matter of that, no; people did not care about them at all; nobody ever thought 
of it a bit after.”  In the essay’s conclusion, Thackeray returns to the fraught 
sentimental sight, to think and care about it more than “a bit after.”  Haunted by the 
extremes of a horrifically static, sentimental image of “the man’s face continually 
before my eyes” and the equally horrid reduction of it to a mere disposable object of 
“brutal curiosity,” Thackeray declares that “I feel myself ashamed and degraded,” 
rhetorically proffering the victim’s suffering “face” as well as his own shamed “eyes” 
to make a lasting—yet less sentimentally fixed—emotional impression of shame on 
his reading audience.  
The theorists of shame who have figured most prominently in my introduction 
and discussion of Austen help to distinguish shame’s mode of spectacularly disrupted 
identification both from absolute identification and from contempt, in ways that 
usefully illuminate attributes of shame that speak to the problematics of 
sentimentality.  When Silvan Tomkins defines shame as “the incomplete reduction of 
interest or joy,” he uses its incomplete quality to differentiate shameful reduction of 
   
114 
interest in a person or object from contemptuous detachment.25  “Shame-humiliation,” 
he argues, “is the negative affect linked with love and identification, and contempt-
disgust the negative affect linked with individuation and hate. Both affects are 
impediments to intimacy and communion, within the self and between the self and 
others. But shame-humiliation does not renounce the object permanently, whereas 
contempt-disgust does.”26  Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick similarly conceptualizes shame’s 
function as a “disruptive moment, in a circuit of identity-constituting identificatory 
communication.”27  By emphasizing that “in interrupting identification, shame, too, 
makes identity,” that it “both derives from and aims toward sociability,” Sedgwick 
focuses on the visceral, spectacular quality of shame’s self-making relationality, 
particularly positioning it to negotiate solipsism and self-effacement (36). Or, to recast 
her theory more directly in relation to the ongoing debates on sentimentality that we 
have considered, shame’s self-consciousness has a compelling, embodied effect akin 
to sentimentality’s immediacy but especially resistant to extremes of “selfish 
reference” or sympathetic loss of self.   
Such resistance can be located in what Sedgwick terms “the double movement 
shame makes: toward painful individuation, toward uncontrollable relationality,” as it 
“mantles the threshold between introversion and extroversion, between absorption and 
theatricality” (37, 38).   For Sedgwick, one strand of shame’s self-making theatricality 
is its disruption of strong identification, a disruption that is “itself a form of 
communication” that dramatically performs the distinct self for others.  Thus, “blazons 
of shame, the ‘fallen face’ with eyes down and head averted . . . are semaphores of 
trouble and at the same time a desire to reconstitute the interpersonal bridge” (36).  
                                                
25 Silvan S. Tomkins, Affect, Imagery, Consciousness: The Complete Edition, vol. 2. The Negative 
Affects (New York: Springer, 2008), 353. 
26 Ibid., 362. 
27 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity (Durham: Duke Univ. 
Press, 2003). Further references will appear in the text. 
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Philip Fisher similarly notes shame’s constitutive sensitivity to others as setting it 
apart from many other emotions; contrary to the common “power of the passions to 
extinguish the reality and claims of others while creating . . . an almost painfully 
pressing awareness of the self,” he observes that “the very premise of shame is the 
acute feeling of the reality of others and of their opinions.”28  Sedgwick’s concept of 
shame’s perfomativity emphasizes the sense of an individualized self within shame’s 
intense relationality: shame entails both a theatrical performance of disconnection—
one insistently performed for another—and a performative act that self-referentially 
creates the self.  In Sedgwick’s discussion, shame’s “peculiarly contagious and 
peculiarly individuating” force involves not only directly shamed subjects but those 
who witness another’s shame, or even sense the shame that another should be feeling, 
since shame “can so readily flood me—assuming I’m a shame-prone person—with 
this sensitivity whose very suffusiveness seems to delineate my precise, individual 
outlines in the most isolating way imaginable” (37).  
For Thackeray, shame addresses not only the problems of locating an relational 
individualized self in sentimentality, but also the challenges posed by sentimentality’s 
uneasy relation to narrative convention and temporality.  The potent contagion of 
shame depends, much like sentimentality, on the legibility of its signification: to feel 
oneself shamed or to sense or demand another’s shame entails recognizing the 
conventions—of behavior, speech, appearance, and so forth—being shamefully 
violated.  To be shameless is, thus, to misconstrue or actively flout social norms.  
Shame departs from sentimentality, however, in this reliance on the foregrounded 
transgression of conventions to produce its emotional effect.  Shame’s contagious 
charge sparks from a recognized deviation from convention rather than static 
repetition of it.  And while shame’s affective illumination of deviation can serve to 
                                                
28 Philip Fisher, The Vehement Passions (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2002), 60. 
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repressively or violently reinscribe norms, it can also self-consciously rework 
established conventions—it can work with conventions, rather than work completely 
within or without them.  Shame can, accordingly, shape exposed convention through 
affectively fueled revision rather than stale repetition or contemptuous mockery.    
Shame does this work in part by attending to the problem of sentimentality’s 
conventionally repeating emotional effect and, more generally, the difficulty of 
integrating strong, embodied feelings into passing time.  The immediate visceral 
impact of shame—perhaps best captured by the blush—also has a particularly 
narrative quality, in the sense that shame is often the result of a temporal sequence and 
retrospection.  Fisher highlights this temporal structure when he distinguishes shame 
from other passions such as anger, fear, grief, and wonder through its common role as 
a “successor passion” and an “aftermath state” that follows other passions (53, 65).  
Acting as a successor passion, shame often serves as a “meta-feeling,” a feeling about 
previous feelings that remembers, reviews, and revalues them.29  In this way, 
Thackeray uses shame to enfold fleeting moments of sentimentality into narratives of 
passing time and retrospective memory, while also encasing sentimental moments 
within shame’s equally emotive—rather than emotionally drained—reflective meta-
                                                
29 I borrow the term “meta-feeling” from Sianne Ngai’s Ugly Feelings (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. 
Press, 2005), 31.  While shame is not one of Ngai’s ugly feelings, her discussion of their meta-feeling 
function resonates with shame’s common reflexivity on other feelings. It is worth noting that shame is 
also included in one of her examples of how a meta-feeling might function, in what appears to be the 
more reflexive position: “the morally degraded and seemingly unjustifiable status of these feelings 
tends to produce an unpleasurable feeling about the feeling (a reflexive response taking the form of ‘I 
feel ashamed about feeling envious’ or ‘I feel anxious about my enviousness’) that significantly 
parallels the doubleness on which irony, as an evaluative stance hinging on a relationship between the 
said and the unsaid, fundamentally depends. In their tendency to promote what Susan Feagin calls 
‘meta-responses’ (since it is hard to feel envy without feeling that one should not be feeling envy, 
reinforcing the negativity of the original emotion), there is a sense in which ugly feelings can be 
described as conducive to or promoting ironic distance in a way that grander and more prestigious 
passions, or even the moral emotions associated with sentimental literature, do not” (10).  While Ngai 
associates the “reflexive response” of a meta-feeling with “ironic distance,” contrasting it with the 
“moral emotions associated with sentimental literature,” in my reading of shame as a meta-feeling on 
sentimentality, shame’s close, yet reflexive, relation to sentimentality could be considered akin to an 
“ironic distance” from sentimentality, but not an opposing contrast, since this distance is not as extreme 
as the distance established by something like ironic contempt.  
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commentary on sentimentality’s affective and formal immediacy.   
It is around the figure of the reader, especially, that sentimentality’s visceral 
effect and shame’s revisionary reflection coalesce into Thackeray’s distinctively self-
conscious style.  While Thackeray models his own shame—as witness and narrator—
as an alternative vantage onto the sentimental spectacle in “Going to See a Man 
Hanged,” he also directly figures the reader as an additional, embodied shameful 
spectacle.  At the key moment in the essay, when the narrator confesses his 
“extraordinary feeling of terror and shame,” he also comes “face to face with the 
reader” in a striking instance of direct address.  We have already considered this 
moment in part; returning to it now, in its entirety, illustrates how the technique of 
direct address that most critics consider central to Thackeray’s novelistic self-
consciousness also proves central to his shameful negotiation of sentimentality.  Upon 
admitting that he “could look no more” at the execution, Thackeray turns not only 
away from the gallows, but toward the reader, asking: 
 
How does an individual man feel under it—In what way does he observe it,—
how does he view all the phenomena connected with it,—what induces him, in 
the first instance, to go and see it,—and how is he moved by it afterwards? The 
writer has discarded the magazine “We” altogether, and spoken face to face 
with the reader, recording every one of the impressions felt by him as honestly 
as he could. 
 I must confess, then (for “I” is the shortest word, and the best in this case), 
that the sight has left on my mind an extraordinary feeling of terror and shame. 
(156) 
A number of characteristic features of Thackeray’s literary direct address combine, 
here, to render both narrator and reader shamefully self-conscious.  Thackeray’s direct 
address, “spoken face to face” to the reader, rhetorically intensifies the contagious 
potential of his own shame by mutually exposing himself and the reader with “the 
double movement shame makes: toward painful individuation, toward uncontrollable 
relationality.”  The workings of the narrator’s and reader’s “individual” minds are 
displayed along with the image of each “face”:  the highlighted use of an “I”—
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than “We”—combines with the questions’ form and content to rhetorically conjure the 
individualized perceptions, feelings and thoughts of both narrator and reader.  Even as 
it is invoked, however, the immediacy of the stark display of face and mind is 
mediated by foregrounded, intervening layers of text and time, reinforcing both shame 
as a meta-feeling and its “double movement” of spectacularly disrupted identification.  
Thackeray emphasizes the temporal disjunction between moments of experience (how 
“an individual man feel[s] under it”) and of memory (how he “is moved by it 
afterwards”), and further highlights the temporal gap between processes of writing and 
reading.  By casting the narrator specifically as a “writer” and the narratee as a 
magazine “reader,” while also highlighting the linguistic conventions that determine 
their exchange, Thackeray lays bare individualized experience, but also the discrete 
scenes—and temporalities—of textual production and consumption.  The reader is 
thus both particularly unveiled—caught in the act of reading—and self-reflexively 
reminded of the temporal and textual distance that reading maintains from the 
sentimental event and even from the writer who has “spoken face to face with the 
reader” only through magazine print.  The critical commonplace of Thackeray’s 
extreme self-consciousness heavily stresses his emotionally detached, literary self-
consciousness: but here we see one, formative example of how such self-
consciousness can position writer and reader as both acutely shamefaced and self-
reflexively aware of this embodiment as a textual construction.      
 
ANALYTIC TEARS 
When Thackeray castigates the “drivelling hysterical sentimentality” of 
popular paintings in his art criticism, he does concede, albeit facetiously, that “the 
great geniuses who invented them have not, you see, toiled in vain,” since “they can 
command the sympathies of the public.”  The potential vanity of sentimentality 
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becomes a much graver matter, however, in Thackeray’s attempt to “command the 
sympathies of the public” as author and illustrator of Vanity Fair.  As the title 
suggests, vanity is the novel’s dominant trope.  In detangling vanity’s intricate formal 
and conceptual strands, it is useful to view it as, in part, a thematized emotional 
problem—indeed the very problem that, as we have seen, underlies recent criticism’s 
sense of a sharp break between sentimentality and critical detachment in Vanity Fair.  
As in “Going to See a Man Hanged,” Thackeray in Vanity Fair focuses on this 
worrisome emotional binary, invoking shame to counter sentimentality’s haunting 
vanity. 
The sentimental letter especially consolidates the social and aesthetic dilemmas 
of sentimentality in Vanity Fair.  The sentimental relic whose time has passed, but 
refuses to disappear, persistently features in the plot and in the narrator’s direct 
address to the reader.  At one point, the narrator laments the horrific metamorphosis of 
a letter, “written in the period of love and confidence” by “a dear friend,” into the 
“vehement protests of dead affection,” “lying epitaphs over the corpse of love.”  
“What dark, cruel comments upon Life and Vanities!” he concludes.  “Most of us have 
got or written drawers full of them. They are closet-skeletons which we keep and 
shun” (353).  Sentimentality’s threatening allure in the novel emanates from its 
abiding presence as something “we keep and shun”: it might be critically revealed 
as—and through—“dark, cruel comments,” but it cannot be put to rest.  In another of 
the narrator’s asides on the ghostly lingering of sentimental letters, Thackeray 
highlights many of the same features of sentimentality that plague him in “Going to 
See a Man Hanged,” while also placing them in a more specifically novelistic context.  
Here, the narrator intrudes his own “dark, cruel comments” to demystify sentimental 
illusions:  
 
Perhaps in Vanity Fair there are no better satires than letters. Take a bundle of 
your dear friend’s of ten years back—your dear friend whom you hate now.  
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Look at a file of your sister’s: how you clung to each other till you quarreled 
about the twenty pound legacy! Get down the round-hand scrawls of your son 
who has half broken your heart with selfish undutifulness since; or a parcel of 
your own, breathing endless ardour and love eternal, which were sent back by 
your mistress when she married the Nabob—your mistress for whom you now 
care no more than for Queen Elizabeth.  Vows, love, promises, confidences, 
gratitude, how queerly they read after a while!  There ought to be a law in 
Vanity Fair ordering the destruction of every written document (except 
receipted tradesmen’s bills) after a certain brief and proper interval. Those 
quacks and misanthropes who advertise indelible Japan ink, should be made to 
perish along with their wicked discoveries. The best ink for Vanity Fair use 
would be one that faded utterly in a couple of days, and left the paper clean and 
blank, so that you might write on it to somebody else. (191-92) 
The contrast of “indelible” and disappearing ink captures the emotional bind of a 
sentimental over-investment which, at the slightest disruption, risks complete 
evaporation, replaced by disdain or disregard: those who once “clung to each other” 
“hate now,” or, perhaps even worse, “now care no more than for Queen Elizabeth.”  
Sentimentality’s indelible ink connotes a disturbing stasis in its affective mode of 
strict identification and idealization, but the alternative “destruction” appears equally 
static—if not by leaving “the paper clean and blank,” by producing an inevitable, vain 
repetitious cycle in which one “might write on it to somebody else” to similar results.  
Both the “indelible” letter and “the paper clean and blank,” destined for endless 
recycling, lack the capacity for an affective accumulation which can accommodate 
mixed feelings and shifting perceptions of the self and others.  Passing time again 
threatens sentimentality’s effectiveness, as sentimental absorption is allowed only “a 
certain brief and proper interval,” and is portrayed as best suited to a system of 
signification “that fade[s] utterly in a couple of days,” along with the feeling.  The 
mere “couple of days” accorded before the emotional “blank” suggests for sentimental 
investment and detachment an unnerving temporal proximity, as if the loss of one 
must immediately usher in the other.  The narrator’s staging of contemptuous 
rereadings of sentimental letters—rereadings which would prefer a “paper clean and 
blank”—especially points up the resistance to retrospective reflection and revision of a 
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sentimental mode intent on “breathing endless ardour and love eternal” in a stagnant 
form. 
 Thackeray’s conceit of letters and ink positions this emotional problem in a 
particularly literary vein.  The letters of Vanity Fair, and “how queerly they read after 
a while,” raise concerns about both sentimental absorption and critical detachment as 
forms of literary engagement that can stand the test of time, whether it be the time of 
reading a lengthy novel or, more abstractly, of literary history.  The figure of the letter 
stresses questions of specifically novelistic engagement: “a bundle of your dear 
friend’s” letters resonates with both the tradition of sentimental epistolary novels and 
the more contemporary trend of monthly serial publication, which Thackeray adopted 
for Vanity Fair’s initial run.  This association of letters and novel form is reinforced 
elsewhere in Vanity Fair: the narrator begins “Quite a Sentimental Chapter” by 
quoting complaints about the novel thus far which he has received from “some 
unknown correspondent,” comically referencing the type of reader feedback between 
numbers that publication in serial parts could allow, and portraying it as contentious 
epistolary exchange (115).  Thackeray also directly parodies sentimental epistolary 
novels in early chapters, especially in Becky Sharp’s letters to “MY DEAREST, 
SWEETEST AMELIA,” with their pointed allusions to the work of Samuel 
Richardson and Frances Burney.  The possible failure of letters in the world of Vanity 
Fair to sustain or accumulate emotional interest over time thus threatens to extend to 
Vanity Fair, as a novel plumbing sentimentality’s capacity to create affective 
continuity and legibility between serial parts and with existing literary conventions.  In 
this light, the stain of sentimentality’s “indelible” letters, marked for imminent 
“destruction,” suggests the menacing shadow of merely repetitive sentimental 
convention or its parodic collapse, each seen as possibly failing to revise, or even 
effectively reuse, novel form.   
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 The sentimental keepsake might seem destined, in Vanity Fair, to be either 
emotively static or affectively drained, but a significant alternative appears in the 
novel—the shameful letter.  George Osborne’s love note, given to Becky on the eve of 
Waterloo, and much later given by Becky to Amelia to prove George’s 
unfaithfulness—arguably the most important letter in the novel’s plot—becomes such 
a shameful letter.  It does not begin as such: on its initial delivery, to Becky, the letter 
makes material the problematic coexistence of extreme sentimental absorption and 
detachment.  It marks both the height of George’s deluded romantic vulnerability to 
Becky’s charms, which yields only her contemptuous mockery of his foolishness, and 
also George’s own long-standing emotional insensitivity toward his wife’s feelings, 
most comically portrayed in the illustration of “Lieutenant Osborne and his ardent 
love letters,” in which he callously uses Amelia’s deluded, lovelorn missives to him to 
light his cigar (135).  However, the love note’s greatest impact occurs when Becky 
recirculates it years later by handing it over to Amelia, to break George’s posthumous 
sentimental spell over her.  The letter accrues rather than loses emotional effect as the 
plot moves from George’s initial writing toward this climactic conclusion, and as the 
letter absorbs various characters’ shame.  Functioning as a multi-faceted signifier of 
shame, the love letter repeatedly intercedes in characters’ tendencies toward extreme 
indulgence in or detachment from sentimentality.  In George’s case, the letter quickly 
morphs into a regret—a wish for “that night’s work undone”—that produces a rare and 
fleeting responsiveness to Amelia’s sentimental appeal as he stands “heart-stained, and 
shame-stricken” over her sleeping form (292).  Becky’s imperviousness to 
sentimentality is also briefly broken down by the possible emergence of the letter as a 
memento of her shame.  Upon finding Amelia crazed with worry during the battle of 
Waterloo, Becky’s thoughts that “she must have seen him give me the letter at the 
ball” trigger the emotional responsiveness of “looking down” and “hanging down her 
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head” (309).  Becky is uncharacteristically “touched in spite of herself” by Amelia’s 
emotive display, a potent mixture of accusatory shaming (culminating in “For shame, 
Rebecca; bad and wicked woman—false friend and false wife”) and histrionic 
suffering much more effective than Amelia’s typical sentimental entreaty (309).  And 
while sparks of shame fanned by the letter increase Amelia’s affective pull on those 
usually immune to her sentimental spectacles, they also disrupt her own excessive 
sentimentality.  Years after George’s death, the long forgotten note reemerges in 
Becky’s mind, no longer signaling the unwelcome display of her own shame as much 
as the need to incite Amelia’s, to intervene in Amelia’s continuing, morbid 
idealization of her late husband and resulting cruel undervaluation of her suitor, 
Dobbin.  Observing the would-be lovers quarrel, Becky muses, “What a noble heart 
that man has . . . and how shamefully that woman plays with it,” then “she absolutely 
bethought herself of something”—the letter that could be shown to Amelia to expose 
her shamefully sentimental delusions about George (670). 
 Amelia’s possible shaming through George’s love note takes on particular 
significance in contrast to her sentimental hoarding of his love tokens addressed to 
her.  Prior to their marriage, when she believes their engagement to be permanently 
broken, Amelia’s rereading of his old love letters epitomizes vainly repetitive, 
resuscitative sentimental reading practices.  George’s letters, in this context, incarnate 
the narrator’s trope of “the relics and remembrances of dead affection . . . the corpse of 
Love” (182).  Rather than contemptuously repudiate the letters, Amelia strains at 
revival as she constantly reviews the letters alone in her bedroom:  
 
She drew them out of the place where she kept them; and read them over—as 
if she did not know them by heart already: for she could not part with them. 
The effort was too much for her; she placed them back in her bosom again—as 
you have seen a woman nurse a child that is dead. . . . If they were cold, yet 
how perversely this fond little soul interpreted them into warmth. If they were 
short and selfish, what excuses she found for the writer!  It was over these few 
worthless papers that she brooded and brooded. (182) 
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Amelia’s plight takes the bind of sentimental letters to a horrific extreme, as her 
sentimentality appears to be not just nursing the fading affective material of the letters 
but “perversely” birthing a “warmth” that was negligible from the start.  The letters 
thus bear the “selfish” traces of George’s callous self-absorption, but also of Amelia’s 
own “perversely” solipsistic self-indulgence, doomed to “worthless” emotional 
exhaustion.  A deathly rupture gapes between the “short and selfish” letters of 
detachment and the excessively emotive, yet equally “selfish,” interpretive attempts to 
breath affective life into a “corpse of Love.”  The vanity of both George’s callous 
signification and Amelia’s sentimental reading highlights the need for an alternative 
letter, one that can mediate between these emotional extremes by intervening in both 
the writer’s form and the reader’s response.  That such a “letter” might take the shape 
of an emotive, feminized spectacle is suggested when the narrator proffers the sight of 
Amelia’s suffering, through direct address, to “you,” to be interpreted “as you have 
seen a woman nurse a child that is dead.”  The reader is confronted with a pathetically 
moving sight, even as the spectacle displays the risk of overly sentimental response.  
Thackeray’s direct address thus highlights the danger of the reader being similarly 
compelled to “nurse a child that is dead”—a danger negotiated, as the novel continues, 
through the circulation of shameful letters that take epistolary, figuratively embodied, 
and direct-address forms.  
If Amelia’s “perversely . . . fond” reading condenses anxieties over the 
sentimental spectacle and spectator, her shame, presented as another moving spectacle 
and model of emotionally charged, interpretive engagement, appears particularly 
poised to address sentimentality’s drawbacks.  Much like Becky, Amelia is 
periodically “touched” by shame—touches that, in her case, loosen sentimentality’s 
stranglehold.  A brush with shame shortly after her wedding to George, when she 
visits her parents’ home, briefly dislodges her all-consuming romantic idealization of 
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him: 
 
What a gulf lay between her and that past life.  She could look back to it from 
her present standing-place, and contemplate, almost as another being, the 
young unmarried girl absorbed in her love, having no eyes but for one special 
object, receiving parental affection if not ungratefully, at least indifferently, 
and as if it were her due—her whole heart and thoughts bent on the 
accomplishment of one desire. The review of those days, so lately gone yet so 
far away, touched her with shame, and the aspect of the kind parents filled her 
with tender remorse. (260) 
As the idol of George wobbles, Amelia also totters at the brink of an affective 
chasm—“a gulf . . .  between her and that past life,” aggravated by a sense of 
accelerated temporal distance and alienation from self and others that recalls the 
narrator’s fantasy of rapidly disappearing ink.  Shame affectively forms for Amelia a 
“present standing-place” from which to “contemplate” and “review those days,” 
infusing her retrospective “look back” with an analytic agency and critical distance 
missing from her previous, compulsive recyclings “by heart” of George’s love letters.  
Shame also, however, helps bridge the gaping “gulf” between past and present, 
absorption and contemplation, and self and others created by her developing critical 
perspective: rather than cold indifference, the “touch” of “shame” evokes a “tender 
remorse” that engages “her whole heart and thoughts,” giving them wider berth and 
greater reflective self-consciousness (italics mine).  Thackeray portrays Amelia’s 
shameful self-consciousness as a tenuous balance between embodied bonds and 
critical “review,” and between self-indulgence and a loss of the self in others: she 
responds emotionally to “the aspect of the kind parents” previously neglected, while 
simultaneously defining an earlier version of herself seen “almost as another being,” 
but still connected to her present self (italics mine).   
The contrast—as well as potent points of contact—between Amelia’s shameful 
interpretive position and that of her previous sentimental letter reading gains emphasis 
when Amelia next moves into her old bedroom and right into “that very chair in which  
   
126 
 
Figure 2.  William Makepeace Thackeray,  
illustration from Chapter XXVI of Vanity Fair (261). 
 
she had passed so many bitter hours . . . and fell to thinking over the past week, and 
the life beyond it” (261).  Physically sliding back into “that very chair” which 
supported her old posture of sentimental letter reading, Amelia precariously wavers 
between its “perversely . . . fond” interpretive practices and her burgeoning, shame-
charged reading.  This wavering is highlighted by the further description—“Here she 
sate, and recalled to herself fondly that image of George to which she had knelt before 
marriage” (261)—as well as the illustration that accompanies it, in which Thackeray 
depicts Amelia in the chair, looking down toward an open letter at her feet, as a maid 
approaches behind her (see figure 2).  Her gesture of sinking into the old chair, with 
slightly bowed head, straddles two possible meanings: her full submission, once again, 
to “that image of George to which she had knelt before marriage,” or her shameful 
revision of the past, accommodating a new relation to a sentimental image “recalled to 
herself fondly,” but not fully reinstated.   
   
127 
In the first edition of Vanity Fair, Thackeray’s in-text illustration of this scene 
appears immediately after the phrase “that image of George to” and occupies the 
remainder of the page.30  Thus, it is not until the following page that the ambiguity of 
Amelia’s posture is emptied, when the narrator asserts her complete fall out of shame, 
and back into a morbid sentimentality the narrator asserts her complete fall out of 
shame, and back into a morbid sentimentality deemed “selfish brooding”: 
 
Did she own to herself how different the real man was from that superb young 
hero whom she had worshipped?  It requires many many years—and a man 
must be very bad indeed—before a woman’s pride and vanity will let her own 
to such a confession. . . . And so she sate for awhile indulging in her usual 
mood of selfish brooding, in that very listless melancholy attitude in which the 
honest maid-servant had found her, on the day when she brought up the letter 
in which George renewed his offer of marriage. (262)  
The ambiguous emotional content of Amelia’s physical pose is not the only thing 
clarified here: the reference to the earlier moment in the plot, when “the honest maid-
servant had found her” reading George’s old love letters, suggests that the illustration 
of Amelia approached by the maid on the preceding page actually pictures this former 
instance of sentimental pining, not her current return to her old bedroom.  The visual 
image of Amelia’s former reading thus takes on an eerie “indelible” quality, uncannily 
outlasting its proper narrative moment much like her “usual mood of selfish 
brooding.”  Her sentimental posture appears as statically coercive as “that image of 
George to which she had knelt before marriage”—a posture that might hold Vanity 
Fair’s reader entranced as much as George’s sentimental image, and her own 
sentimental stances, hold Amelia.  But even as the narrative explanation of the 
illustration ostensibly disposes of any remaining traces of a shameful alternative in 
Amelia’s own position, direct address preserves the interpretative insights of shame in 
the invoked novel reader.  The question—“Did she own to herself how different the  
 
 
 
 
                                                
30 William Makepeace Thackeray, Vanity Fair, a novel without a hero. With illustrations on steel and 
wood by the author (London: Bradbury and Evans, 1847-48), 228. 
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real man was from that superb young hero whom she had worshipped?”—attributes a  
critical awareness of the “real man” to the addressed reader, placing this shrewd reader  
at a distance from the illustrated Amelia, while also aligning the reader with the 
fleeting discernment of her shame, discernment which the narrator implies will again, 
and more fully, be realized by Amelia after “many many years.”  Shame opens a 
possible point of affective affinity between the emotive woman of the illustration and 
the savvy reader of the narrative address—between, more broadly, sentimental image 
and self-conscious letter.  
The shame that accumulates throughout the novel around sentimental tokens 
most fully mediates between excessive sentimental investment and critical detachment 
when George’s love letter to Becky is once more delivered—passed on to Amelia near 
the end of Vanity Fair, yielding its most pronounced and productive shaming effect.  
Here, “The letter before Waterloo” takes the additional form of Thackeray’s 
illustration of Amelia’s response to the letter, an illustration paired with narration, 
directly addressed to the reader, of the pictured moment (see figure 3).  “The Letter 
before Waterloo” exemplifies Thackeray’s concerns over sentimentality, concerns 
particularly manifest in the novel’s sentimental letters and feminized bodies.  In the 
accompanying narration, both become the material, not of contemptuous repudiation, 
but of Thackeray’s shameful recirculation, which seeks, through self-conscious direct 
address, to negotiate sentimentality’s affective and formal binds.  
Considered on its own, the illustration “The letter before Waterloo” stages a 
highly sentimental set piece.  The conventional trappings of sentimentality’s 
spectacular identification are in place: the visibly overwrought body of a suffering 
women is reinforced by plentiful pathetic gestures and signals—a clutched letter, a 
covered face, and a dark shadow cast over the cherished portraits of her late husband 
and her son.  Within Victorian conventions for codified rhetorical gestures, Amelia’s  
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Figure 3.  William Makepeace Thackeray, 
“The letter before Waterloo,” Vanity Fair (681). 
 
 
pose is especially legible as the suffering of shame.  Her posture reproduces the 
hanging of the head and covered eyes associated with shame in popular acting and 
rhetorical guidebooks, particularly resembling the illustration of “a female 
expression”of “shame in the extreme” in Gilbert Austin’s popular nineteenth-century 
treatise on rhetorical delivery (see figure 4).31  In Austin’s listing of significant 
gestures for “The Head and Face” and “The Hands,” he notes that “[t]he hanging 
down of the head denotes shame or grief” and “[t]he hand on the head indicates pain 
or distress.  On the eyes, shame.”32  In an acting manual influential throughout the 
nineteenth century, Henry Siddons similarly argues that “To veil and cover up the face 
. . . is equally the sign of shame and modesty”; he additionally describes common 
manifestations of a shamed person: “He hangs his head on his breast; his neck stiffens,  
                                                
31 Gilbert Austin, Chironomia, or A treatise on rhetorical delivery . . . (London: W. Bulmer and Co., 
1806), 489, figure 108. 
32 Ibid., 482, 484. 
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Figure 4.  “Shame,” from Gilbert Austin,  
Chironomia, or A treatise on rhetorical 
 delivery . . . (489, figure 108). 
  
as it were, to resist any effort to lift up his head; and he either averts his timid eyes, or 
conceals them under his eyelids.”33  While Amelia’s body follows such convention in 
signifying shame, it is shame deployed sentimentally, in the sense that its 
representation goes to various sentimental extremes.  Amelia’s hunched posture and 
dangling arm portray her shame and grief as overwhelming and immediate.  The 
primary reliance on a conventional, visual posture to convey emotions also lessens 
their ambiguity.  The conventional visual form further creates a temporal limitation, a 
formal difficulty of portraying Amelia’s feeling developing or changing over narrative 
time, that gives it a particularly fixed quality.  Formally emphasizing these sentimental 
qualities in the illustration, by depicting shame not just visually, but conventionally 
and excessively, Thackeray highlights the challenges of sentimentality, not as a 
specifically visual form, but more broadly as an affective structure focused on 
spectacular identification.   
                                                
33 Henry Siddons, Practical illustrations of rhetorical gesture and action; adapted to the English 
drama: from a work on the subject by M. Engel, 2d ed. (London: Sherwood, Neely and Jones, 1822), 6, 
174. 
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Figure 5.  “Contempt,” from Henry Siddons,  
Practical illustrations of rhetorical gesture and action (39). 
 
Thackeray problematizes sentimentality in “The letter before Waterloo” by 
taking it to certain extremes, and he further critiques it by including a discordant 
feature within the sentimental frame: Becky’s clearly non-identifying presence as she 
looks at Amelia’s emotive display.  Becky exudes an emotion particularly resonant 
with the illustration of contempt in Siddons’ acting manual—a contempt apparent by  
the conventions of rhetorical gestures (see figure 5).34  By inserting an unambiguous 
figure of contempt within the system of signs otherwise orchestrated by the 
conventions of sentimental submission, Thackeray produces a tension within the 
sentimental image that points up the limits of sentimentality as a mode demanding 
                                                
34 The illustration is described as “a kind of pantomime, frequently resorted to by the Italian, when he 
wishes to express his contempt of a menace or a warning. He gently draws the back of his hand several 
times under his chin, and turns back his head with an ironical smile, as if deaf to the speaker, and 
concentrated in himself.” Becky’s pose also resembles “other marks of disdain” described elsewhere: “a 
glance of raillery, while the head inclines a little on one side”; “a disdainful smile, mixed with pity”; 
and “turning away from the person, or looking at him aside, darting a quick glance with a haughty air.  
Sometimes with the head turned over the shoulder, as if the object were unworthy of a more serious or 
attentive examination” (Siddons, 169-70). 
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absolute, immediate and unambiguous identification.  Becky, here, seems to represent 
the necessary casualty—an affective rupture—of such rigid relational and formal 
demands on the representation of feeling.  In this sense, “The letter before Waterloo” 
appears to function, much like the narrator’s trope of sentimental letters in the world 
of Vanity Fair, as an encapsulation of sentimentality’s basic lack of viability—an 
“indelible” mode destined for obsolescence and “destruction.”  
However, the sentimental letter, as we have seen, does not remain an 
irresolvable emotional problem in Vanity Fair, as its supplementation by shame 
negotiates the seeming rupture between sentimentality and contempt. “The letter 
before Waterloo,” similarly, cannot be considered on its own, and lends itself to 
shameful revision within the larger narrative context of Vanity Fair.  In the case of 
“The letter before Waterloo,” the spectacle of Amelia’s shame already appears in the 
sentimental image itself, emphasizing the possibility for reworking rather than merely 
repudiating the sentimental mode.  The narration of the moment pictured in “The letter 
before Waterloo” takes the sentimentally deployed spectacle of shame and transforms 
it into a looser affective and aesthetic mode that can address sentimentality’s greatest 
limitations.  While the illustration pushes shame toward sentimental rigidity, the 
narration emphasizes those aspects of shame that can preserve sentimentality’s 
assets—particularly its embodied, intensely relational immediacy—combined with a 
critical capacity for spectacularly disrupted identification, reflective temporality, and 
accumulating thoughts and feeling.  
Initially, the narration of Amelia’s reception of the letter seems simply to 
duplicate the emotional dynamics of the illustration.  Amelia displays passive and 
suspended emotional submission, while Becky appears detached from her histrionics:  
 
Emmy’s head sank down, and for almost the last time in which she shall be 
called upon to weep in this history, she commenced that work.  Her head fell to 
her bosom, and her hands went up to her eyes; and there for awhile, she gave 
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way to her emotions, as Becky stood on and regarded her. (680-81) 
But while Becky regards from a distance, the narrator ushers the reader further into the 
scene, where its emotive spectacle appears a more complex matter than at first 
suspected:   
 
Who shall analyze those tears, and say whether they were sweet or bitter? Was 
she grieved, because the idol of her life was tumbled down and shivered at her 
feet, or indignant that her love had been so despised, or glad because the 
barrier was removed which modesty had placed between her and a new, a real 
affection? “There is nothing to forbid me now,” she thought. “I may love him 
with all my heart now. O, I will, I will, if he will but let me and forgive me.” I 
believe it was this feeling rushed over all the others which agitated that gentle 
bosom. (681-82) 
Amelia’s shaming becomes the occasion for Thackeray to broach one of the central 
questions of sentimentality, in past and continuing debates: “Who shall analyze those 
tears”?  If we consider “tears” in their common function as a synecdoche for the 
sentimental mode, the question opens onto a number of significant lines of inquiry 
raised in and around Thackeray’s work, and in sentimentality studies more generally: 
Does sentimentality warrant or benefit from analysis? Can sentimentality and 
analysis—or, more generally, extreme emotion and rational thought—productively 
coexist?  Is sentimentality a valid mode for self-analysis, or must it be analyzed from 
an outside, detached position?  Thackeray, in his presentation of Amelia, as well as in 
his figuration of the perceptive narrator and reader through highly self-conscious 
direct address, pursues these questions by melding sentimentality and shame into what 
we might call a mode of analytic tears.   
In contrast to Amelia’s sentimental brooding, her sentimental “tears” here 
provide a vehicle for her most self-conscious, yet emotionally invested, analysis of 
herself and others.  They become such a vehicle through her acute shame: “this 
feeling” that “rushed over all the others which agitated that gentle bosom,” her sense 
that “I may love [Dobbin] . . . if he will but let me and forgive me.”  The passage 
emphasizes those aspects of shame that are downplayed in “The letter before 
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Waterloo,” while preserving shame’s compelling effect in the image.  The narrative 
maintains shame’s visually engaging, embodied quality in the illustration, as Amelia 
physically “g[ives] way to her emotions” with bowed head and covered eyes.  But the 
emphasis now lies on the “emotions”—wavering and accumulating, including varied 
feelings and “thought”—that intense shame particularly accommodates.  As “this 
feeling rushed over all the others,” in the description, the divergent strands of “love” 
and grief, of feelings “glad” and “indignant,” gather in shame’s wake, accentuating its 
function as a meta-feeling, reflective on other emotions. 
Mixing diverse feelings from her past and present, Amelia’s rush of shame also 
delivers on the reflective potential latent in her earlier, fleeting touches of shame.   
Amelia finally makes the “confession,” the assault on her own “pride and vanity,” of 
“how different the real man was from that superb young hero whom she had 
worshipped”—a confession predicted by the narrator when Amelia visits her parents’ 
home and her old scene of sentimental reading (262).  Similar to that early incident in 
the novel, we have by this point seen Amelia inch toward, yet finally retreat from, 
such shameful insight when she quarrels with Dobbin shortly before receiving 
George’s letter from Becky, accusing him of unjustly tainting George by implying an 
indiscretion with Becky.  Dobbin denies the charge: “‘Reflect, afterwards when—
when you are at leisure, and your conscience will withdraw this accusation.  It does 
even now.’ Amelia held down her head” (669).  Dobbin reads the signification of 
Amelia’s reflective “confession” in her bowed head, but in addition to signaling her 
own developing critical insights, her shamed posture is portrayed, in this instance, as 
particularly conducive to inciting them in others.  Dobbin echoes Amelia’s developing 
reflective stance when he interrogates his own delusive idealization of Amelia:  
 
“It is not that speech of yesterday,” he continued, “which moves you. This is 
but a pretext, Amelia, or I have loved you and watched you for fifteen years in 
vain. Have I not learned in that time to read all your feelings, and to look into 
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your thoughts? I know what your heart is capable of: it can cling faithfully to a 
recollection, and cherish a fancy; but it can’t feel such an attachment as mine 
deserves to mate with, and such as I would have won from a woman more 
generous than you. No you are not worthy of the love which I have devoted to 
you . . . you couldn’t reach up to the height of the attachment which I bore you, 
and which a loftier soul than yours might have been proud to share.” (669) 
Amelia’s shameful spectacle appears poised to challenge, not just for herself but for 
Dobbin, the threat of vain interpretation that fails to accumulate insight over time—the 
threat that “I have loved you and watched you for fifteen years in vain.”  However, 
another form of vanity still plagues such accumulative insight, even if achieved: the 
possibility that discerning interpretation will lead to an affective rupture with the 
object of heightened critical scrutiny, making “fifteen years” of “lov[ing] and 
watch[ing]” as emotionally vacant as the unreflective alternative is critically vacant.  
Thus, although Dobbin believes that “I have learned in that time to read all your 
feelings, and to look into your thoughts,” such learning leaves little room for 
emotional attachment to the woman read.  Instead, as a result of such learned reading, 
“William thus suddenly broke the chain by which she held him, and declared his 
independence and superiority” (670).  The broken attachment portrayed, here, once 
again stems from a sentimental idealization that cannot be reconciled with critical 
insight.  Amelia’s continuing resistance to her own shameful self-awareness fuels 
Dobbin’s contempt—or at least the closest he ever comes to this position—but in his 
contemptuous critique of Amelia he downplays his own shamefully sentimental 
idealization of her as well.  While briefly admitting that “I was a fool, with fond 
fancies, too,” he still clings to the idea of the “height of the attachment’’ which “a 
loftier soul . . . might have been proud to share.”  His resistance to the full shameful 
exposure of his own misinterpretations, even to himself, continues during (and 
seemingly reinforces) his brief estrangement from Amelia: his belief that his love for 
her is absolutely “flung down and shattered” and “destroyed” is linked, in the 
narration of his thoughts, to his insistence, “Why pine, or be ashamed of my defeat?” 
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(677).  In spurning the sentimental pining of his “fond mistake” he also spurns his 
shame (677). 
 Like the trope of rereading sentimental letters, Dobbin’s desire not to “have 
loved you and watched you for fifteen years in vain” resonates with the dilemma of 
the novel reader, especially one positioned, as the reader of Vanity Fair is, with both 
foregrounded access to representations of characters’ interiorities and constant 
destabilizations of the transparency and reliability of such access.  Thackeray’s self-
conscious narration often produces, for the reader, variations of Dobbin’s question in 
regards to one’s grasp of characters’ “feelings” and “thoughts”—“Have I not learned 
in that time to read all your feelings, and to look into your thoughts?”  “No,” 
Thackeray most often suggests, as his form of direct address regarding characters’ 
feelings and thoughts evokes intimate views but refuses to endorse the “independence 
and superiority” of the confidence that one could “read all your feelings” (italics 
mine).  This refusal of complete critical access does not, however, dismissively imply 
the reader’s sentimental naiveté.  By constantly highlighting the ambiguities, risks, 
and inevitable “fond mistake[s]” of literary interpretation, while balancing these 
mistakes with assurances of the reader’s critical acumen, the direct address of Vanity 
Fair suggests the delicate balance needed to maneuver through the Vanity Fair of 
interpretation, avoiding the minefields of its sentimentally absorbed and 
contemptuously detached extremes.   
Amelia’s eventual reception of George’s letter exemplifies shame’s 
centrality—as literary spectacle and modeled mode of reading—in Thackeray’s 
negotiation of interpretive vanity through direct address.  While the letter before 
Waterloo accrues many characters’ shame in the novel, its final address, to the novel’s 
reader, fashions that reader as an additional spectator and spectacle of shame.  Shame 
exerts on the reader the contagious pull of its striking, embodied spectacle in “The 
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letter before Waterloo,” and the reader’s shame is further invited rhetorically through 
the self-conscious narration of such spectacle.  The question—“Who shall analyze 
those tears, and say whether they were sweet or bitter?”—overlays Amelia’s spectacle 
of shame with the reader’s own exposure, one that, like Amelia’s, centers on processes 
of interpretation. The accumulation of various possible feelings and thoughts within 
Amelia’s shamed posture disrupts the legibility of sentimental identification, replacing 
it with an ambiguous spectacle of disrupted identification that extends to the reader: 
“Was she grieved, because the idol of her life was tumbled down and shivered at her 
feet, or indignant that her love had been so despised, or glad because the barrier was 
removed which modesty had placed between her and a new, a real affection?”  This 
series of questions invokes the individualized workings of the narrator’s and reader’s 
minds, as does the narrator’s qualification of “I believe” when asserting Amelia’s 
dominant feeling.  The reader’s exposure further involves being rhetorically “seen” in 
the scene of reading, inscribed there by reference to the novel itself in the narrator’s 
assurance that it is “almost the last time in which [Amelia] shall be called upon to 
weep in this history.”  Here, the divergent temporalities of plot, narration, and the 
reading are all on display.  While reinforcing the reader’s distance from the characters, 
narrator, and writer of “this history,” Thackeray’s foregrounded layering of 
temporalities also creates a powerful point of affinity—if not rigorous identification—
between Amelia’s retrospective insight through shame, and that demanded from the 
reader.  Thackeray asks the reader to look closely and responsively at Amelia’s 
shamed body and thoughts, and to fill in ambiguities by examining previous narrative 
events and the shifting perceptions of them while reading.  Ultimately, it is not simply 
reading the shamed woman, but also reading like her, that offers a solution to the 
impasse of vain stasis or non-accumulative repetition of the sentimental letter in 
Vanity Fair. 
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“I SHAME TO SAY” 
As Thackeray recirculates the letter before Waterloo to diverse shameful ends 
in Vanity Fair, it is important to recognize the agent of its dramatic redelivery within 
the plot: Becky Sharp.  Becky’s masterfully orchestrated revelation of “how 
shamefully” Amelia has acted represents the apex of her remarkable career in shaming 
effects.  The incident also marks a reversal of an exchange in the novel’s opening 
sequence, in which Becky and Amelia depart from Miss Pinkerton’s academy to enter 
“the world . . . before the two young ladies” (9).  In response to an onslaught of bad 
behavior on Becky’s part—flinging “Johnson’s Dixonary” out the departing carriage’s 
window, mocking the Misses Pinkerton, and rebelliously crying “Vive la France, Vive 
l’Empereur, Vive Bonaparte!”—Amelia attempts a shaming that falls decidedly flat:  
 
 “Oh Rebecca, Rebecca, for shame,” cried Miss Sedley. . . . “How can you 
have such wicked and revengeful thoughts?” 
 “Revenge may be wicked but it’s natural,” answered Miss Rebecca. “I’m 
no angel”—and to say the truth she certainly was not. (10) 
From the novel’s first pages, shame suggestively hovers between the two protagonists, 
as a possible—and clearly yet to be realized—mediator of their relationship with each 
other, with others, and with “the world.”  Thackeray also indicates, from the start, 
which specific qualities of each character might need mediating: Amelia is introduced 
as a sentimental “silly thing,” while Becky is characterized by her “hard-heartedness” 
(5, 11).  We have seen these two emotional poles figured by the “indelible” and 
disappearing ink of the sentimental letter, and by the incompatible postures of Amelia 
and Becky in “The letter before Waterloo”:  the overall structure of Vanity Fair, with 
its parallel plots centered on Amelia and Becky, respectively, similarly thematizes the 
fraught points of contact and divergence between sentimentality and contemptuous 
detachment, and depicts both protagonists’ significant relations to shame as the novel 
explores it as an alternative affective mode.  Just as Amelia’s growing sensitivity to 
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shame highlights its possible disruptions of sentimental stasis through accumulative 
and retrospective analysis, Becky’s engagement with shame emphasizes its 
compelling, embodied effects, which can animate, as well as potentially revise, social 
and aesthetic conventions.  
 In her cantankerous exit from Miss Pinkerton’s academy, Becky’s penetrating 
comprehension of social convention, with its many injustices and hypocrisies, appears 
to find limited relief in a potent mix of  “hatred” and acts of violent revolt and 
rejection.  “An almost livid look of hatred” accompanies her dramatic flinging away of 
the dictionary, followed by “a smile that was perhaps scarcely more agreeable” as she 
says, “So much for the Dixonary, and thank God I’m out of Chiswick” (9).  The 
narrator further emphasizes Becky’s driving “hatred” when he wryly observes that 
“though Miss Rebecca Sharp had twice had occasion to thank Heaven; it has been in 
the first place for ridding her of some person whom she hated, and secondly for 
enabling her to bring her enemies to some sort of perplexity and confusion” (10).  Two 
problems particularly plague Becky’s stark displays of contempt, problems 
accentuated by her richly connotative spurning of “Johnson’s Dixonary.”  How to 
create strong effects in others that are not merely alienating?  And how to establish 
affective investments—in others, in the social world, in literature—that can coexist 
with sharp critical awareness, especially of social and aesthetic conventions?  In 
shame, Becky finds a feeling that does not just work—on her and others—in spite of 
her incisive self-consciousness, but through it.  
 The compatibility of Becky’s heightened awareness with shameful spectacles 
comes into relief through the problems of her sentimental displays.  Martin Meisel 
suggests that Becky’s oft-noted association with theatricality stems not so much from 
skill, as from inadequate sentimental acting: “The reader is brought to perceive Becky 
as an actress because she is a bad actress of sentiment.  The pretense is transparent; the 
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language, attitudes, even costumes, are ‘theatrical’: that is, they are stereotyped, shrill 
(a favorite epithet for Becky’s voice), visibly calculated for ‘effect,’ and faintly wrong 
in timing or tone.”35  Meisel’s description of Becky’s shortcomings reveals 
sentimentality’s tricky bind: how to avoid the “stereotyped” as well as the “faintly 
wrong in timing or tone”?  To seem overly proficient—to avoid the “faintly wrong”—
risks ruining the performance, even as sentimentality, in its mode of immediate 
legibility, relies on repeated conventions that have little room for the “faintly wrong.”  
Accordingly, Becky’s hyperawareness of sentimentality’s conventions, and of the 
need for those conventions to be clearly recognizable, gets her into trouble, making 
her performances look overly contrived, manipulative, and insincere.  Her self-
conscious deployment of sentimental convention especially obtrudes in her various 
retellings of Rawdon Crawley’s abuse of her, when she takes on the role of the 
wronged, innocent wife to explain their separation.  Her recounting of this abuse for 
Jos Sedley pulls out all the stops, as she “passed her handkerchief with tattered lace 
across her eyelids” and proclaims herself the “truest wife that ever lived” and the 
“fondest mother” (655).  When her account culminates with what should be the perfect 
combination of sentimental gestures, it instead becomes most clunky: 
 
 “I had but one child … they tore it from me—tore it from me;” and she put 
her hand to her heart with a passionate gesture of despair, burying her face for 
a moment on the bed.   
 The brandy-bottle inside clinked up against the plate which held the cold 
sausage.  Both were moved, no doubt, by the exhibition of so much grief. (655) 
Becky’s patent hypocrisy is the most obvious focus of satire here.  But Thackeray also 
troubles, as he does in his earlier essays, the aesthetic clumsiness of trying to juggle 
too many sentimental signs at once, despite the codified proliferation needed to 
guaranteed their effect.  The joke of cheap, hard objects jarring against the “exhibition 
                                                
35 Martin Meisel. Realization: Narrative, Pictorial, and Theatrical Arts in Nineteenth-Century England 
(Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1983), 333. 
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of so much grief” additionally suggests the inflexibility of sentimental forms—
especially as they are deployed knowingly by Becky—and the stale repetition required 
for them to move the spectator.  The banging of the brandy-bottle against the 
sentimental gesture emphasizes a further discordance: that between Becky’s growing 
disregard for social niceties after she is spurned by “society,” and her flickering 
desires to reconnect with it.  The narrator warns that, after breaking with her husband, 
“there was a period of Mrs. Becky’s life, when she was seized, not by remorse, but by 
a kind of despair, and absolutely neglected her person, and did not even care for her 
reputation” (638).  During this near-shameless break with social norms, spurts of 
sentimentality provide the shaky means of reattachment.      
 However, when Becky is moving up in “good” society, and resides briefly 
among the best before her fall, shame proves her greatest asset, allowing her to 
produce effective, self-conscious and affectively charged spectacles.  The affective 
animation of shame wards off bouts of alienation: even when Becky is most fully 
integrated into high society, the narrator suggests that she maintains strains of the 
active contempt of her youth and anticipates the listless “kind of despair . . . that did 
not even care for her reputation” toward which she is headed: 
 
Becky has often spoken in subsequent years of this season in her life when she 
moved among the very greatest circles of the London fashion. Her success 
excited, elated, and then bored her. . . . Becky’s former acquaintances hated 
and envied her: the poor woman herself was yawning in spirit. “I wish I were 
out of it,” she said to herself. “I would rather be a parson’s wife, and teach a 
Sunday School than this; or a sergeant’s lady and ride in the regimental wagon; 
or, O how much gayer it would be to wear the spangles and trowsers, and 
dance before a booth at a fair.” (504)  
The fantasy of the sensational self-exposure of “danc[ing] before a booth at a fair” 
sparks a renewed interest in those around her, spurred by her sense of the aghast 
fascination she could extract from them: “How Lady Blinkey would open her eyes, 
and Lady Grizzel Macbeth would stare!” (504).  The fantasy briefly cures her 
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“yawning in spirit,” but imaginatively takes the spectacle of shame to the shameless 
extremity of a final act of defiance, akin to pitching “Johnson’s Dixonary” back at 
those who gave it to her.   
In practice, Becky avoids such full and permanent shameful exposure, instead 
harnessing the frisson of shame through carefully calibrated, partial displays.  The 
technique is exemplified by the show Becky actually gives Lady Grizzel Macbeth, 
who becomes irritated when Becky converses in perfect French “rather 
ostentatiously”:   
 
 “How very well you speak French,” Lady Grizzel said. . . .  
 “I ought to know it,” Becky modestly said, casting down her eyes. “I taught 
it in a school, and my mother was a Frenchwoman.” 
 Lady Grizell was won by her humility, and was mollified towards the little 
woman. She deplored the leveling tendencies of the age, which admitted 
persons of all classes into the society of their superiors: but her ladyship 
owned, that this one at least was well behaved and never forgot her place in 
life.  (505) 
Rather than phobicly dodge the shame clustering around her upward mobility and 
dubious origins, Becky eagerly showcases it, always keeping tight reins on the 
performance.  Through her understanding of social norms and their slightest 
deviations, as well as her more contextually specific self-consciousness, she probes the 
limits of the socially acceptable, and in so doing pushes them as well.  With shame, 
the “faintly wrong in timing or tone” drives, rather than deflates, the effect.  Becky 
uses what is slightly off in herself or others as the terms of engagement, making that 
the space for subtle revision of the very conventions she employs.  Accordingly, 
“Lady Grizell was won by her humility” and gives Becky a place in her circle that her 
fixed sense of propriety would not usually allow.   At other times, Becky wins over 
others by wielding their shame as her protection.  When Mr. Wagg approaches Becky 
at a dinner party, intent on publicly humiliating her, “The little woman, attacked on a 
sudden, but never without arms, lighted up in an instant, parried and reposted with a 
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home-thrust, which made Wagg’s face tingle with shame” (506).  Self-
consciousness—and the ability to incite it in others—proves an active weapon, rather 
than a fatal flaw, in her social performances: shameful self-consciousness pierces the 
body as much as sentimentality, and keeps Becky “lighted up” in animated relation to 
surroundings that otherwise risk losing their affective hold on her.    
Becky’s spectacles of shame also capitalize on an ambiguity of signification 
that sentimentality cannot easily accommodate.  Her sallies with Rawdon during their 
courtship exemplify her technique of skillfully conjuring the contours of her own 
possible shame, but refusing fully to inhabit them.  When Rawdon “rallied her about 
his father’s attachment,” Becky seizes on the promising material, piling all her various 
claims to shame—class, nationality, and sexuality—onto his suggestion: “You don’t 
suppose I can’t defend my own honour”; “Do you suppose I have no feeling of self-
respect, because I am poor and friendless, and because rich people have none?”; “Do 
you suppose a Montmorency is not as good as a Crawley?” (143).  Her litany of 
amassed humiliations—painstakingly outlined through her ostensible refusal of 
them—culminates in the deflection of shame onto Rawdon: “I can endure poverty, but 
not shame—neglect, but not insult; and insult from—from you” (143).  Far from 
repelled, Rawdon is left a “humiliated, infatuated guards-man” (143).  When Becky 
strains at embodying sentimental clichés like the “truest wife that ever lived” and the 
“fondest mother,” the glaring gap between herself and the idealized, inflexible 
signifier signals the failure of her sentimental mode: with shame, such a gap forms the 
essence of the show, and critical self-consciousness only heightens the effects.  
Becky’s most intriguing shameful effects insinuate her distance from the social ideal, 
while also eluding the absolute stain of irredeemable shame. 
Vanity Fair depicts such ambiguous shame as a dangerous, but also potentially 
quite profitable, form.  Thackeray’s own style intersects in striking—and sometimes 
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rather ostentatious—ways with Becky’s speculative courting of shame.  The narrator’s 
constant, pointed direct address to the reader echoes in Becky’s rhetorical flourish, 
designed to spread shame to Rawdon: “I can endure poverty, but not shame . . . from 
you.”  Thackeray’s narrative techniques, particularly direct address, most 
conspicuously overlap with Becky’s shameful spectacles when her affair with Lord 
Steyne propels her towards dizzying rewards as well as considerable risk.  Becky’s 
indelicate connection with Lord Steyne fuels her social and financial credit as long as 
its exact nature can be kept provocatively fuzzy.  To emphasize the precariousness of 
her lucrative position, the narrator describes Becky’s reputation being bandied about 
freely by merchants and servants as well as high society.  The narrator brings the 
reader into this circulation of Becky’s story when he directly warns “you” about 
trafficking, like Becky, in ambiguous shame:  
 
 If you are guilty: tremble. That fellow behind your chair may be Janissary 
with a bow-string in his plush breeches pocket. If you are not guilty have a 
care of appearances: which are as ruinous as guilt. 
 “Was Rebecca guilty or not?” the Vehmgericht of the servants’ hall had 
pronounced against her. 
 And, I shame to say, she would not have got credit had they not believed 
her to be guilty. . . . And so—guiltless very likely—she was writhing and 
pushing onward towards what they call a “position in society,” and the servants 
were pointing at her as lost and ruined. (445) 
What begins as a warning against Becky’s flirtations with disgrace takes on their 
defining features as the passage continues.  Shame spreads, here, from the possibly 
guilty Rebecca to the surrounding activity of posing—and speculating on—the 
question of her guilt.  The narrator broaches this shameful activity—what “I shame to 
say”—by lingering, much like Becky’s wont, on its classed inflections, associating 
such speculation with the “Vehmgericht of the servants’ hall.”   The narrator also, 
however, claims a distinction between himself and those shamefully gambling on the 
assumption of Becky’s necessary guilt.  Unlike “those who had pronounced against 
her” as “lost and ruined” (many of whom ultimately suffer financially from this 
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unsound premise for “credit”), the narrator refuses to fix Becky’s guilt, wavering 
between the presentation of damning evidence and the possibility that she is “guiltless 
very likely.”  The narrator therefore resists fixing his own shame as well, insofar as 
such shame depends on declaring Becky unequivocally guilty, and speculating on that 
absolute guilt.  He stakes his claim, instead, on the narrative “credit” of Becky’s 
ambiguous displays of shame.     
Thackeray most dramatically calls in the value of such narrative credit when 
Becky loses control of her own shameful speculations.  Upon being discovered with 
Lord Steyne in compromising circumstances, Becky must forgo her previously 
profitable coyness in a stab at saving face with her husband: “‘I am innocent,’ said 
Becky. And he left without another word” (534).  After desperately repeating the 
hackneyed refrain of stage-melodrama heroines—“I am innocent”—to no effect, 
Becky is left amidst her “heap of tumbled vanities lying in a wreck,” which, we learn 
earlier in the scene, includes “banks notes” and “love-letters many years old.”36  The 
contents of her thoughts parallel the “tumbled vanities” of these documents, as the 
narrator asks, “What were her thoughts when he left her?” and then fills them in 
partially: “She thought of her long past life, and all the dismal incidents of it.  Ah, how 
dreary it seemed, how miserable, lonely and profitless!” (534-35).     
Just as Amelia’s shamed body approximates the extremities of sentimentality 
in “The letter before Waterloo,” Becky’s shamed thoughts here slide toward the other 
extreme—the blank of detachment.  Her interiority resonates with the dilemma of the 
                                                
36 Describing acting in nineteenth-century English melodrama, Michael R. Booth highlights “outraged 
innocence” as one of the main emotions the heroine conventionally performs, with “innocent” serving 
as a “word usually uttered by misunderstood heroines” in a distinctive style.  Booth quotes from H. J. 
Smith’s “The Melodrama,” Atlantic Monthly (March 1907) to illustrate this histrionic style: “It should 
be dwelt on syllable by syllable, and a certain long-drawn prominence should be given to the n’s. For 
gesture, one hand may be slightly extended and upraised, the other pressed timidly upon the breast; and 
at the close of the word the eyes should fall, the head droop forward with sweet submission.  This 
position may be retained for several seconds. Then, the gallery will clap—tumultuously.” Michael R. 
Booth, English Melodrama (London: Herbert Jenkins, 1965), 201, 194. 
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sentimental letter in Vanity Fair, its “destruction,” as well as its disappearing ink, now 
moved inward to fuse letter and exposed feminine mind.  The crisis of Becky’s fall 
from social grace carries a tinge of wish fulfillment, as if the inevitable climax of the 
contemptuous longing for social rupture contained in Becky’s hurling of the dictionary 
and fantasy of dancing in the fair.  When the break actually arrives, however, Becky 
grasps at the traces of the sentimental signifier—the cliché “I am innocent” being just 
her first attempt—whose emotional effects, on herself and others, seem fading fast.  
While Becky’s shameful spectacles entertain the reanimating and revisionary 
possibilities of shame throughout much of Vanity Fair, this push to the brink of social 
alienation delves anxiously into shame’s distinct hazards.  Subsequently, in Becky’s 
frequent, active flouting of social conventions, interspersed with numerous incidents 
of her being peremptorily cut by former acquaintances when she attempts 
reconnection, the narrative stages two such risks: voluntary isolation and repressive 
banishment imposed “for shame.” 
Just as the sentimental manifestation of “The letter before Waterloo” was not 
its final destination, Becky’s exposed mind, mirroring the haunting extremes of 
sentimental ink, is also redelivered, here via direct address to the reader.  The narrator 
follows the answered question, “What were her thoughts when he left her?” with a 
more open-ended query: 
 
What had happened? Was she guilty or not? She said not; but who could tell 
what was truth when it came from those lips; or if that corrupt heart was in this 
case pure? All her lies and her schemes, all her selfishness and her wiles, all 
her wit and genius had come to this bankruptcy. (535) 
On the one hand, the narrator appears to replicate Becky’s disdainfully detached 
tendencies, fueled by her keen insight, in this case critically rejecting Becky herself as 
a worthless, “corrupt” object of contempt.  But on the other hand, the narrator turns 
toward reconnection in Becky’s own favorite form, the spectacle of ambiguous shame.  
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The unresolved question of Becky’s guilt in the affair with Lord Steyne places an 
essential ambiguity at the “heart” of Vanity Fair.  Thackeray counteracts the 
“bankruptcy” of Becky’s assigned guilt within the world of Vanity Fair by endlessly 
prolonging the ambiguous and enticing effects of Becky’s shameful speculations 
within the narrative of Vanity Fair.  The narrator’s questions cast his and the reader’s 
interpretive processes as additional spectacles, especially steeped in shame: the 
recirculated question of the “servants’ hall”—“Was Rebecca guilty or not?”—that the 
narrator would “shame to say,” is here said anyway in direct address to the reader.  As 
Becky embarks on her shameless descent, direct address keeps her ambiguous 
shame—and its potentially engaging spectacle—in sight.              
The feminized bodies of the narrator and addressed reader are even more 
directly exposed as Becky threatens to sink entirely out of narrative view.  When the 
narration approaches “a period in Mrs. Becky’s life, when she . . . absolutely neglected 
her person, and did not even care about her reputation,” the question of what one 
might “shame to say” switches to the content of the novel itself.  The narrator coyly 
highlights and downplays the scandalous content of Vanity Fair: “If we were to give a 
full account of her proceeding during a couple of years that followed after the Curzon 
Street catastrophe, there might be some reason for people to say this book was 
improper” (638).  To keep the novel presentable, Becky is slowly submerged in a 
murky pool of  “abattement and degradation . . . as a man who goes overboard hangs 
on to a spar whilst any hope is left, and then flings it away and goes down, when he 
finds that struggling he is vain.” (638).  In contrast, the narrator and reader are kept 
afloat, and clearly in view, through the more ambiguous spectacle of their shared 
shame:    
 
We must pass over a part of Mrs. Rebecca Crawley’s biography with that 
lightness and delicacy which the world demands—the moral world, that has, 
perhaps, no particular objection to vice, but an insuperable repugnance to 
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hearing vice called by its proper name. There are things we do and know 
perfectly well in Vanity Fair, though we never speak of them . . . and a polite 
public will no more bear to read an authentic description of vice than a truly-
refined English or American female will permit the word breeches to be 
pronounced in her chaste hearing. And yet, Madam, both are walking the world 
before our faces every day, without much shocking us. If you were to blush 
every time they went by what complexions you would have! It is only when 
their naughty names are called out that your modesty has any occasion to show 
alarm or sense of outrage, and it has been the wish of the present writer, all 
through this story, deferentially to submit to the fashion at present prevailing, 
and only to hint at the existence of wickedness in a light, easy, and agreeable 
manner, so that nobody’s fine feelings may be offended. (637) 
As in “Going to See a Man Hanged,” Thackeray—as the “present writer”—here 
comes “face to face” with the reader—a reader who is no longer imagined as “an 
individual man,” but as a blushing, “truly-refined English or American female.”  By 
comparing Vanity Fair’s narration to the “breeches” that are “walking the world 
before our faces every day,” the narrator stages a confrontation between a masculine 
form (“breeches”) and the feminization of “our faces” that are possibly blushing.  On 
the one hand, the narrator wields the masculine power of “breeches,” using his direct 
address to shame the susceptible, feminized reader.  In this sense, the image of the 
automatic, overwhelming, and constant blush in response to “breeches”—“If you were 
to blush every time they went by what complexions you would have!”—foregrounds 
the potential of shame’s impact to be as immediate, embodied, and statically repeated 
as sentimentality, particularly the emblematic sentimental tears.  But on the other 
hand, a constant, uncontrolled physical response is precisely what the addressed 
“Madam” does not have; instead this figure for the reader “has any occasion to show 
alarm or sense of outrage” only intermittently, and “only when their naughty names 
are called out.”  This feminized “polite public” of blushing readers take on the 
“breeches,” insofar as they combine the embodied, emotive sensitivity culturally 
aligned with the feminine and the controlled rational judgment associated with the 
masculine.  The blush maintains a selective responsiveness: it is specifically attuned to 
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linguistic signification and transgression of conventional usages—“naughty names” 
that are “called out” in violation of the representative norms of the “fashion at present 
prevailing.”  Far from the unreflective, purely emotive sentimental vulnerability that 
critics have perceived in Thackeray’s characterizations of the feminized reader, this 
vividly evoked “English or American female” cultivates a strangely calibrated blush, 
one that extends the viscerally charged and analytically controlled qualities we have 
seen in Amelia’s analytic tears and Becky’s self-conscious spectacles of shame.  Set 
quietly next to, and despite, his satire of feminine “fine feelings,” Thackeray’s 
figuration of the reader blends emotive investment and critical acumen through an 
emotionally charged, self-conscious shame.  Thackeray’s blushing “Madam,” evincing 
the feminine self-consciousness of “breeches” and the masculine self-consciousness of 
one who wears the “breeches,” tentatively negotiates Vanity Fair’s thematized 
emotional problem—with its heavily gendered implications—by staging a critically 
conscious and emotionally invested response to the “things we do and know perfectly 
well in Vanity Fair,” and to how these “things” appear in literature.   
While the selectively blushing woman is accorded some of the critical self-
consciousness aligned with the “breeches,” the narrator initially appears to waver 
between his possible affinity with the blushing physiognomy—suggested in the joint 
image of “our faces”—and a firmly phobic projection of that exposed face squarely 
onto the feminized “you.”  As the passage continues, however, the narrator—cast as 
an “I” and an “author, with modest pride”—presents the image of the “monster’s 
hideous tail” that threatens his own shameful exposure, providing “some reason for 
people to say this book was improper”:   
 
I defy anyone to say that our Becky, who has certainly some vices, has not 
been presented to the public in a perfectly genteel and inoffensive manner.  In 
describing this syren, singing and smiling, coaxing and cajoling, the author, 
with modest pride, asks his readers all round, has he once forgotten the laws of 
politeness, and showed the monster’s hideous tail above water? No! Those 
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who like may peep down under waves that are pretty transparent, and see it 
writhing and twirling, diabolically hidden and slimy, flapping amongst bones, 
or curling round corpses; but about the water-line, I ask, has not everything 
been proper, agreeable, decorous, and has any the most squeamish immoralist 
in Vanity Fair a right to cry fie? When, however, the syren disappears and 
dives below, down among the dead men, the water of course grows turbid over 
her, and it is labour lost to look into it ever so curiously. (638) 
The overdetermined “monster’s hideous tail,” affixed to the “syren,” is central to 
many assessments of Vanity Fair’s gender ideology, with interpretations of its rich 
symbolism ascribing to it everything from the height of misogynist fear to more 
ambivalent justifications of Becky or assertions of her power.37  It is useful to 
contextualize this striking image of the “tail” as a continuation of the immediately 
preceding “breeches,” and thus as part of a broader, specifically linguistic spectacle of 
flirtatiously shameful exposure.  “[T]he author” and his acts of “describing” and 
“show[ing]” are as much on display here as Becky’s “tail,” just as his narrative’s 
figurative “breeches” have previously stood in for “Mrs. Rebecca Crawley’s 
biography.”  Adopting the seemingly defensive position of “defy[ing] anyone to say 
that our Becky . . . has not been presented to the public in a perfectly genteel and 
inoffensive manner,” the author’s honor appears as much at stake as Becky’s own.  
And like Becky, in her earlier, ambiguous shows of shame, the author’s denial of 
shame is a histrionic, seductive suggestion of it.   The author’s “hideous tail” unfurls 
here, as elsewhere, through direct address, rhetorically curling around the reading 
public with the suggestive question that the “author . . . asks his readers all round.”  
                                                
37 See, for example, Richard Barickman, Susan MacDonald, and Myra Stark, Corrupt Relations: 
Dickens, Thackeray, Trollope, Collins, and the Victorian Sexual System (New York: Columbia Univ. 
Press, 1982); Judith L. Fisher, Thackeray’s Skeptical Narrative and the "Perilous Trade" of Authorship 
(Burlington: Ashgate, 2002); Lisa Jadwin, “Clytemnestra Rewarded: The Double Conclusion of Vanity 
Fair,” in Famous Last Words: Changes in Gender and Narrative Closure, ed. Alison Booth 
(Charlottesville: Univ. of Virginia Press, 1993); James Phelan, “Vanity Fair: Listening as a 
Rhetorician—and a Feminist,” in Out of Bounds: Male Voices and Gender(ed) Criticism, eds. Laura 
Claridge and Elizabeth Langland (Amherst: Univ. of Massachusetts Press, 1990); and Harry E. Shaw, 
“Why Won’t Our Terms Stay Put? The Narrative Communication Diagram Scrutinized and 
Historicized,” in A Companion to Narrative Theory, eds. James Phelan and Peter J. Rabinowitz 
(Malden: Blackwell, 2005).  
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The author’s terse disavowal of the “monster’s hideous tail above water”—his 
emphatic “No!”—is undercut by the lingering invocation of “waves that are pretty 
transparent” in his next, slowly uncoiling question.  Inviting the blushing reader to 
more actively, and shamefully, “peep down,” the shimmering “water-line” of the 
narrator’s question, much like the blush, animates a “proper, agreeable, decorous” 
posture on the narrator’s part, but one that still provides a “pretty transparent” view to 
fuller shame down below.  Even as, at this point in the novel, Becky figuratively 
drowns in her increasing disregard of her deepening shame, even though “the water of 
course grows turbid over her, and it is labour lost to look into it ever so curiously,” 
Thackeray, of course, cannot help but look.  Hardly “labour lost,” his persistent, 
ambiguous displays of the shameful woman—whether the blushing “Madam,” 
Amelia, or here, Becky—suggest a model for Vanity Fair’s form and its desired 
narrative effects.   
 
“AUTHORS’ MISERIES” 
Thackeray’s charged imagery of the blushing reader and monstrous author 
comes at the very beginning of the last serial part of Vanity Fair’s first run, when the 
rapidly-approaching publication of Vanity Fair as a single volume perhaps loomed 
large, fueling textual ruminations on reception and authorial self-presentation related 
to, specifically, a “book [that] was improper.”38  Two of Thackeray’s illustrations in 
this final serial installment, “The letter before Waterloo” and “Virtue rewarded. A 
booth in Vanity Fair,” emphasize Vanity Fair’s status as not just “book,” but novel.  In 
“The letter before Waterloo,” the letter that Amelia ambivalently grasps resonates,  
                                                
38 Vanity Fair was first issued in monthly serial parts between January 1847 and July 1848.  The last 
serial part, a double-number installment of numbers 19 and 20, was published on July 1, 1848.  The first 
book edition followed soon after, published on July 18, 1848.  Peter L. Shillingsburg provides an 
overview of Vanity Fair’s early publication—detailing how “following the completion of the parts issue 
on 1 July 1848 and during the succeeding fifteen years, Bradbury and Evans issued the first edition of 
Vanity Fair continuously in parts and volume forms”—in “The Printing, Proof-reading and Publishing 
of Thackeray’s Vanity Fair: The First Edition,” Studies in Bibliography 34 (1981): 121. 
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Figure 6.  William Makepeace Thackeray,  
“Virtue rewarded. A booth in Vanity Fair.” Vanity Fair (688). 
 
much like the trope of the “indelible” and fading ink in Vanity Fair, with the form of 
both the serial novel and the sentimental epistolary novel.  The significance of this 
illustration to Thackeray’s meditations on the emotional and material form of his 
novel is heightened by its shifting placement in the text: while “The letter before 
Waterloo” was first published in Vanity Fair’s final serial part, it became the 
frontispiece for the book.  Just as Amelia’s cry of “for shame” to Becky reverberates  
around the two school-girls’ entrance into Vanity Fair, Amelia’s emotive posture of 
shame, as frontispiece, shapes the reader’s affective entry-point into the novel.  This 
new entry point for the book further suggests shame’s relevance, particularly as an 
accumulative, reflective emotion, to Thackeray’s negotiation of sentimental absorption 
and critical detachment, and, further, to his negotiation of serial and single-volume 
material forms, and the emotional problems of shifting between the two.  If “for 
shame” organizes the relations of Amelia and Becky, as characters and as protagonists 
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of a double plot structure, it seems appropriate that the book closes with an ambiguous 
image of Becky’s humility, with Amelia an ambivalent onlooker, in “Virtue rewarded. 
A booth in Vanity Fair” (see figure 6).  Here, the comic allusion to Samuel 
Richardson’s Pamela, or Virtue Rewarded casts Becky’s shamefully self-conscious 
animation and revision of social convention as an intervention in literary conventions, 
especially the sentimental conventions that Richardson’s novels greatly influenced. 
Thackeray’s “Authors’ Miseries,” a series of comic drawings that ran in Punch  
shortly after his completion of Vanity Fair, suggests that the emotional problem 
central to that novel continued to influence not only his own work, but his perception 
of the challenges facing the contemporary author more generally.  The first number of 
“Authors’ Miseries,” published in September of 1848, returns once again to the 
ambiguously emotive female body as central to literary emotions, authorial and 
otherwise.  In the drawing, Thackeray himself stoops over the shoulder of a drowsy 
female reader; the caption deploys a comic variation of direct address as self-address: 
“Perhaps you flatter yourself that you have made an impression on Miss Flannigan (at 
Worthing), and you find her asleep over your favourite number” (see figure 7).39  Miss 
Flannigan’s overdetermined posture condenses the three overlapping affective modes 
of reading emphasized in Vanity Fair: sentimental absorption (“you have made an 
impression on Miss Flannigan); extreme detachment (“you find her asleep over your 
favourite number”); and shame (in its echoes of Amelia’s shamed pose in “The letter 
before Waterloo”).  Thackeray once again “peep[s] down” onto an enticing and 
potentially disturbing sight, but the “truly-refined English . . . female” whose vantage 
he seeks betrays no blush: instead, she takes Becky’s “yawning in spirit” to a 
mortifying extreme—especially mortifying for an author who appears sentimentally 
invested in making a strong and lasting “impression.”  However, it is in this  
                                                
39 William Makepeace Thackeray, “Authors’ Miseries No. 1,” Punch 15 (1848): 105. 
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Figure 7.  William Makepeace Thackeray, 
“Authors’ Miseries No. 1,” from Punch (105). 
 
mortification, as it broaches sentimentality, that a possible source of reinvigorated 
interest emerges, if not for Miss Flannigan then for the reader of the drawing who 
peeps at the shamefully exposed author as he raptly reads his possible “impression” on 
a novel reader.  The serial part is at the center of Thackeray’s shamefully self-
conscious negotiation of readers’ affective responses.  But insofar as the discarded 
“number” at the woman’s feet resonates with the number of this drawing, the number 
of a serial novel like the recently published Vanity Fair, and, through the allusion to 
Amelia’s posture in Vanity Fair’s frontispiece, the sentimental letter and sentimental 
epistolary form, Thackeray consolidates here not just many of the forms contemporary 
authors and readers were facing, but the diverse affective strands that could, in their 
aesthetic intermingling, shape—even reanimate—their conventions.   
Despite the current critical view that Thackeray’s work is afflicted by a 
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contemptuous, or emotionally detached, self-consciousness, Thackeray was not alone 
in his sense that shame constituted, but might also help solve, both “Authors’ 
Miseries” and those miseries inflicted by authors on the reading public.  George Henry 
Lewes notes of Thackeray, in 1848, that “[t]he author indulges in no sentimentalities,” 
further observing that “Mr. Thackeray grows serious and pathetic at times—but almost 
as if he were ashamed of it, like a man caught in tears at the theatre.”  Lewes gestures 
at the broader literary scene that this “almost . . . ashamed” style could benefit, casting 
Thackeray’s avoidance of sentimental indulgence as “a merit worth noting in a literary 
age which has a tendency to mistake spasm for force.”40  In another 1848 review of 
Thackeray’s writing, Abraham Hayward similarly picks up on an ambiguous, yet 
palpable, shame in Thackeray’s style:  
 
His pathos (though not so deep as Dickens) is exquisite; the more so, perhaps, 
because he seems to struggle against it, and to be half ashamed of being caught 
in the melting mood, but the attempt to be caustic, satirical, ironical, or 
philosophical, on such occasions, is uniformly vain and again and again have 
we found reason to admire how an originally fine and kind nature remains 
essentially free from worldliness, and, in the highest pride of intellect, pays 
homage to the heart.41 
Such accounts may seem surprising for current readers, prone to understand 
Thackeray’s “intellect” as decidedly at odds with his “heart.”  Nonetheless, they 
capture the possibilities of Thackeray’s work and its potent mix of critical and 
affective modes—the revisionary possibilities of being “half ashamed of being caught 
in the melting mood.”  
 
 
 
 
                                                
40 George Henry Lewes, “Vanity Fair: A Novel without a Hero,” Athenæum (Aug. 12, 1848): 795. 
41 Abraham Hayward, “Thackeray’s Writing,” Edinburgh Review 87 (Jan. 1848): 50. 
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CHAPTER THREE   
“ERRING AS I”:  
JANE EYRE’S SHAMEFUL REVISIONS OF VICTORIAN SYMPATHY 
 
“PAIN, SHAME, IRE”  
 
     We were ascending the avenue when he thus paused; the hall was before 
us. Lifting his eye to the battlements, he cast over them a glare such as I 
never saw before or since. Pain, shame, ire—impatience, disgust, 
detestation—seemed momentarily to hold a quivering conflict in the large 
pupil dilating under his ebon eyebrow. Wild was the wrestle which should be 
paramount; but another feeling rose and triumphed; something hard and 
cynical; self-willed and resolute: it settled his passion and petrified his 
countenance: he went on:—“During the moment I was silent, Miss Eyre, I 
was arranging a point with my destiny. She stood there, by the beech-
trunk—a hag like one of those who appeared to ‘Macbeth’ on the heath of 
Forres. ‘You like Thornfield?’ she said, lifting her finger; and then she wrote 
in the air a memento, which ran in lurid hieroglyphics all along the house-
front, between the upper and lower row of windows. ‘Like it if you can!’ 
‘Like it if you dare!’ 
     ‘I will like it,’ said I. ‘I dare to like it;’ and (he subjoined moodily) I will 
keep my word: I will break obstacles to happiness, to goodness—yes, 
goodness.”  
      
     —Charlotte Brontë, Jane Eyre 
 
While Jane Eyre ascribes Rochester’s mysterious pause, here, to an emotional 
battle, it is not entirely clear what feeling comes out on top.  The “quivering conflict” 
between “pain, shame, ire—impatience, disgust, detestation” yields no clear winner 
before the intrusion of “another feeling” that “rose and triumphed.”1  In Rochester’s 
own words, he has been struggling with a “hag”—clearly an allusion to his hidden 
wife, Bertha Mason, and the feelings that she both inspires in and embodies for him—
and he pronounces that, having vanquished the “hag,” “happiness” has won the day.  
But this assertion jars with Jane’s description of “something hard and cynical” that has 
ascended over the “quivering conflict” in Rochester’s eye with petrifying effect.   
                                                
1 Charlotte Brontë, Jane Eyre (New York: Norton, 1987), 125.  Further references will appear in the 
text. 
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Rochester forcefully imposes “happiness,” squashing the “quivering conflict” 
of competing emotions, yet Jane’s rapt scrutiny and precise naming of the “pain, 
shame, ire” in his “dilating” eye capture her ongoing interrogation of the role these 
affective modes can play in felicitous selfhood and intimate relations, particularly if 
she is to be happy, as she asserts earlier, “in my way” (7).  Jane, like Rochester, is 
attracted to the state of happiness and its verbal assertion: her confident proclamation 
at novel’s end that “My Edward and I, then, are happy” cements the narrative’s 
romantic resolution (398).  Perhaps more surprisingly, Jane introduces herself in the 
novel’s bleak opening sequence as already enjoying moments of happiness. Despite 
her strong sense of estrangement at Gateshead Hall in her childhood, the narrating 
Jane remembers that, sequestered behind a curtain to read, “With Bewick on my knee, 
I was then happy: happy at least in my way” (7).  Happiness appears a highly 
individualized and malleable state: to be happy in one’s own way can entail personal 
idiosyncrasies and a variety of private and social arrangements, largely because such 
happiness also seems to accommodate, for Jane, other feelings.  If Jane’s intent gaze at 
Rochester’s wrestling “pain, shame, ire”—feelings positioned as simultaneously 
guaranteeing the hero’s emotional complexity, the heroine’s interpretive acuity, and 
the potential depth of their burgeoning intimacy—anticipates the centrality of these 
feelings to her self-proclaimed happiness at the novel’s end, these affective ingredients 
also encapsulate the interpretive lenses and postures that Jane adopts throughout the 
novel, in relation to others as well as to her own, self-narrated “I.”  The novel, as much 
as Jane herself, ultimately refuses to expel “pain,” “shame,” and  “ire” from a 
conception of happiness: these emotions’ “quivering conflict” keeps possibilities for 
relationships and subjectivity at play, as potential sites of revision rather than 
petrification.      
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Jane’s assessment of Rochester’s emotional conflict also offers an apt figure 
for the critical desires and practices that have been directed at Jane Eyre itself.  The 
intense, continuing critical fascination with Charlotte Brontë’s work, and with Jane 
Eyre in particular, has been fueled by questions revolving around psychological—and 
more specifically, emotional—presentation, authority, ownership, and naming.  The 
precise terms of “pain, shame, ire” that Jane initially wields as investigative and 
signifying tools in her analysis of Rochester’s “eye” (and “I”) can be productively 
extended to explore our own critical lenses for Jane Eyre.  The presence of these 
warring feelings metonymically captures three major and often competing affective 
modes that inflected the terms of subjectivity and intimate social relations in 
nineteenth-century British literature and culture.  However, in criticism on Brontë, and 
on the novel form more generally, only two of these feelings have emerged from the 
“quivering conflict” of Victorian affective modes as “paramount”: contemporary 
criticism has been attentive to the centrality of anger—or “ire”—and sympathy—often 
thriving on “pain”—in Victorian social organization, gender relations, and novelistic 
politics and form.  Yet shame, though it presents a potent affective mode, equally 
constitutive of the period’s aesthetic and social possibilities, remains critically 
neglected.  
Shame should inform critical consideration of Jane Eyre, not in order to 
invalidate the current critical lens, but to widen its scope.  In its more self-reflexive 
moments, Jane Eyre models valuable approaches for our continuing engagement with 
the text: chief among these are an array of specified terms for conceptualizing distinct 
yet intersecting affective modes, tempered with the warning that to raise a single 
feeling above the “quivering conflict” can render interpretive possibilities “petrified.”  
Brontë presents shame as an emotion that can enhance possibilities for the self and for 
intimate connections with others, but only through its productive interaction with other 
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feelings such as anger, or sympathy, or happiness.  Shame’s inability to stand alone—
its tendency to hover in the vicinity of other feelings, and its strong registering of the 
demands of others—represents, in fact, a large part of its value in the novel.  As we 
will see, Jane Eyre links such relational qualities of shame to its particular disruption 
of personal emotions: shame not only resists being owned by just one individual, but 
is most compelling in a spectacular, conditional form, when not really belonging to 
anyone at all. 
In Jane Eyre, Brontë explores not just the repressive but the revisionary 
possibilities of the scene of shame, fashioning shameful spectacles that can fuel 
intimate relations while still preserving individual differences, especially emotional 
differences.  Shame’s differentiated intimacy provides, in the novel, a space of 
mediation between the extremes of sympathy and anger.  The near absence of shame 
in critical accounts of Jane Eyre thus produces a problem the novel itself raises, that of 
an evasive affective “medium” between what Jane calls “absolute submission” and 
“determined revolt” in social relations—or, to cast these extremes in the terms of 
contemporary novel criticism, between an oppressively normalizing socialization, 
particularly associated with sympathy, and a potentially antisocial alienation, linked 
with anger (352).  The discussion that follows brings into relief shame’s mediating 
relational and formal role in Jane Eyre, arguing that by constructing a shame-inflected 
narrating voice that enacts and bolsters eroticized investment in individualized 
difference, Brontë questions a normalizing and universalizing modern subjectivity, 
rather than, as some critics have claimed, reinforcing it.  Drawing on theorizations of 
shame’s form, especially those of Philip Fisher, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, and Adam 
Smith, and, aligning this affect theory with narratology, I explore how Brontë 
innovates with retrospective narration and hypothetical focalization to stretch shame’s 
possibilities of intimate relational difference within social relations, subjectivity, 
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novelistic form, and literary hermeneutics.  Brontë’s narrative innovation offers a 
particularly rich example of shameful signification—a signification that disrupts and 
revises sympathy’s often normalizing mimetic imperative, and allows for 
representations of intimate relations that unsettle strict identification.  Insofar as Jane 
Eyre’s shameful signification contributes to an autobiographical narrative voice 
widely regarded, especially from feminist perspectives, as notable for its fraught yet 
potent agency and self-assertion, Brontë’s novel situates shameful signification in an 
empowered voice that particularly showcases the productive, revisionary valences of 
shame throughout the nineteenth century.  These valences, as I will discuss in 
conclusion, have continuing relevance for contemporary critical debates on the 
relationship between feminism and novelistic feeling.  
 
“I KNOW NO MEDIUM”: JANE EYRE’S MEDIATING SHAME 
Jane Eyre raises the problem of an evasive intermediate feeling—or  
“medium”—when St. John Rivers paves the way for his marriage proposal with a curt 
command for a private walk with Jane.  Jane comments to the reader on her quick 
acquiescence:        
 
I know no medium: I never in my life have known any medium in my dealings 
with positive, hard characters antagonistic to my own, between absolute 
submission and determined revolt. I have always faithfully observed the one, 
up to the moment of bursting, sometimes with volcanic vehemence, into the 
other; and as neither present circumstances warranted, nor my present mood 
inclined me to mutiny, I observed careful obedience to St. John’s directions; 
and in ten minutes I was treading the wild track of the glen, side by side with 
him. (352) 
This statement highlights Jane’s ongoing crisis of sympathy in the novel while 
problematizing two of her common responses, “absolute submission” and “determined 
revolt.”  Rather than detailing a gradual “triumph of sympathy,” the plot stages 
sympathy’s repeated ruptures and inevitable impossibility, even as Jane continues to 
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seek it.2 The crisis of sympathy extends beyond Jane’s relationships with overt 
antagonists, such as the Reeds, and constitutes, to varying degrees, the state of all 
relations—even those more intimate relations with characters such as Bessie, Miss 
Temple, Helen Burns, and Rochester. The novel suggests that having any claims to 
one’s own, distinct character is to find oneself constantly rubbing up against other 
“positive, hard characters” that, rather than displaying full sympathetic likeness, are in 
some sense necessarily “antagonistic.”  Intimacy becomes the fraught process of 
negotiating the repellent “hardness” of another’s difference without effacing the other 
or losing one’s own distinct form.  From initially finding herself, among the Reeds at 
Gateshead Hall, “a thing that could not sympathize with one amongst them,” Jane’s 
emotional trajectory moves not toward sympathetic closure, but rather toward 
intimacies less dependant on sympathetic identification (12).   
 As two polar responses to the fantasy of natural or easy identification, 
“absolute submission and determined revolt” overlap suggestively with the modes of 
relational subjectivity that feminist critics have organized under the headings of 
sympathy and anger, in readings of Jane Eyre and of the Victorian novel more 
broadly.   Moments of Jane’s actual or near submission to others’ desires often are cast 
by Brontë as desperate and dangerous bids for sympathetic union.  The obliterated 
agency implied by “absolute submission” echoes recent critiques launched at 
sympathy as a hierarchal, objectifying concept that, in practice, often demands one 
subject’s marginalization or erasure by an empowered other, or more broadly, all 
individualized subjects’ self-regulating submission to normative socializing forces.  
“Determined revolt,” on the other hand, captures the dramatic, radically disruptive 
                                                
2 I borrow the phrase “triumph of sympathy” from Lorri Nandrea, who usefully identifies the “widely 
noted … manner in which the end of the novel emphasizes Jane’s success in eliminating all possible 
threats to her newly attained subject position and presents us with a picture of a hyperbolically unified 
and autonomous subjectivity” (119).  See Lorri G. Nandrea, “Desiring Difference: Sympathy and 
Sensibility in Jane Eyre,” Novel 37, no. 1/2 (2003): 112-34. 
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potential of refusing subjectivity and relations on another’s—or more broadly modern 
society’s—limited terms, while also suggesting the nightmarish alienation and loss of 
social legibility that threatens to accompany complete rebellion.  Jane’s “determined 
revolt” often takes the specific emotional form of anger, and her angry outbursts 
particularly highlight a tenuous distinction between subversive rejection of, and newly 
instated demands for, sympathetic identification—a tension that haunts anger’s 
relational dynamics in Jane Eyre.  Jane’s reactive anger fuels cycles of rebellion and 
replication, as she refuses emotional submission to other “hard characters” only to 
desire similar submission from others.  Anger broaches the collapse of relationality; in 
attempts to repair this alienation, Jane often seeks new intimates who will identify 
absolutely with her anger, turning her rebellion into sympathetic conscription of 
others, such as Helen Burns and Miss Temple, who in turn refuse to submit.  An 
emotional “medium” would thus offer respite from not just the extreme oppositions 
but also the constant oscillations of submission and revolt.  
 While Jane introduces her walk with St. John by denying a “medium,” over its 
course just such a stance “between absolute submission and determined revolt” 
emerges in reaction to his demand that Jane accompany him as a missionary to India, 
and do so as his wife.  St. John’s proposal represents the pinnacle of a sympathetic 
struggle between the two “hard characters,” in which each tries to overwrite the 
other’s emotions and desires in his or her own image. Early in their relationship, St. 
John explicitly challenges Jane’s attempts at sympathetic interpretation of his feelings 
for Rosamond Oliver.  Acknowledging “something penetrating in your eye,” he still 
insists:  “you partially misinterpret my emotions. You think them more profound and 
potent than they are. You give me a larger allowance of sympathy than I have just 
claim to … Know me to be what I am—a cold, hard man” (330).  This quality of 
hardness signifies a challenge to Jane’s assessments based on her own emotional 
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tendencies, but still constitutes a space of intimate exposure and relations on other 
terms.  Despite the misinterpretation of her sympathetic hermeneutics, Jane has, he 
admits, “taken my confidence by storm”; thus St. John offers a stripped-down self-
revelation: “I am simply, in my original state—stripped of that blood-bleached robe 
with which Christianity covers human deformity—a cold, hard, ambitious man” (330).   
While Jane continually encounters barriers to making St. John her sympathetic 
counterpart, risks heighten of the reverse—that she will become instead his 
sympathetic likeness, an extension of his “hard” desires and feelings.  This 
sympathetic pull is figured ominously: Jane admits that “By degrees, he acquired a 
certain influence over me that took away my liberty of mind” as he cast a “freezing 
spell” (350).  Brontë conveys the difficulty and cost of one interiority mirroring 
another through emphatically physical imagery, contrasting the erotics of St. John’s 
naked exposure of difference with tortuous blurrings of separate bodies.  When Jane is 
forced onto the “rack” of sympathy (as Adam Smith famously imagined the 
paradigmatic sympathetic scenario), she bemoans: “it racked me hourly to aspire to the 
standard he uplifted. The thing was as impossible as to mould my irregular features to 
his correct and classic pattern, to give to my changeable green eyes the sea-blue tint 
and solemn luster of his own” (351).  St. John’s sympathetic demands become explicit 
when he presses his marriage proposal, tempting her to “Think like me, Jane—trust 
like me” and to embody “the complement of the qualities I seek” (355).  Imagery of an 
incarcerating identification intensifies accordingly, as Jane feels “an awful charm was 
framing round and gathering over me” and “my iron shroud contracted round me; 
persuasion advanced with slow sure step” (353-354, 355).  Jane’s breaking point is 
marked by a shift from physical enclosure to actual invasion: “I shuddered as he 
spoke: I felt his influence in my marrow—his hold on my limbs” (357).  
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 This breaking point, however, produces neither “absolute submission” nor 
“determined revolt”—as we might anticipate—but instead a “medium” of shame, 
between the two extremes, that encapsulates how shame’s affective mediation 
functions more generally in Jane Eyre.  Jane negotiates St. John’s sympathetic 
invasion with a compromise, an agreement offered “[c]onditionally”—as she 
emphasizes—to work with him in India as a sister rather than a wife (357).  The 
condition reserves for herself her “heart,” set apart from the “energies” willingly 
offered up to the missionary and his mission.  When Jane counters St. John’s rejection 
of this “mutilated sacrifice” with the insistence that God can have her heart but “You 
do not want it,” the narrating Jane explains what emboldened her continued 
negotiation against his growing “influence”:  
 
I had silently feared St. John till now, because I had not understood him. He 
had held me in awe, because he had held me in doubt. How much of him was 
saint, how much mortal, I could not heretofore tell: but revelations were being 
made in this conference: the analysis of his nature was proceeding before my 
eyes. I saw his fallibilities: I comprehended them. I understood that, sitting 
there where I did, on the bank of heath, and with that handsome form before 
me, I sat at the feet of a man, erring as I. The veil fell from his hardness and 
despotism. Having felt in him the presence of these qualities, I felt his 
imperfection, and took courage. I was with an equal—one with whom I might 
argue—one whom, if I saw good, I might resist. (358, italics mine) 
Neither sympathetic submission nor angry mutiny dominates Jane’s response: the two 
extremes instead are replaced by a conditional resistance—“I might argue,” or “if I 
saw good, I might resist”—that extends her conditional acceptance of St. John’s 
proposal.  Such conditional agreement posits the possibilities of sympathetic 
identification or rupture without enacting either, keeping Jane and St. John in close 
relational proximity while preserving emotional distance and difference between them. 
This space of conditional agreement is supported by the imaginative spectacle of St. 
John’s shameful qualities—a spectacle that counters the evocation of Jane’s 
“mutilated sacrifice” with the unveiling of “his hardness and despotism.”  The 
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unveiled “imperfections,” positioned as St. John’s new, true form, displace the illusive 
“handsome form before me.”  The spectacular and somewhat superficial quality of this 
new “form” does not constitute the whole space of shame, however.  The “hardness” 
of this form has accumulated multiple valences at this point in the novel, conveying 
the threat of enforced sympathetic submission, on the one hand, but also, particularly 
in its moments of naked revelation, signaling the possibility of an intimacy, and even 
erotic intensity, that can keep the hardness of individual character intact.  Here the 
hardness of St. John’s form signifies not a rigid assignment of shame through the 
exposure of shameful imperfection, but a more transactional and conditional dynamic 
around shame, captured in Jane’s assertion that St. John is “a man, erring as I.”  Jane 
implicates herself in St. John’s freshly displayed error, but also mitigates this 
assignment of shame and error by distributing it between both of them.  Insofar as St. 
John is himself “erring” in the rigidity of his shaming standards, which render Jane a 
“mutilated sacrifice,” Jane’s own shameful error is alleviated.  But insofar as he is as 
“erring as I,” the loosening of Jane’s shame reverberates back onto St. John’s error, 
relieving it as well. Rather than countering St. John’s attempts at shaming her into 
submission with the kind of hierarchal power reversal that characterizes their 
sympathetic relations, Jane imagines a relation of equality constituted through mutual, 
conditional proximity to hard, spectacular, shameful error: the “man, erring as I” 
becomes, through the specific construction of their relational dynamic, “an equal.”   
While this equality avoids Jane’s submission to the compulsory sameness of 
absolute identification, it does not necessarily disarm shame’s potential for 
sympathetic socialization.  In fact, shame appears initially poised in this passage to 
reinforce and rigidify just such identification on Jane’s terms, if not St. John’s.  To 
capture an unbridgeable gap in their sympathetic struggle, Jane earlier evokes the 
physical impossibility of “moulding” her “irregular features” to St. John’s “correct and 
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classic pattern”: the inverse mutilation of his “handsome form” to match her own 
might seem to figure the means of finally closing that gap.  Instead, however, 
sympathetic shaming becomes the “form” that can fuel identificatory socialization, but 
that can also, as it does here, produce an alternate content of more conditional, 
differentiated shameful relations.  The productive interdependence—yet possible 
disjunctions—of shame’s physicalized form and less concrete content, repeated 
throughout the novel, is crystallized by the juxtapositions of Jane’s insistence that 
“revelations were being made in this conference: the analysis of his nature was 
proceeding before my eyes. I saw his fallibilities: I comprehended them.”  The 
stretched cognitive duration of an “analysis” that “was proceeding before my eyes” 
supplements the visual immediacy emphasized in “revelations” and the following 
image of St. John’s instantaneous and total revealing when the “veil fell.”  Brontë 
echoes this tension between total visualized exposure and secondary analytic process 
in Jane’s claim that “I saw his fallibilities: I comprehended them.”  Shame allows for 
the complex temporal structure and competing signification of initial, visual 
sympathetic arrests and subsequent, prolonged understanding and telling of what Jane 
“could not heretofore tell.”  This complexity constitutes shame’s promise as an 
emotional “medium”—its particular ethical and aesthetic value in the novel, as both a 
relational and representational emotion, that Brontë especially cultivates through 
retrospective narration and hypothetical focalization of spectacles of shame. 
 
“THROUGH THE QUIET MEDIUM OF TIME”: SHAME AND RETROSPECTIVE NARRATION 
Thus when Jane states, “I know no medium: I never in my life have known any 
medium in my dealings with positive, hard characters antagonistic to my own, 
between absolute submission and determined revolt,” the claim rings false, not only 
because of evidence in the novel’s plot to the contrary, but also because of her 
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uncharacteristic equation of past and present knowledge in this self-assessment.  The 
doubling of “I know no medium” and “I never in my life have known any medium” 
emphasizes that the first, present-tense iteration is the cognitive condition of Jane’s 
present, narrating self—a condition whose periodic appearances in the novel usually 
mark emotional and intellectual change as a central feature of her Bildungsroman.  
These present-tense interjections suggest a direct and unambiguous exposure of the 
narrating Jane’s current feelings and thoughts, which tend to deviate markedly from 
those of her past experience, both in tense and content.  The first instance of such 
present-tense exposure of the narrator, in the early scene in which the ten-year-old 
Jane is locked in the red-room, highlights the way in which interpretive difference 
around feelings, as much as time, divides her past and present: “I could not answer the 
ceaseless inward question—why I thus suffered; now, at the distance of—I will not say 
how many years, I see it clearly” (12).  Here, the reader is positioned to expect that 
emotional insight constitutes the “distance” between the experiencing and narrating 
Jane, and that its acquisition will close this distance as the plot moves forward.   
Jane’s suffering in the red-room, like her later reflection on her tendency 
toward extremes rather than mediums, infuses both “absolute submission” and 
“determined revolt” with an inefficacy certain to threaten—if not obliterate—the 
legible and conscious relational self.  The red-room establishes a concrete, spatio-
temporal rendering of Jane’s initial lack of an emotional “medium” and unstable 
oscillations between relational submission and revolt.  If, as many critics argue, albeit 
with differing emphases, Jane’s narrative ultimately can be read as her continual return 
to and renegotiation of a metaphoric red-room, perhaps the red-room can be seen as 
crystallizing a crisis of ruptured sympathy and the limited set of responsive affective 
strategies, especially sympathy and anger, that Jane eventually escapes through the 
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“medium” of shame missing in the red-room’s first configuration.3 
The emotional insight that Jane reveals in her narration of the red-room 
sequence, in contrast to her lack of clarity during the experience, is particularly related 
to the problems of sympathy.  After asserting that she can now “see … clearly” why 
she suffered in the red-room, the narrator explains what exactly she sees: “I was a 
discord in Gateshead Hall; I was like nobody there; I had nothing in harmony with 
Mrs. Reed or her children, or her chosen vassalage. If they did not love me, in fact, as 
little did I love them. They were not bound to regard with affection a thing that could 
not sympathise with one amongst them” (12).  The narrating Jane clings to sympathy’s 
continuing appeal—in the implication that being “like” the others might have 
alleviated her suffering—but she also registers greater critical distance from 
sympathy’s allure than the child does.  Jane’s insight shows that the problem was not 
merely that she was not “like” the Reeds, but that she made such equivalence the 
terms of her affection as much as they did. This self-critique emerges in the 
movement, as her statement progresses, from her status as “discord”—which her 
childhood self already appears capable of comprehending—to her own role in 
aggravating this discord into complete alienation—which the young Jane fails to 
acknowledge.  The child’s thoughts on her suffering, provided a few paragraphs 
                                                
3 Criticism of Jane Eyre has delivered on Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar’s proposal that Jane’s 
experience in the red-room is “probably the most metaphorically vibrant of all her early experiences” 
and can serve as “a paradigm of the larger drama that occupies the entire book” (340).  As a paradigm 
of Jane’s conflicts, the red-room has been equally central to two varying critical endeavors: to chart 
Jane’s development over the novel, in which she eventually escapes from the metaphoric red-room, or 
to chart a cyclical return to its unresolved conflicts.  Gilbert and Gubar’s analysis reveals the red-room’s 
potential in a developmental account, arguing that “Jane’s pilgrimage consists of a series of experiences 
which are, in one way or another, variations on the central red-room motif of enclosure and escape,” 
and that ultimately end in escape (341).  Sally Shuttleworth’s reading of the red-room as “a spatialized 
configuration of Victorian notions of female interiority” used to “capture the bewildering, contradictory 
formulations of femininity in Victorian discourse” exemplifies the red-room’s opposing interpretive 
possibility: to reveal that Jane’s “history … is that of a series of moments of conflicts, a series, 
moreover, which does not display the characteristics of progression, but rather the endless reiteration of 
the same” (159). See Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer 
and the Nineteenth-Century Literary Imagination (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1984); Sally 
Shuttleworth, Charlotte Brontë and Victorian Psychology (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996). 
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earlier, dwell on the numerous faults of the Reeds, contrasting them to her own 
blameless behavior as “one who dared commit no fault” (12). The narrating Jane 
factors her own past approach to intimacy into the equation: “If they did not love me, 
in fact, as little did I love them,” she observes, implicating her own requirement of 
equivalence and identification as well as the Reeds’ narrow parameters for acceptance 
and affection.  It was she, Jane recognizes, who was “a thing that could not sympathise 
with one amongst them” through similarly limited conceptions of sympathy as the sole 
terms for “love.”  
The novel further pressures Jane’s limited and idealized early conception of 
sympathy when we return to the child’s perspective, as she conjures the memory of the 
late Mr. Reed—“my own uncle—my mother’s brother”—as a replacement for the 
other Reeds’ insufficient sympathy and similarity.  Mr. Reed initially arises as a 
fantasy of sympathetic validation for her pain and her anger, but the absolute 
emotional mirroring quickly takes on an eerie tinge:  
 
I thought Mr. Reed’s spirit, harassed by the wrongs of his sister’s child, might 
quit its abode—whether in the church vault, or in the unknown world of the 
departed—and rise before me in this chamber. I wiped my tears and hushed my 
sobs, fearful lest any sign of violent grief might waken a preternatural voice to 
comfort me, or elicit from the gloom some haloed face, bending over me with 
strange pity. This idea, consolatory in theory, I felt would be terrible if 
realised: with all my might I endeavoured to stifle it—I endeavoured to be 
firm. (13-14) 
Jane hurries to erase the sentimental tableau’s conventional physical “sign[s] of 
violent grief”—“tears” and “sobs”—when their potency conjures a horrifically 
hypostatized “theory” of sympathy invasively looming over her “with strange pity.”  
The threat of Mr. Reed’s enclosing sympathy—requiring the defense of “firm” 
character—anticipates both the nature and imagery of Jane’s future struggles with 
male sympathetic invasion in her relations with St. John and Rochester.  Here, despite 
the attempted reinstatement of “firm” difference, the brush with sympathy’s threat to a 
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distinct self ushers in another classic sentimental posture—the swoon—as Jane finally 
succumbs to an ominous “species of fit” ending in “unconsciousness” (15).  Along 
with registering the overwhelming excess of the sympathetic specter’s “strange pity,” 
the fit answers Mrs. Reed’s rigid standard for sympathy—her “condition of perfect 
submission and stillness” for eventual liberation from the red-room—with an extreme 
literalization of exterior demands (14).    
 While Jane’s fit figures, in part, as a self-obliterating swoon into sympathy, its 
literalization of Mrs. Reed’s condition also verges on a subversively parodic 
oppositional stance that breaks completely with oppressive socializing forces.  In this 
sense, the swoon figures the outer limit of Jane’s determination “to go all lengths” in 
her angry “mutiny” against the Reeds’ unjust strictures (9).  Thus, if the fit results 
from Jane’s incantation of Mr. Reed’s ghost, that call contains vengeful anger as much 
as sympathetic yearning.  The haunting specter and the final swoon each collapse, into 
a single figure, the alternative extremes of sympathetic hyper-socialization or angry, 
extrasocial singularity as means of escaping the red-room.  Both the specter and 
swoon emphasize how these extremes put individuated subjectivity and relational 
reciprocity in jeopardy. 
The novel’s retrospective narration imbues the red-room with the promise of 
eventual insight into other affective alternatives.  Though the gap between experience 
and subsequent narration would seem to withhold any such consolation from the child, 
the experiencing Jane herself starts to grasp at the imaginative and formal resolutions 
that the narrator has refined in an effort to loosen the strictures of sympathy into a 
mode of relational difference.  While at first “fascinated … involuntarily” by the 
ghostly “strange little figure” of her mirrored reflection—a figure that anticipates Mr. 
Reed’s sympathetic haunting—Jane breaks from this seductive yet alienating mimesis.  
“Superstition was with me at that moment; but it was not yet her hour for complete 
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victory: my blood was still warm; the mood of the revolted slave was still bracing me 
with its bitter vigour; I had to stem a rapid rush of retrospective thought before I 
quailed to the dismal present” (11).  “[R]etrospective thought” offers a fleeting 
reprieve from sympathy’s spell—a reprieve much more fully realized in the novel’s 
retrospective narration.  This “retrospective thought” of the child fails to significantly 
disrupt either the logic or signifying system of sympathy, however, instead flowing 
back into them in an unstoppable, “rapid rush” that merges the reflective thought with 
the immediacy and continuity of present feeling.  The content of this “retrospective 
thought” further aligns it with sympathy’s lack of differentiated relations:  
 
All John Reed’s violent tyrannies, all his sisters’ proud indifference, all his 
mother’s aversion, all the servants’ partiality, turned up in my disturbed mind 
like a dark deposit in a turbid well. Why was I always suffering, always 
browbeaten, always accused, for ever condemned? Why could I never please 
… I dared commit no fault; I strove to fulfill every duty; and I was termed 
naughty and tiresome, sullen and sneaking, from morning to noon, and from 
noon to night. (11-12)  
Despite the gesture of distinguishing the “retrospective thought” of “bitter vigour” 
from the “dismal present” of superstitious sympathy, the “turbid well” of Jane’s mind 
mixes and erases temporal and affective distinctions into undifferentiated totalities 
marked by the repeated “always” and by conditions continuing from “morning to 
noon, from noon to night.”  Such oppressive continuity defines her perception of those 
who surround her, whose past qualities and actions blur together and into one another 
as uniform failures of sympathy.  Jane’s own self-conception also is prone to endless 
states—the “for ever” and the “never.”  The insistent equivalence in perceptions of the 
self and others equals a “dense ignorance” that Jane bemoans: “What a consternation 
of soul was mine that dreary afternoon! How all my brain was in tumult, and all my 
heart in insurrection!” (12).   
The narrator’s subsequent, present-tense interjection of emotional insight 
models both a distance from the sympathetic imperative and a set of formal strategies 
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to enact this distance—strategies whose absence in Jane’s previously ineffective 
“retrospective thought” serve to highlight their presence in the retrospective narration.  
Distance is as central to Jane’s changed relation to the past as it is to her new 
perspective on sympathy.  When she says, “I could not answer the ceaseless 
question—why I thus suffered; now, at the distance of—I will not say how many 
years, I see it clearly,” the coy refusal to specify the distance renders it temporally 
indeterminate but definitely short enough to still “see … clearly,” keeping the narrator 
in palpable proximity to the past even as this past is marked as separate and different.  
The imagery of sight positions the narrator as preserving the past spectacle of her 
transparently emotive self, but from a stable affective and temporal distance that 
removes her later self from these mimetic dynamics.  Rather than re-enact the younger 
self’s desperate attempt to erase sentimental “sign[s] of grief” in order to efface 
sympathy’s specter, the narrator embeds these spectacular signs into her retrospective 
narration, linking them to a reflective voice that overlays their mimetic transparency 
with the assurance of difference between past and present selves, and, as the novel 
continues, between self and others.  This consolatory and re-visionary potential of 
voice is present even within the sympathetic spectacle of Mr. Reed’s spirit, which first 
materializes as “a preternatural voice to comfort me” then, with increasing menace, 
morphs “from the gloom” into “some haloed face, bending over me with strange pity.”  
The interjecting narrator—one who “see[s] … clearly” but can herself be more clearly 
heard than seen—counters the spirit’s looming, gradually hypostatizing sympathy with 
her own “preternatural voice,” which offers alternatives to sympathy that do not 
constitute alienation. 
Another voice hovers around the red-room: Miss Abbot cries, “For shame! for 
shame! … What shocking conduct, Miss Eyre, to strike a young gentleman, your 
benefactress’s son!” as she and Bessie usher the struggling child into the red-room to 
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be “thrust … upon a stool” (9).  Miss Abbot’s cry introduces the emotion that 
eventually will shape Jane’s own self-perception and narrating voice, and will also 
bridge the red-room’s glaring gaps between self and other.  As the first diegetic 
reference to Jane’s surname, the cry significantly inflects “Miss Eyre” with an 
identity-constituting shame that continues to be reinforced through the novel’s echoing 
of err and Eyre.  Critics have been attentive to the novel’s punning on the name Eyre, 
most directly when Adèle Varens, upon first introduction to her governess, forces a 
French translation: “Aire? Bah! I cannot say it” (89).  Though exploring valences of 
Eyre including ire, air, heir and eye/ear,4 critics have yet to invoke the most direct 
homonym, which Rochester accents when he counsels his governess: “Dread remorse 
when you are tempted to err, Miss Eyre: remorse is the poison of life” (119-120).  Far 
from being the “poison of life,” error and shame provide Jane with the antidote for her 
wounded and wounding feelings—feelings for which the red-room provides a vivid 
stage and figure.  
While “Miss Eyre” is interpellated by the external shaming of others, the 
narrator herself voices an intermingling of shameful error and subjectivity that cannot 
be dismissed as internalized discipline. Instead, shame provides productive affective 
and formal resources for self-fashioning and aesthetic production.  As we have seen, 
Jane’s revelation that St. John is as “erring as I” imagines a social dynamic of 
differentiated “equality” around shame.  Once “erring” is understood to evoke the 
heroine’s own name, the relational possibilities of perceiving another as “erring as I” 
intersect with a model of self-understanding.  In the phrase “erring as I,” the oft-
critiqued hyperbolic unity of Jane’s subjectivity, her “I,” comes into transactional 
                                                
4 For example, Gilbert and Gubar write in The Madwoman in the Attic, “Jane Eyre—her name is of 
course suggestive—is invisible as air, the heir to nothing, secretly choking with ire” (349, 342); 
Nandrea observes in “Desiring Difference: Sympathy and Sensibility in Jane Eyre” that a “dynamic 
competition between eye and ear, voice and vision, is signaled continually in the name ‘Eyre’” (122). 
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proximity with an “erring” Eyre that can neither be severed from nor conflated with 
the “I,” structuring both the interiority of the narrated Jane Eyre and the narrating 
voice of Jane Rochester.  The novel’s application of this shameful dynamic in its 
narrative form and that form’s depiction of relationality and interiority reveal how 
Jane Eyre’s model of subjectivity and novelistic voice enables intimate relations of 
difference with others, rather than naturalizing normative subjectivity and relations 
through a sympathetic teleology.         
The shameful dynamic characterizing Jane’s interiority, as much as her 
relations with others, is aligned with Jane Eyre’s autobiographical narration, as seen 
when Jane’s recognition of St. John as “erring as I” comes under the renewed assault 
of his sympathetic insistence, “steely ire,” and growing impatience over “so long a 
space for reflection and repentance” regarding his marriage proposal (363, 360).   The 
present-tense narrator intervenes at a moment of sympathetic crisis:   
 
I felt veneration for St. John—veneration so strong that its impetus thrust me at 
once to the point I had so long shunned. I was tempted to cease struggling with 
him—to rush down the torrent of his will into the gulf of his existence, and 
there lose my own. I was almost as hard beset by him now as I had been once 
before, in a different way, by another. I was a fool both times. To have yielded 
then would have been an error of principle; to have yielded now would have 
been an error of judgment. So I think at this hour, when I look back to the 
crisis through the quiet medium of time: I was unconscious of folly at the 
instant. (368)       
The affective middle range, or “medium,” that the narrating Jane earlier denied her 
past and current self reemerges here, with slightly shifted emphasis, as an interpretive 
“medium” for retrospective self-perception, one with both temporal and affective 
valences.  To “think” and “look back” at herself “through the quiet medium of time” 
is, for Jane, also to remember and narrate herself through the affective “medium” of 
shame.  The exact temporal divide of “the quiet medium of time” remains vague, here, 
but the affective distance between ignorant experience and insightful retrospection 
takes the distinct form of shame over past “folly” and “error,” as the “quiet medium of 
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time” blends with the affective mode of shame that shapes and preserves such 
distance.  This distance from sympathetic crisis is particularly reinforced by the 
present-tense narrating stance of retrospective shame.  When Jane claims “I know no 
medium: I never in my life have known any medium in my dealings with positive, 
hard characters antagonistic to my own, between absolute submission and determined 
revolt,” the difference between past and present self, experience and memory—in 
more literary terms, even story and discourse—all but collapses.  The threat of 
collapse is linked to the more explicit problem of a rigid sympathetic standard for 
relations that can produce only sympathetic submission or alienating revolt.  While 
shame offers a “medium” in relations with others, it additionally functions as a 
mediator between alienation from and undifferentiated continuity with retrospective 
conceptions of one’s past self.  Accordingly, shame also maintains a space of intimate 
relational difference between story and narration in Jane Eyre’s autobiographical 
form. 
In considering this retrospective narrative structure, we might usefully turn to 
Gérard Genette’s discussion of voice in Narrative Discourse, in which he 
provocatively alludes to the differentiating work that shame might perform.  
Observing the especially fragile temporal distinctions of interpolated narrating, or 
narrating “between the moments of action,” common in epistolary novels, Genette 
writes, “the extreme closeness of story to narrating produces . . . most often, a very 
subtle effect of friction (if I may call it that) between the slight temporal displacement 
of the narrative of events (‘Here is what happened to me today’) and the complete 
simultaneousness in the report of thoughts and feelings (‘Here is what I think about it 
this evening’).”5  This “friction” often entails a barely perceptible difference between 
                                                
5 Gérard Genette, Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method, trans. Jane E. Lewin (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. 
Press, 1980), 217-218. Further references will appear in the text. 
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story and narrating, hero and narrator: “Here, the narrator is at one and the same time 
still the hero and already someone else: the events of the day are already in the past, 
and the ‘point of view’ may have been modified since then; the feelings of the evening 
or the next day are fully of the present, and here focalization through the narrator is at 
the same time focalization through the hero” (218).  In Genette’s example, from 
Choderlos de Laclos’s Les Liaisons Dangereuses, one feeling particularly embodies 
the “friction” of past experience and present feelings:  
 
Cécile Volanges writes to Mme. de Merteuil to tell her how she was seduced, 
last night, by Valmont, and to confide in her her remorse; the seduction scene 
is past, and with it the confusion that Cécile no longer feels, and can no longer 
even imagine; what remains is the shame, and a sort of stupor which is both 
incomprehension and discovery of oneself . . . The Cécile of yesterday, very 
near and already far off, is seen and spoken of by the Cécile of today. We have 
here two successive heroines, (only) the second of whom is (also) the narrator 
and gives her point of view, the point of view—displaced just enough to create 
dissonance—of the immediate post-event future. (218) 
In general, Genette’s example portrays the “friction” inherent in interpolated narrating, 
a friction any number of emotions could join with the form to display.  Yet in 
specifically bringing shame together with the “friction” produced by the epistolary 
mode, Genette’s illustration also suggests how this formal effect and shame amplify 
each other: shame, here, appears especially potent affective material for marking 
subtle distinctions of focalization and voice when temporal proximity threatens to 
elide them.  A point of view tinged with shame—and its performance of disrupted 
identification—will be “displaced just enough to create dissonance” but not enough to 
break close contact with past perspectives.  Through shame, the interpolated narration 
even more tangibly rubs up against an immediately preceding yet distinct affective 
experience, keeping the past self who is perceived as a compelling spectacle of shame 
“very near and already far off.”   
Shame’s narrative function here recalls the retrospective narrative quality—as 
we have seen in earlier chapters—in Philip Fisher’s theorization of shame as a 
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“successor passion” that follows other “impassioned states.”6  In Fisher’s account, 
shame involves a successive “aftermath” moment in an individual’s emotional 
narrative; this moment retreats from the preceding “extrasocial” absorption of another 
passion, like anger, of which one is now ashamed, but shame enacts this retreat 
through a retrospective reexamination of one’s earlier passionate self-absorption, 
embedding while reinflecting from a more distanced perspective the “telling 
revelation” of one’s previous emotional excesses.7  Genette’s characterization of 
shameful retrospection provides a more directly literary application of shame’s 
“aftermath moment,” with shame working, much like in Fisher’s account, to fortify an 
autobiographical characterization containing “two successive heroines, (only) the 
second of whom is (also) the narrator.”  Such “successive heroines” accumulate into a 
coherent identity—an autobiographical “I”—that changes and encompasses affective 
deviations over the temporal progression of the novel.  Enwrapped within the dual 
signification of being both “seen and spoken of” by the narrator, the past heroine 
becomes, to borrow Fisher’s phrasing, a “telling revelation” of shame. 
 If we consider interpolated narrating not only as a broad narrative category, but 
in the specific context of the sentimental novel that often adopts this form, then the 
changing heroine represented through shame becomes especially significant.  While 
Genette focuses primarily on the temporal “closeness of story to narrating” that can 
blur the experiencing and narrating heroine, the sentimental novel puts this temporal 
closeness within a larger relational and representational logic of sympathetic 
equivalence.  In such a context, it is not just the affective differences between 
individuals that can fade, but also those within an individual character.  In novels such 
as Samuel Richardson’s Pamela and Clarissa, for example, the mimetic structure of 
                                                
6 Philip Fisher, The Vehement Passions (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2002), 65. 
7 Ibid., 65, 68. 
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one character sympathetically reproducing another’s feelings extends to a mimetic 
structure of interiority, in which past and present selves replicate relatively unvarying 
emotional responses.  By extension, the epistolary or journaling narrator tends to 
replicate and reinforce her earlier affective experience during a sympathetic revisiting.  
In a sentimental interpolated narrative, the “dissonance” and “friction” between 
experience and narrating that Genette particularly evokes through shame thus could 
not only instate fragile yet distinct differences in voice and focalization, but also, in so 
doing, disrupt the larger mimetic logic of the narrative.  
Jane Eyre does not, of course, include interpolated narrating, falling firmly 
into the category of subsequent narrating, “the classical position of the past-tense 
narrative” (217).  Nonetheless, shame’s differentiating potential in interpolated 
narrating helps to isolate a similar effect in Brontë’s novel.  Jane Eyre incorporates 
shame’s “friction” into a much wider temporal gap between story and narrating, 
reinforcing a “dissonance” between a past and present “I” that also disrupts 
sympathetic idealization and sentimental signification.  In adapting shame’s “friction” 
from interpolated narrating, Jane Eyre not only creates dissonance but also preserves 
an intimate closeness between a past and present self—a closeness which is not, as in 
interpolated narrating, enacted through temporal nearness.  Harnessing shame’s 
capacity to stage “successive heroines” who are both “very near and already far off” 
from one another, the novel creates, through shameful retrospection, a sense of 
affective contact in the place of literal temporal proximity.  By stretching the temporal 
interval between experience and memory, Brontë pushes the limits of relational 
difference between the experiencing and narrating Jane, while using shame to preserve 
intimacy and prevent an alienating break within the autobiographical “I.”  Similar to 
the eighteenth-century novels Genette invokes, Jane Eyre “exploit[s] that narrative 
situation propitious to the most subtle and the most ‘irritating’ counterpoints: the 
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situation of the tiniest temporal interval” (218).  Brontë, however, innovatively 
furthers this exploitation by replacing the irritation of the “tiniest temporal interval” 
with the purely affective substitute of shame’s differentiated closeness.8  Jane Eyre 
thus explores the possibilities of an intimate dynamic of shame in terms of social 
relations, interiority and narrative form.  
 While the narrating Jane “look[s] back to the crisis through the quiet medium 
of time,” her previous temptation to submerge herself in the “gulf of [St. John’s] 
existence” appears to resurface in the present, in the form of the subtle allure of a 
sympathetic merging into her past self.  As the narration lingers on the moment of 
crisis, its repeated, deictic “now” begins to blur narrative levels, as if pushing desires 
of the past into the “now” of the narrating present.  Jane recalls, “I was almost as hard 
beset by him now as I had been once before, in a different way, by another. I was a 
fool both times. To have yielded then would have been an error of principle; to have 
yielded now would have been an error of judgment.”  The subsequent interjection—
“So I think at this hour, when I look back to the crisis through the quiet medium of 
time: I was unconscious of folly at the instant”—at first seems to reassert a clear 
border between present and past thought, between “this hour” and “the instant.”  This 
border, however, is undone by Jane’s situating of the ambiguous temporality of the 
preceding nows into an unambiguously present thought—“now,” “at this hour,” Jane 
can “think” what remained “unconscious . . . at the instant”—thus further blurring past 
and present temporalities, even as they are ostensibly being defined.  
                                                
8 Susan Lanser suggestively reads Brontë’s engagement with epistolary form as part of “the narrative 
practices that create Jane Eyre’s singular voice,” a “narrative voice, which has been perceived as almost 
tyrannical in its power to impose a stance” and historically “has no precedent in the authority it claims 
for a female personal voice” (182, 176-77). For Lanser a new “kind of public epistolarity becomes the 
narrative sign, then, of Jane’s quest for . . . a blend of intimacy and autonomy”; but Lanser implies that 
this blend is a reaction against (rather than, as I argue, an extension of) Jane’s experiences of shame, 
when she asks, “Who can blame her (to paraphrase Jane) if, abandoned by family and publicly shamed, 
Jane might anxiously seek the approval of a larger audience?” (186). See Susan Sniader Lanser, 
Fictions of Authority: Women Writers and Narrative Voice (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1992).  
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Through the same dynamic of conditional shame that she uses to negotiate 
relations with others in the story, however, the narrating Jane resists sympathetic 
submission to her past self without falling into self-estrangement.  Repeating the 
layered temporalities and significations of St. John’s shameful unveiling, a look—here 
a “look back”—reveals the “error” of a spectacular “instant” that is enfolded in the 
prolonged, reflective “think[ing] at this hour.”  In her earlier recognition of St. John’s 
error, Jane relaxes the rigid assignment of shame as well as the sympathetic pull of his 
shameful spectacle by embedding his concrete, instantaneous exposure into the 
duration of an “analysis” that determines he is as “erring as I.”  When Jane unveils her 
own past “error” and “folly” to her narrating self and to the reader, a similar interplay 
of immediate, visualized exposure and subsequent thinking occurs—one that is now 
mapped onto a mode of memory that intersects with a specific literary form, 
retrospective autobiographical narration.  In addition to pairing the signifying 
technique of immediate visual arrests with the longer cognitive duration of 
“analysis”—in this case, specifically of narration—Jane applies to her own self-
assessment the mitigating distribution of shame that she earlier enacts with the 
formulation that St. John is “erring as I.”  Jane’s error is distributed, here, not between 
different characters, but between multiple, differentiated moments making up the “I.”  
The narrator’s introduction of an even earlier “error of principle” (in response to 
Rochester’s seduction) places that error in a comparison with her “error of judgment” 
that destabilizes any rigid assignment of shame to past or present selves.  For Jane 
may have been “a fool both times,” but she did not in fact yield to Rochester’s 
seduction, anticipating that she also will not yield to St. John’s tempting proposal.  
The narration emphasizes the conditional status of what “would have been an error” in 
both cases.  This conditional status alleviates the narrator’s present shame as well, 
since it relies on capturing a fleeting “instant” of “folly” which the temporal 
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progression of subsequent events will empty of much of its actual “error.”  The 
conditional status of both errors brings past and present selves into a relational 
dynamic of mutual proximity to conditional shame—a shame that can circulate 
without fixing anywhere permanently—and the reader, too, is drawn into this 
shameful dynamic.  The erring Jane of past experience is exposed to the narrator in an 
“instant” of being “unconscious of folly”; the narrator similarly exposes herself to her 
reader in the present-tense act of “think[ing] at this hour” that contains the past 
“unconscious” moment with particular clarity.  Jane Eyre thus enacts a dynamic of 
proximity to shame across relationality, interiority, and narrative form that provides a 
mode of readerly engagement as well.  
 
READING SHAME: HELEN BURNS 
In the sequence at Lowood School, and especially in Jane’s relationship with 
Helen Burns, Brontë most directly connects the relational possibilities of shame to a 
literary hermeneutics and to the formal permutations of sentimental signification that I 
have described as shameful signification.  Jane Eyre positions shame as a relational, 
representational and reading mode in the depiction of Jane’s childhood encounters 
with Helen at Lowood.  We see the problem of individualized subjectivity and social 
relation that haunts Jane’s first days at Lowood in her fuzzy perception of her new 
surroundings, and especially the other girls, as an indistinguishable mass.  She can 
only register the “hum of many voices” and their seemingly “countless” number, and 
the difficulty of differentiation spreads from Jane’s surroundings to her thoughts, even 
impinging on narration: “My reflections were too undefined and fragmentary to merit 
record: I hardly yet knew where I was” (37, 42).  Only two “marked event[s]” cut 
through the perceptual and descriptive haze of Jane’s first day: Helen reading and 
Helen being publicly shamed (44).  In each instance, Jane recognizes another 
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individual and interrogates possible forms of intimate interaction with her.  The 
narration similarly finds in Helen an individual character around which to organize 
Jane’s past perceptions and present memories: Helen, and Jane’s reactions to her, 
“merit record.”  Through the same dynamic of shame that she uses to negotiate her 
relationship with Helen, the narrating Jane resists both sympathetic submission to her 
past self and self-estrangement.  Jane Eyre enacts this dynamic of shame in terms of 
not only relationality, but also interiority and narrative form—a dynamic that, as we 
will see, provides a significant model of readerly engagement as well.    
 When Helen first comes into Jane’s view, she conjures the prospect of 
sympathetic identification:  
 
I saw a girl sitting on a stone bench near; she was bent over a book, on the 
perusal of which she seemed intent: from where I stood I could see the title—it 
was “Rasselas;” a name that struck me as strange, and consequently attractive. 
In turning a leaf she happened to look up, and I said to her directly; —“Is your 
book interesting?” I had already formed the intention of asking her to lend it to 
me some day . . . I hardly know where I found the hardihood thus to open a 
conversation with a stranger; the step was contrary to my nature and habits: but 
I think her occupation touched a chord of sympathy somewhere; for I too liked 
reading, though of a frivolous and childish kind; I could not digest or 
comprehend the serious or substantial. (42-43) 
Jane initially attempts to assimilate the “stranger” to her investment in sympathetic 
likeness, and, by staging this potentially sympathetic scene specifically as a scene of 
reading, Brontë extends the subsequent disruption of Jane’s limited sympathetic 
idealization to literary investments.  For the “chord of sympathy” is plucked only to be 
loosened: a sympathetic paradigm of close identification with novelistic content, as 
well as other readers’ responses, is frustrated when Jane actually looks inside the 
coveted book, “a brief examination” of which “convinced me that the contents were 
less taking than the title: ‘Rasselas’ looked dull to my trifling taste; I saw nothing 
about fairies, nothing about genii; no bright variety seemed to spread over the closely 
printed pages” (43).  Jane’s interest in Helen persists in spite of their discordant 
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reading practices, however.  The “chord of sympathy” that can be touched through 
reading—as a generalized activity—is made to accommodate differences in 
understanding and affective engagement.  Like shame—and sharing its paradigmatic 
bent posture, here “bent over a book”—the scene of reading provides a form that can 
bind those drawn to reading both despite and through pointed divergences of reading 
practice and response.  To distinguish Brontë’s conceptualization of reading from 
more fixed sympathetic hermeneutics and sentimental signification, it is useful to 
recall the constitutive aspects of Adam Smith’s classic sympathetic scene, as well as 
Smith’s and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s shameful reconfigurations of it, which I trace 
in my introduction: the scenario, the signifying body, and interior emotion.  Smith and 
Sedgwick help us conceptualize how the scenario of shame might position a 
spectacularly signifying body to exert an emotional pull akin to that of the sentimental 
spectacle, but producing significant deviations between the actual interior emotions of 
those embodying and witnessing the signified shame.  In Brontë’s scene reading, 
broadly defined, similarly acts as a compelling scenario with a strong relational pull: 
Jane is initially intrigued simply because “I too liked reading.”  The signifying body, 
here, entails both a physical body—Helen’s bent posture—and a textual one—the 
book cover bearing the “strange, and consequently attractive” title of Rasselas.  Unlike 
the rigid sympathetic continuity of signifying form and interior emotional content, 
however, there is room for variance.  The actual “contents” of Rasselas diverge 
between “dull” and absorbing, depending on the distinct responses of readers whose 
own interior emotional content—while evoked by the shared posture and scenario of 
reading—can diverge as well without breaking the bond of reading.  
 Following this initial upset of a strict sympathetic connection, Jane continues 
to attend to the “stranger,” and an intense bond between Jane and Helen develops that 
is especially forged through shameful reading.  While remaining an explicit figure of 
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reading, Helen also morphs increasingly into the text Jane most longs to read—and 
which can be most intimately and closely read through shame. In the second “marked 
event” of Jane’s initial day at Lowood, Helen’s shameful “disgrace,” like her reading, 
draws Jane into a compelling spectacle that pulls the novel’s relational alternative to 
sympathy into sharper focus (44).  Before turning to this spectacle, however, we 
should first consider another, later exhibition of Helen’s shame that threatens to push 
Jane past relational disconnection, and into angry, antisocial alienation.  The 
representational features of this scene of humiliating exposure illuminate those aspects 
of sentimental signification that Brontë seeks to revise in other scenes of more 
conditional shameful exhibition.  The scene also occurs during Jane’s stay at Lowood, 
and in it Helen is literally transformed into a text of shame:  “Miss Scatcherd wrote in 
conspicuous characters on a piece of pasteboard the word ‘Slattern,’ and bound it like 
a phylactery round Helen’s large, mild, intelligent, and benign-looking forehead. She 
wore it till evening, patient, unresentful, regarding it as a deserved punishment. The 
moment Miss Scatcherd withdrew after afternoon-school, I ran to Helen, tore it off, 
and thrust it into the fire: the fury of which she was incapable had been burning in my 
soul all day, and tears, hot and large, had continually been scalding my cheek; for the 
spectacle of her sad resignation gave me an intolerable pain at the heart” (64).  Though 
Helen is shamed, here, her shame has much of the representational rigidity of Smith’s 
sympathetic rack, rather than his shameful pillory.  The shaming scenario, imprinted 
onto the signifying body with a horrifyingly fixed materiality and explicitness of 
signification, secures, in turn, the interior content of that body: Helen regards the sign 
of “Slattern” “as a deserved punishment.”  An excruciating continuity and 
transparency of sentimental signification traps Jane, as spectator, between the 
extremes of hyper-socialized submission—akin to Helen’s response here—or 
antisocial revolt.  Jane’s responding anger not only severs connection with clearly 
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oppressive forces, represented by Miss Scatcherd, but also imperils any affective 
continuity between herself and Helen: Jane feels “the fury of which [Helen] was 
incapable.”  Jane’s response here approaches—as it does in an earlier scene in which 
Helen’s shame is branded directly onto her body through a beating—“a sentiment of 
unavailing and impotent anger” (46). 
Yet the first shaming of Helen that Jane witnesses—to return to the second 
“marked event” of her first day at Lowood—strikingly contrasts with the inflexible 
signification represented by the material label of “Slattern.”  Similar to Smith’s pillory 
and Sedgwick’s thought experiment discussed in my introduction, a scenario 
demanding shame here circulates a palpably communicative feeling that still fails to 
define entirely any individual’s interior content, or to produce strict identification 
between individuals: 
 
The only marked event of the afternoon was, that I saw the girl with whom I 
had conversed in the verandah, dismissed in disgrace, by Miss Scatcherd, from 
a history class, and sent to stand in the middle of the large schoolroom. The 
punishment seemed to me in a high degree ignominious, especially for so great 
a girl—she looked thirteen or upwards. I expected she would show signs of 
great distress and shame; but to my surprise she neither wept nor blushed: 
composed, though grave, she stood, the central mark of all eyes. “How can she 
bear it so quietly—so firmly?” I asked of myself. “Were I in her place, it seems 
to me I should wish the earth to open and swallow me up. She looks as if she 
were thinking of something beyond her punishment—beyond her situation: of 
something not round her nor before her. I have heard of day-dreams—is she in 
a day-dream now? Her eyes are fixed on the floor, but I am sure they do not 
see it—her sight seems turned in, gone down into her heart: she is looking at 
what she can remember, I believe; not at what is really present. I wonder what 
sort of a girl she is—whether good or naughty?” (44-45) 
As in the previous scene of reading, Jane is frustrated in any easy application of a 
sympathetic hermeneutics to Helen’s compelling spectacle.  She fails to trace the 
expected continuity of shaming scenario and concrete physical signs—“signs of great 
distress and shame”—as Helen “neither wept nor blushed,” and appears “composed, 
though grave.”  Instead, the bowed head—“her eyes fixed on the floor”—again allows 
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for diverse interior content, bringing Helen and Jane into a shameful scenario whose 
form nonetheless accommodates other feelings, and affectively binds Jane to Helen 
despite her sense of their divergent emotions and thoughts.   
The spectacle of Helen’s extreme, visual exposure as “she stood, the central 
mark of all eyes” further is alleviated of an all-consuming shame by layered acts of 
thinking—Jane thinking that Helen “looks as if she were thinking of something 
beyond her punishment—beyond her situation.”  Through this “thinking,” Helen 
attains some distance from the explicit affective demand of her shaming 
“punishment.”  The precise structure of this thought is provocative: Jane imagines that 
Helen finds relief from a highly visible shame, even as that spectacle draws others 
toward her, because “she is looking at what she can remember, I believe; not at what is 
really present.”  Helen’s remembering doubles Jane’s own narratorial stance of 
establishing proximity to shame through retrospection.  That Helen’s remembering is 
accessible only through Jane’s telling about it highlights the way in which it figures 
Jane’s narrative act, emphasizing how certain forms of both perceiving and telling 
about shame can enhance the possibilities of a conditional relation to its punitive 
spectacle.   
Jane’s own remembered perceptions of Helen’s acts of remembering capture 
the individuated intimacy enabled by shame that Brontë further accentuates through 
effects of focalization.  When Jane thinks, “Were I in her place, it seems to me I 
should wish the earth to open and swallow me up,” she focalizes an overwhelming 
perception of shame both on behalf of herself and Helen and, in a sense, for no one.  
Through what remains a merely hypothetical focalization of self-eviscerating shame, 
Brontë enacts an intimate contact between the two girls’ still distinct thoughts and 
feelings, and a friction between each girl’s interior emotional content and the form of 
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shame’s spectacle.9  For Jane is not “in her place,” and recognizes as much in her 
thoughts, which emphasize her own distance from the shame she only hypothetically 
perceives.  Neither does the perception of intense shame appear to apply to the stoic 
Helen’s actual feelings in that shaming “place.”  This hypothetical focalization of 
shame captures shame’s potential to combine fragile yet marked distinctions with a 
tangible sense of closeness, as Jane and Helen are drawn near both the “punishment” 
of shame and each other’s interiority, yet escape undifferentiated merging.  In its 
absolute exposure of the experiencing Jane’s thoughts, the hypothetical focalization of 
shame provides a formal, interior equivalent of the scene of shame’s ability to create a 
spectacularly visualized body that can bind individuals in relational difference.  
Further, Jane here—in her keen engagement that is not reducible to identification—
offers a figure for the reader’s own relation to such novelistic spectacles of shame. 
While the formulation “Were I in her place” gives Jane and Helen some 
distance from the threat of overwhelming shame when Jane actually is put “in 
[Helen’s] place,” such distance is still preserved through layers of retrospection that 
come together within Jane’s interiority.  Soon after Helen’s public shaming, Jane finds 
herself hoisted on a stool in the schoolroom for Mr. Brocklehurst’s public 
condemnation of her, and the perception of shame that Jane had experienced in 
relation to Helen’s exposure enables a meeting with her own past self as well as with 
Helen: 
 
There was I, then, mounted aloft: I, who had said I could not bear the shame of 
standing on my natural feet in the middle of the room, was now exposed to 
general view on a pedestal of infamy. What my sensations were, no language 
can describe: but just as they all rose, stifling my breath and constricting my 
throat, a girl came up and passed me: in passing, she lifted up her eyes. What a 
                                                
9 I draw the term “hypothetical focalization” from David Herman’s work on “the use of hypotheses, 
framed by the narrator or a character, about what might be or might have been seen or perceived—if 
only there were someone who could have adopted the requisite perspective on the situations and events 
at issue” (303).  See David Herman, Story Logic: Problems and Possibilities of Narrative (Lincoln: 
Univ. of Nebraska Press, 2002).  Herman also develops the concept in his article “Hypothetical 
Focalization,” Narrative 2, no. 3 (1994): 230-53. 
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strange light inspired them! What an extraordinary sensation that ray sent 
through me! How the new feeling bore me up! It was as if a martyr, a hero, had 
passed a slave or victim, and imparted strength in transit. I mastered the rising 
hysteria, lifted up my head, and took a firm stand on the stool. Helen Burns 
asked some slight question about her work of Miss Smith, was chidden for the 
triviality of the inquiry, returned to her place, and smiled at me as she again 
went by. What a smile! I remember it now, and I know that it was the effluence 
of fine intellect, of true courage; it lit up her marked lineaments, her thin face, 
her sunken grey eye, like a reflection from the aspect of an angel. (58-59) 
The narrator here brings her present-tense “I” into retrospective contact with two past 
“I”s: the “I, then, mounted aloft” and the “I, who had said I could not bear the shame.”  
The experiencing Jane, “mounted aloft,” engages in the same act of remembering a 
past proximity to shame as the narrating “I,” offering a model for the narrator’s ability, 
through shameful retrospection, to bring together yet differentiate between moments 
making up the self.  The complex interaction of closely connected yet distinct “I”s 
enabled by Jane’s “expos[ure] to general view on a pedestal of infamy” encapsulates 
not just shame’s relational possibilities, but the affectively charged narrative structure 
of Jane Eyre’s retrospective autobiographical form and its shame-delineated space of 
intimate relational difference between story and narrating.  
Jane’s schoolroom exposure culminates in a moment that conveys the intimate 
friction such spectacles of shame can produce.  The narrating and experiencing Janes’ 
memories of differentiated past selves are linked to another significant memory related 
to Jane’s shaming—Helen’s smile.  The affectionate observation “What a smile!”—
like the memory of shame—briefly bridges the voice and focalization of the 
experiencing and narrating Jane, while the subsequent interjection, “I remember it 
now,” reinstates the difference of time.10  The smile brings Jane’s differentiated “I”s 
                                                
10 James Phelan’s concept of “dual focalization” in character narration—“a narrative situation . . .  [that] 
involves a narrator perceiving his former self’s perceptions”—helps to describe this moment and to 
explain its effect of intimate differentiation (215).  As Phelan suggests in a discussion of Vladimir 
Nabokov’s Lolita, “story and discourse overlap” in moments of dual focalization, but important 
distinctions are preserved insofar as “the narrator’s focalization does not drop away. Instead, the 
narrator’s focalization contains the character’s” (118-19).  See James Phelan, Living to Tell About It: A 
Rhetoric and Ethics of Character Narration (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 2005). 
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together with Helen in a moment of acute connection that—unlike the sympathetic 
paradigm—depends on distinctions within the self and between the self and others.  
The affective intensity of the smile derives in part from the sequence of shifting 
postures that precedes it and wavers between relationality and disconnection: Helen 
“lifted up her eyes” to make contact with Jane’s bowed head; and Jane in turn “lifted 
up [her] head,” as Helen “passed.”  These postures—variously mismatched and 
corresponding, rather than stagnantly mirroring—culminate in the momentary, 
intimate contact of the smile—a moment the narrator lingers over still.   
The affective intensity of Helen’s smile further derives from the ways in which 
it makes manifest much of the agency and intimacy embedded in the previous scene of 
Jane watching Helen’s “disgrace.”  In the earlier spectacle Helen stood still with “her 
eyes . . . fixed on the floor”: but now Helen moves, lifts her gaze, and smiles, actively 
responding to and physically advancing the reach that Jane had before extended 
toward her in thought only.  Helen’s smile and Jane’s response enact the intimate 
differentiation of Jane’s formulation “Were I in her place” as a now tangible point of 
connection, as Helen directly acknowledges Jane’s shameful scenario while also 
prompting her to move beyond its limiting, oppressive contours.  And Jane’s own 
layered memories at this moment, producing palpable contact between past and 
present selves around the spectacle of shame, further draw out the processes implicit 
in Helen’s earlier “look[ing] as if she were thinking of something beyond her 
punishment” because she seemed to be “looking at what she can remember.”  The 
convergence of these two scenes’ spectacles of shame particularly illustrates how the 
autobiographical subject’s recognition and staging of differences within a coherent 
self can inform an increased attention to—even seeking of—compelling difference in 
others.  To recognize, here, how Jane Eyre’s autobiographical narrative of 
development reinforces the novel’s investment in relational difference is to begin to 
   
190 
challenge the common critique of Jane Eyre’s interiority and voice, especially from 
her concluding position as a bourgeois domestic woman, as effecting a normalizing 
and exclusionary idealization of sympathetic identification. 
 
SHAME’S “TERRIBLE SPECTACLE” 
Any unsettling of Jane Eyre as a narrative idealizing sympathetic union must 
account for Jane’s final romantic reunion with Rochester, and particularly for the two 
spectacles that seem to position this reunion as a highly sympathetic one: Rochester’s 
inexplicable call, which leaves Jane’s “flesh quiver[ing] on my bones,” and his 
disfigurement, which renders Jane, through his devotion to and physical dependence 
on her, “absolutely bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh” (369, 397).  To be sure, 
each of these spectacles touches a palpable “chord of sympathy,” but they also 
function beyond the immediacy of their purely sympathetic displays.  Indeed, it is 
through subsequent narrations of these seemingly sympathetic spectacles, by Jane and 
by other characters, that Brontë establishes an erotics of shame—an erotics that 
constitutes the novel’s affective closure in a form that also, I suggest, helps to keep 
Jane Eyre open to readers’ diverse engagements and critical concerns.  
Rochester’s call to Jane might at first appear the antithesis of, even the antidote 
for, the cry “for shame!” that forces the young, alienated Jane—“a thing that could not 
sympathize with one amongst” the Reeds—into the red-room (12).  When Jane, 
despite their gaping geographic separation, experiences a heightened sense of 
Rochester’s feelings, her histrionic body responds to Rochester’s emotion with classic 
sympathetic susceptibility: “My heart beat fast and thick,” then “stood still to an 
inexpressible feeling that thrilled it through, and passed at once to my head and 
extremities,” she explains (369).  Along with her sympathetic, bodily response, 
however, Jane also registers a voice: “I saw nothing: but I heard a voice somewhere 
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cry—‘Jane! Jane! Jane!’ nothing more” (369).  While an “inexpressible feeling” 
threatens to merge completely with Jane’s responsive body, the compelling, 
individuated voice remains distinct, for “it was the voice of a human being—a known, 
loved, well-remembered voice—that of Edward Fairfax Rochester” (369).   
This deviation from the sympathetic paradigm continues, veering closer to the 
cry for shame, as the following narration explains Rochester’s “cry” by linking it to 
his desperate “call” to his wife, Bertha Mason.  When Jane investigates the meaning of 
her uncanny experience by returning to Thornfield Hall, an inn-keeper provides 
background on the “terrible spectacle” of its burning and Rochester’s doomed attempt 
to remove his wife (375): 
 
He . . . went back to get his mad wife out of her cell. And then they called out 
to him that she was on the roof; where she was standing, waving her arms, 
above the battlements, and shouting out till they could hear her a mile off; I 
saw and heard her with my own eyes. She was a big woman, and had long 
black hair: we could see it streaming against the flames as she stood. I 
witnessed, and several more witnessed Mr. Rochester ascend through the 
skylight on to the roof: we heard him call “Bertha!” We saw him approach her; 
and then, ma’am, she yelled, and gave a spring, and the next minute she lay 
smashed on the pavement. (377) 
Rochester’s thoroughgoing public exposure and reverberating call to Bertha provide 
his intimate cry—“Jane! Jane! Jane!”—with a dramatically humiliating source.  The 
spectacle on the rooftop, widely witnessed and heard “a mile off,” literalizes a 
scenario that Rochester only imagines early in his relationship with Jane, in his coy 
hint that he has hidden “defects,” “a past existence, a series of deeds, a colour of life to 
contemplate within my own breast, which might well call my sneers and censures 
from my neighbours to myself” (118-19).  Rochester gestures at self-exposure in this 
early statement, but firmly limits this possibility to private “contemplat[ion] within my 
own breast.”  The actual revelation of his “defects” and “past existence” to the 
surrounding neighborhood thus dramatically inverts a tactic of not just privacy, but 
extreme secrecy and disavowal, that Rochester has taken toward the shame that Bertha 
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represents for him.  For Rochester’s ensconcing of Bertha in a “secret inner cabinet” 
of Thornfield encapsulates a simultaneous hoarding and denial of shame that 
characterizes his relation to Bertha and to his own past self.  When full disclosure of 
his past to Jane becomes inevitable, Rochester’s account emphasizes his tendency to 
displace his own personal shame and error onto his demonized wife—a strategy that 
constitutes not distancing but near-denial of his own proximity to shame.  Rochester 
bemoans the humiliating contagion that he locates firmly in Bertha:  “In the eyes of 
the world I was doubtless covered with grimy dishonour: but I resolved to be clean in 
my own sight—and to the last I repudiated the contamination of her crimes, and 
wrenched myself from connection with her mental defects. Still, society associated my 
name and person with hers!” (270).  The suggestion of “Hope” to return to England 
and hide his mad wife is the extreme of such absolute location of shame within Bertha: 
“That woman, who has so abused your long-suffering—so sullied your name; so 
outraged your honour; so blighted your youth—is not your wife … Let her identity, 
her connection with yourself, be buried in oblivion; you are bound to impart them to 
no living being. Place her in safety and comfort: shelter her degradation with secrecy, 
and leave her” (272).  Rochester’s intolerance for personal shame—or even closeness 
to shame—creates an absolute rupture in any relation with Bertha.  He tells Jane, “I 
found her nature wholly alien to mine,” and this “alien” quality can only produce, for 
him, “extreme disgust”: she becomes “what I most hate” (269, 272, 264).  The 
relational rupture extends beyond Bertha to his own memories: Rochester’s 
retrospective narration reveals estrangement from his “mad wife” and his past self. 
 Rochester’s rejection of difference and disavowal of related shame takes 
particularly dramatic form in his struggles with Bertha, but the limitations of his 
approach also shape his romance with Jane. Jane’s rejection of Rochester’s proposal to 
become his mistress should be read, to some extent, as a rejection of Rochester’s 
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absolute denial of shame and difference. For Rochester’s seduction is, like St. John’s, 
a sympathetic seduction that is given a threateningly invasive cast: 
 
After a youth and manhood passed half in unutterable misery and half dreary in 
solitude, I have for the first time found what I can truly love—I have found 
you. You are my sympathy—my better self—my good angel—I am bound to 
you with a strong attachment. I think you good, gifted, lovely; a fervent, a 
solemn passion is conceived in my heart; it leans to you, draws you to my 
centre and spring of life, wraps my existence about you—and, kindling in pure, 
powerful flame, fuses you and me in one. (277) 
Rochester’s sympathetic idealization has a coercive edge, requiring Jane to embody 
his feelings and “my better self.”  His violent rejection of the dissimilar as the wholly 
alien, in relation to Bertha, finds a counterpart in the demand that what he “can truly 
love” manifest sympathetic equivalence.  His sympathetic conception of romance 
expels disparity, and also makes no room for shame.  Rochester’s fantasy of romantic 
escape with Jane ominously parallels his imprisonment of Bertha in its clear 
compartmentalization of shame.  While Rochester envisions violently containing all 
shame by “shut[ting] up Thornfield Hall … nail[ing] up the front door, and board[ing] 
the lower windows” with Bertha still inside, Jane would be positioned abroad, 
similarly confined in a “secure sanctuary from hateful reminiscences, from unwelcome 
intrusion—even from falsehood and slander” (264-265).  Rochester’s proposition is a 
sympathetic temptation that threatens to sever Jane from shame and memory—a 
proposition she painfully but decidedly rejects.  Rochester’s call on the rooftop thus 
places him in spectacular relation to the shame he has so persistently hidden—now 
given concrete form in the figure of Bertha and in the crowds who hear and see him.   
“Shame,” writes Michael Warner, “is an experience of exposure, in which I 
become suddenly an object through the eyes of another; it thus resonates powerfully in 
situations of erotic objectification, visuality, and display.”11  Indeed, at the point of 
                                                
11 Michael Warner, “Pleasures and Dangers of Shame,” in Gay Shame, eds. David M. Halperin and 
Valerie Traub (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2009): 290. 
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Rochester’s dramatic display on the rooftop such shameful exposure has accumulated 
an intense erotic allure in Brontë’s narrative, having provided Jane with a space of 
intimacy with others, and even her own memories.  From the beginning, Jane’s 
relationship with Rochester is driven by an erotics of shameful exposure: in this sense, 
the “terrible spectacle” of his long-hidden shame finally delivers on the eroticized, 
potential surfacing of error and degradation that has enticed Jane.  Like Helen, 
Rochester is a text whose vulnerable physical surface fascinates Jane, especially as it 
suggests depths that Jane desires to read through shame.  As we have seen, when 
Rochester intently gazes at Thornfield Hall early in their relationship, Jane just as 
intently scrutinizes the mysterious glint in his eyes, puzzling over the “pain, shame, 
ire” she perceives wrestling in the “quivering conflict in the large pupil dilating under 
his ebon eyebrow,” and critics often have turned to the roles of rebellious “ire” and 
sympathetic “pain” in reading Jane’s conflicted romance with Rochester and the 
ideological and aesthetic implications of its resolution (125).  Yet Jane’s ruminations 
on the happiness in store for Blanche Ingram, as Rochester’s intended bride, suggest 
that shame, particularly, constitutes the desired depth of Rochester’s impenetrable eye, 
and that its materialization would offer for her something akin to erotic climax and 
marital closure.  Jane worries about her increasing tendency toward “forgetting all his 
faults, for which I had once kept a sharp look-out,” and reinstates the watch: 
 
And as for the vague something—was it a sinister or a sorrowful, a designing 
or a desponding expression?—that opened upon a careful observer, now and 
then, in his eye and closed again before one could fathom the strange depth 
partially disclosed; that something which used to make me fear and shrink, as 
if I had been wandering amongst volcanic-looking hills, and had suddenly felt 
the ground quiver, and seen it gape; that something I at intervals beheld still, 
and with throbbing heart, but not with palsied nerves. Instead of wishing to 
shun, I longed only to dare—to divine it; and I thought Miss Ingram happy, 
because one day she might look into the abyss at her leisure, explore its 
secrets, and analyse their nature. (165) 
Jane’s imagining of the fleeting revelation of Rochester’s secret as a sudden 
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“gap[ing]” of the “ground” she traverses echoes the imagery of her conditional 
relation to Helen’s shameful exposure: “Were I in her place, it seems to me I should 
wish the earth to open and swallow me up.”  The spectacular surfacing of Rochester’s 
shameful, “vague something” on the burning rooftop—and Jane’s own mediated 
contact with this spectacle through the inn-keeper’s later narration of it—allows her 
once again to approach the “open[ing] and swallow[ing]” earth that figures the frisson 
of partial contact with another’s shameful exposure.  For as with Helen’s display, 
Rochester’s spectacle of shame produces a compelling form with uncertain content, a 
form that preserves his interior emotions as “a strange depth” still only “partially 
disclosed.”  Reading Rochester’s call to Jane in relation to his call to Bertha, and 
especially the shame that it signifies, illuminates the full erotic significance of the oft-
cited romantic call and response, and allows it a greater textual function than the 
consolidation of a normalizing sympathetic bond between the lovers.  The fervent call 
and response between Rochester and Jane presents a moment of precarious intimate 
connection, the erotics of which depends, like the smile Jane shares with Helen, on 
proximity to a shameful spectacle that both exposes another and enticingly obscures 
the full transparency of that other’s distinct interiority.  
While the spectacle of Rochester’s shame forwards the novel’s erotic 
resolution, it is also significant that Bertha Mason has been incorporated into the 
scenario.  As we have seen in Jane’s shame-fueled relations with Helen, and her own 
past selves, the scene of shame in Jane Eyre is also, often, a scene of productive 
individuation and intimate relation through difference.  Yet Bertha, as many critics 
have contended, is the character who most pressures the novel’s capacity to tolerate 
difference.12  From this perspective, Bertha’s integration into a relational spectacle of 
                                                
12 In his analysis of Bertha Mason’s central role in readings of Jane Eyre, Laurence Lerner usefully 
outlines three common critical approaches to Bertha: “Bertha as representing Jane’s repressed sexual 
desire, Bertha as representing Jane’s suppressed anger, and . . . Bertha-Antoinette as representing the 
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potential individuation—with Rochester, her most virulent critic and oppressor, no 
less—suggests Brontë’s attempt to push the limit of difference that the novel’s 
dynamic of shame can accommodate. The violent death of Bertha, as she “lay smashed 
on the pavement,” undeniably marks this limit, and shame’s potential for damaging 
effects and normalizing demarcations (377).  Bertha’s frantic, ultimately self-
destructive gestures and unintelligible response to Rochester’s call seem designed to 
keep her on the cusp of relationality: the legibility of Jane’s answer (“I am coming”) to 
Rochester’s cry of “Jane!  Jane!  Jane!” is withheld from Bertha, whom onlookers 
have seen “waving her arms” and “shouting out” before, in response to Rochester’s 
“call” of “Bertha!” she “yelled, and gave a spring” (369, 377).  But Rochester’s call to 
Bertha, in its partial parallels to his romantic cry to Jane, also offers a fleeting 
extension of individualized identity and relationality to the one character to whom 
they have been consistently denied—both by Rochester and by the text more 
generally.  We can more fully understand the complex, and often contradictory, 
aesthetic and cultural impact of Victorian shame (and Victorian emotions more 
broadly) by recognizing that here, the novel allows Bertha the most legibility and 
recognition she receives from other characters, not in spite of shame’s exclusionary 
effects, but through shame’s relational dynamic.             
Brontë’s novel further counters the embodiments of shame’s indisputable 
violence with the striking revision of shame’s form in subsequent narrations of 
Rochester’s injuries.  When Jane reunites with Rochester, he relates the “terrible 
spectacle” of Thornfield’s burning, Bertha’s end, and his own misfortunes in more 
indirect fashion than the inn-keeper, interpreting the events, and especially his maimed 
                                                                                                                                       
colonial subject” (279). Across each broadly defined approach, Bertha tends to be read as the figure of 
excessive or foreign elements—whether elements of desire, emotion, or racial and national identity—
that the novel represses or violently marginalizes. For a discussion of representative criticism, see 
Laurence Lerner, “Bertha and the Critics,” Nineteenth-Century Literature 44, no. 3 (1989): 273-300. 
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body, as a just and long-overdue shaming punishment for “my stiff-necked rebellion”: 
“Divine justice pursued its course; disasters came thick on me. . . . His chastisements 
are mighty; and one smote me which has humbled me for ever. You know I was proud 
of my strength; but what is it now, when I must give it over to foreign guidance, as a 
child does its weakness” (393).  As his narration continues, Rochester’s cry to Jane is 
positioned as the direct outgrowth of his humbling—particularly his physical 
humiliation. Rochester’s renarrating of his earlier cry places him in a relational 
dynamic with Jane organized around his humiliated body, a dynamic that echoes the 
emotional proximity established between Helen and Jane around their physical 
exposures in the schoolroom.  Jane further renarrates this moment for the reader in a 
way that remakes her bond with Helen, bringing both Rochester and the reader into the 
scene.  In Jane’s previous perception, Helen had alleviated the shame of her 
spectacular punishment through a physical posture suggesting memory: “Her eyes are 
fixed on the floor, but I am sure they do not see it—her sight seems turned in, gone 
down into her heart: she is looking at what she can remember, I believe; not at what is 
really present.”  Now Rochester stands, like Helen before him, “bending his sightless 
eyes to the earth . . . in mute devotion,” while Jane repeats Helen’s reflective turn 
“into her heart”: “Reader . . . I listened to Mr. Rochester’s narrative; but made no 
disclosure in return. . . . I kept these things then, and pondered them in my heart” 
(394).  The narrator explicitly invokes the “Reader” as a witnessing participant, 
invited into the erotic structure of shame and positioned much like the young Jane in 
her prior scene of intimacy with Helen, which this scene reenacts—a reenactment that 
constitutes romantic reunion with Rochester. 
When Jane recollects Rochester’s physical dependence on her due to his 
blindness, she lingers on his seemingly shameful body, which encompasses not just 
“Divine justice” but also bitter-sweet love: “there was a pleasure in my services, most 
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full, most exquisite, even though sad—because he claimed these services without 
painful shame or damping humiliation” (397).  Jane’s description emphasizes the form 
of shame—present in Rochester’s physical condition and its expected “painful shame 
or damping humiliation”—while embedding this form in acts of narration that mitigate 
shame’s hold.  Jane alleviates Rochester’s sense of shame by “putting into words” the 
world he can no longer see, thus disrupting the rigid alignment of shameful scenario, 
signifying body, and interior emotional content that his lost “strength” initially 
inflicted on him (397).  Revising the indelible signification of absolute shame into 
more conditional shame, Jane also claims the happiness she had earlier imagined for 
Blanche Ingram: Jane now “might look into the abyss” of her husband’s shameful eye 
“at her leisure,” but she also relieves the shame caused by that blinded eye by looking 
and narrating on its behalf. The possibility of revising the shamefully signifying body 
further materializes when Rochester’s blindness begins to heal, but not completely, 
and not before it “drew us so very near” (397).  When Jane first discerns the 
“quivering conflict” of “pain, shame, ire” in Rochester’s eye, he rejects it as posing 
“obstacles to happiness,” but her concluding narration of and for this eye brings shame 
into close and productive contact with other feelings—with a “sad[ness]” and pain 
inextricable from “pleasure”—such that “Edward and I, then, are happy” and “those 
we most love are happy likewise” (125, 398).  Shame—as much as “pain” and “ire”—
facilitates happiness: in both preserving and reworking the form of “painful shame or 
damping humiliation,” Brontë’s novel reimagines felicitous selfhood and relationality.  
 
FEMINISM AND NOVELISTIC FEELING 
Yet however comfortably happy Jane Eyre seems by the novel’s end, Brontë’s 
heroine also raises numerous, often uncomfortable questions about the costs of such 
happiness for the self and for others.  For contemporary feminist criticism, for which 
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Jane Eyre remains a touchstone text, such questions often revolve around the costs of 
emotional identification, cast specifically in terms of anger and sympathy.  Observing 
the “highly charged contentious response” Jane Eyre continues to elicit, Cora Kaplan 
postulates that Brontë’s novel “condenses unresolved questions in and for feminism 
today,” questions concerning how “the status of female feelings in feminism” relates 
to “the status of female individualism.”13  In her characterization of the “emotive 
history” of this criticism, Kaplan foregrounds the specific feelings of anger and 
sympathy and links them to the issue of “identification”: a history of “angry or 
sympathetic identification with the text” of Jane Eyre “and its heroine” has, she 
suggests, also “produced a second order set of feelings about the critical debates, for 
which, nevertheless, Jane Eyre remains a referent.”14  The most influential exemplar of 
“angry . . . identification” would, of course, be Gilbert and Gubar’s The Madwoman in 
the Attic, with its centerpiece reading of anger in Jane Eyre.  In mapping a feminist 
poetics centered on anger, this landmark study entails problematic demands for 
emotional identifications that define the “female” and the “feminist.”  While the 
madwoman figures an attractive “rebellious feminism” for Gilbert and Gubar, the 
subversive energy of anger must be distinguished from potentially antisocial or 
illegible madness, and the challenges of maintaining this distinction appear to 
motivate the claim that the angry double in nineteenth-century literature serves to “act 
out the subversive impulses every woman inevitably feels when she contemplates the 
‘deep-rooted’ evils of patriarchy.”15  The madwoman is kept legible and relational as 
“every woman,” but at the risk of universalizing female emotional makeup—what 
“every woman inevitably feels”—through a hermeneutics of identification involving 
the shared anger of literary characters, authors and readers.  Thus in their reading of 
                                                
13 Cora Kaplan, Victoriana: Histories, Fictions, Criticism (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2007), 25. 
14 Ibid., 25, 31. 
15 Gilbert and Gubar, 338, 77, my emphasis. 
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Jane Eyre, Gilbert and Gubar’s emphasis on a “constitutional ire”—in various stages 
of repression—that emotionally defines not only Jane Eyre and her double, Bertha 
Mason, but all of the other major female characters, begins to function less as an 
uncovering of personal emotion and more as a pervasive mandate for truly feminist—
or even female—feeling.16  In order for the angry double to qualify as a subversive 
rather than a monitory literary figure, the author also must manifest traceable 
identification with her rage, and, for the feminist potential of this identification to take 
full effect, the reader must acknowledge—and even better, share—this anger as well.  
In highlighting the problems of such universalizing of gendered emotion, 
revisionist feminist criticism of Jane Eyre has often focused on sympathy in order to 
pose the risk of a coercive idealization of emotional identification.  In her study How 
Novels Think, for example, Nancy Armstrong positions Jane Eyre’s romantic 
resolution as representative of the Victorian novel’s “project of universalizing the 
individual subject” through the “fantasy of domestic plentitude or wholeness of being 
within the household.”17  Armstrong does not discuss sympathy explicitly in her 
reading of Jane Eyre, but she situates the novel’s idealization of naturalized 
domesticity—which, she claims, reproduces emotional connections within and 
between “almost indistinguishable” happy homes as novelistic closure—as exemplary 
of a restrictive phase of a paradoxically self-regulating individualism that she links, in 
her introduction, to the “logic of sympathy.”18  Amit Rai and Lorri Nandrea also 
                                                
16 Ibid., 349.  Gilbert and Gubar read Miss Temple’s superficial “ladylike virtues,” for example, as a 
disguise for “a ‘sewer’ of fury beneath this temple”; and Helen Burns’ “self-renunciation” is similarly 
symptomatic, for “despite her contemplative purity, there is evidently a ‘sewer’ of concealed resentment 
in Helen Burns, just as there is in Miss Temple” (346).  Indeed, Miss Temple is not just tranquil; neither 
is Helen Burns simply resigned.  But affective nuance begins to be effaced by Gilbert and Gubar’s 
insistent retrieval of anger, which positions emotional differences between female characters as more a 
matter of degree than kind, and anger as the “constitutional” base for all substantial claims to real 
female experience and expression in a patriarchal society. 
17 Nancy Armstrong, How Novels Think: The Limits of British Individualism from 1719-1900 (New 
York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2005), 10, 25. 
18 Ibid., 143-44, 15. 
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critique sympathy in Jane Eyre as a predominantly normalizing mode of emotional 
identification that can solidify individual and group identities, but at the expense of 
excluded others.  Rai traces “the narrative of Jane’s assumption of a sympathetic 
police-agency”; and Nandrea describes as the “triumph of sympathy” the oft-noted 
“manner in which the end of the novel emphasizes Jane’s success in eliminating all 
possible threats to her newly attained subject position” through “a systematic negation 
of others and otherness.”19  Yet while Rai and Nandrea critique a dominant narrative of 
the “triumph of sympathy” in Jane Eyre, Rai also maintains that “the trajectory of 
Jane’s assumption of power gives off a certain haunting,” a faint, mainly disavowed 
“signal [of] the possibility of another relationship between subjectivity, sympathy and 
spirituality.”20  Nandrea more thoroughly engages with an affective “undercurrent to 
the major narrative trajectory of the text,” one that, she argues, revels in the 
“disempowering pleasures of sensibility.”21  Both usefully seek to uncover additional 
affective facets of Jane Eyre, suggesting that a critique of sympathy’s problematic 
imperative of identification need not entail a critical rejection of all emotional 
connections within (or, to a certain extent, with) the novel. 
If we heed Brontë’s call “for shame,” acknowledging it as a central affective 
strand of Jane Eyre—one that insistently appears in the form of compelling spectacles 
of relational difference—we can recognize the novel as less a triumphant march 
toward normalizing identification than an exploration of shame as an alternative for 
shaping individuated, intimate social relations.  Insofar as shame encompasses, for 
Brontë, a mode of readerly engagement, its insistent presence in Jane Eyre asks us to 
think again about the ideological implications of the relationship between emotion and 
                                                
19 Amit S. Rai, Rule of Sympathy: Sentiment, Race and Power, 1750-1850 (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 
99; Nandrea, 119. 
20 Rai, 103-104. 
21 Nandrea, 119. 
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form in the development of the nineteenth-century novel.  Indeed, shame’s role in 
Jane Eyre as an affective mediator between coercive over-identification and 
potentially alienating emotional ruptures perhaps accounts for the rapt scrutiny the 
novel continues to inspire in readers looking to Victorian literature to find points of 
affinity with—as well as instructive differences from—current investments in issues 
of affect, gender, identification, and novel form. “Pain, shame, ire”: as critics 
responsive to, while also thinking and telling about, the affective impact of novels, we 
might find ourselves suggestively, because imperfectly, reflected in Jane’s hope, and 
Brontë’s seeming confidence, that the registering and narrating of such conflicting 
feelings could forward productive forms of individual and relational happiness.  
 203 
CODA 
“AT THE BOTTOM OF ALL”  
 
More than a striking instance of novelistic shame, George Du Maurier’s Trilby 
would seem to be the Victorian novel par excellence of superficial sensation.  The 
wildly popular work, first published in 1894, sparked a transatlantic marketing 
sensation. “Trilby-mania” involved popular serialized and book editions of the novel, 
but also spun off into Trilby-inspired stage plays and periodical articles, as well as a 
wide array of products, ranging from hats to tooth-paste.  Appropriately, the 
sensational plot of the novel itself thematizes superficial spells.  Its heroine, Trilby 
O’Ferrall, is transformed into an international singing star whose artistry relies on 
Svengali’s exploitative mesmerism of her.  At the novel’s end, after Trilby’s death, we 
learn that “There were two Trilbys.”1 One was the warm and ostensibly real Trilby 
who was “an angel of paradise” (298); the other, “an unconscious Trilby of marble … 
a singing-machine—an organ to play upon” (299).  This human singing-machine is 
positioned as a performer nightmarishly detached from her own psychological agency 
and depth, and she also acts as a siren who casts superficial spells, as her performances 
produce automatic hysteria in teeming crowds.   
It is useful to consider the novel as a timely rumination on superficial and self-
alienating sensations—literary and otherwise—and much critical work has 
productively adopted this approach.2  But I would like here to place Trilby in a 
different, if not wholly unrelated, context: that of nineteenth-century novelistic 
psychological realism, characterized by tropes of emotional depth.  For while the 
                                                
1 George Du Maurier, Trilby (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1998), 298.  Further references will 
appear in the text. 
2 See, for example: Phyllis Weliver, “Music, Crowd Control, and the Female Performer in Trilby” in 
The Idea of Music in Victorian Fiction, eds. Sophie Fuller and Nicky Losseff (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2004); Lara Karpenko, “Purchasing Largely: Trilby and the Fin de Siècle Reader,” Victorians Institute 
Journal 34 (2006): 215-42. 
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novel’s heroine is an uncanny figure of vacant performance when she becomes a 
singing sensation in the later parts of the novel, early in the novel she concretely 
embodies the potent Victorian metaphor of feminine character as hidden emotional 
depths.  The novel’s sensational conceit of these “two Trilbys” contained in a single 
female form can thus be read as the end-point of a century-long negotiation of 
novelistic investments in representing and cultivating deep feminine interiority.  More 
specifically, Trilby marks the culmination of a nineteenth-century tendency to use 
spectacular novelistic displays of one particular emotion—shame—to negotiate 
anxieties about the presentation, circulation and development of ostensibly private and 
personal female interiorities through the increasingly commercial and popular form of 
the novel.          
Early in Trilby, we get a striking display of shame’s distinct role in novelistic 
underworlds of gendered emotion.  In his second encounter with Trilby, the novel’s 
hero, Little Billee, discovers an unexpected depth when he examines the quirky model 
who has been frequenting his art studio:  
 
Then he looked into her freckled face, and met the kind and tender 
mirthfulness of her gaze and the plucky frankness of her fine wide smile with a 
thrill that was not aesthetic at all (nor the reverse), but all of the heart. And in 
one of his quick flashes of intuitive insight he divined far down beneath the 
shining surface of those eyes (which seemed for a moment to reflect only a 
little image of himself against the sky beyond the big north window) a well of 
sweetness; and floating somewhere in the midst of it the very heart of 
compassion, generosity, and warm sisterly love; and under that—alas! at the 
bottom of all—a thin slimy layer of sorrow and shame. (30-31)  
Du Maurier, here, portrays the emotional range of his heroine as a hidden depth, 
lurking below the “shining surface” of physical features and expressions and yielding 
itself up only to the unique “intuitive insight” of Little Billee.  And, within this vast 
emotional range, shame and sorrow are emotions set apart.  Far from the easy 
legibility of physical and emotional surface, the “thin slimy layer of sorrow and 
shame” at the “bottom of all” forms the deepest limits of penetrating insight. This 
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penetrating insight marks the hero’s aesthetic and affective perception and also defines 
the distinctive view constructed for readers of the psychological novel.  The imagery 
of this “thin slimy layer” suggests a simultaneous fascination and repulsion attributed 
to Little Billee, and through his surrogate status as an insightful reader, to the novel 
reader who peers into a character’s interiority.  The uneasiness is intensified by the 
narrator’s strange insistence that Little Billee’s responding “thrill” is “not aesthetic at 
all” but also not “the reverse.”  The responsive reader’s heart, it seems, must be 
expansive enough to appreciate Trilby’s interiority as both an enticing aesthetic 
display and as something else—presumably something more authentic, “not aesthetic 
at all.”   
As the plot unfolds, shame especially condenses concerns over emotional 
display, as Trilby’s interior exposure is put in close relation to a physical exposure that 
is portrayed as even more explicitly disturbing and improper: that of Trilby’s nude 
modeling.  The slimy shame that Little Billee perceives is the emotional correlate of 
Trilby’s practice of nude modeling or, as she breezily puts it, of posing “for the 
altogether” (15). The shame that Little Billee sees “at the bottom of all” provides the 
first clue of this blot on Trilby’s femininity.  But, her capacity for shame—even more 
than for sorrow—is also perceived, by him, as the key to its eventual erasure.  
However, even as shame is positioned as the antidote to Trilby’s indecent self-
exposure, simply waiting to be raised by Little Billee to the surface, this antidote is 
threatened by an association between the scandalous exhibition of her nude body and 
the exhibition of her even more private emotional makeup, available only to a 
particularly insightful and intimate reader.  The dramatic slippage between a 
shamefully exposed, eroticized body and an open mind suggests Du Maurier’s 
anxieties around the novel’s growing role in the cultural production and display of 
domestic femininity and also provides a site for self-reflexive negotiations of that role.   
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Despite Little Billee’s insistent marriage proposals to Trilby and his faith that 
she will make an ideal wife once shame has transformed her, the novel clings to the 
impossibility of Trilby, the nude figure model, ever quite fitting the mold of the 
Victorian domestic paragon.  The shame that is laid bare for Little Billee and the 
reader is the uncomfortable seat of deep feminine interiority that becomes increasingly 
troublesome as the plot progresses.  On the one hand, Trilby’s possession of hidden 
yet ultimately accessible shame—shame that can be penetrated by “intuitive 
insight”—is the guarantee of her complex and authentic subjectivity, and of her 
submerged suitability for domesticity.  Her possession of other, more traditional 
emotional ingredients of the Angel in the House—qualities like “compassion,” 
“generosity,” and desexualized “warm sisterly love”— seem to rest on this layer of 
shame that troubles but can also animate and authenticate her other domestic feelings.  
Little Billee hones in on this shame and makes it the quality that, if properly raised and 
encouraged, can re-make the bohemian Trilby into a proper bourgeois wife.  However, 
as the narrative progresses this shame also represents the sole, indelible signifier of 
qualities that make her fundamentally unsuitable as the wife of a middle-class English 
gentleman.  Little Billie and Trilby enjoy a short engagement that is violently 
disrupted by his meddling relatives who successfully break off the relationship.  These 
relatives are ushered into the narrative as representatives of British bourgeois 
hypocrisy and an unfair sexual double standard, but despite this overt castigation, the 
novel never shakes the sense that they still might be right about an essential mismatch 
between a former model for the “altogether” and a British husband, even one as 
progressive and open-minded as the artist Little Billee.    
While Little Billee’s family wields shame as the tool of a repressively narrow 
demand for absolute feminine modesty and chastity, the novel’s lingering on Trilby’s 
shame cannot be reduced to just this repressive function.  We can see the novel’s 
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spectacles of shame as also working in a less repressive and more productively critical 
light if we consider Du Maurier’s lingering on Trilby’s shame to be illuminating a 
broader tension within novelistic psychological realism.  This broader tension is 
between, on the one hand, the novelistic dependency on exposing private feminine 
feelings in order to reproduce and reinforce domesticity, and, on the other hand, the 
anxiety that such exposure inevitably forms subjectivities that—because of the taint of 
artistic production and public display and circulation—can never fully be reconciled 
with the ideological domestic space for which they are being shaped.  Little Billee’s 
relatives conceptually distinguish the ruined Trilby from other pure, marriageable 
English women.  However, the novel does not posit an essential incompatibility 
between Trilby and a domestic sphere that could accommodate other, less shameful 
women. Instead, Trilby’s unstable relation to the domestic sphere stages a more 
thoroughgoing tension between the concept of the Victorian domestic paragon and the 
popular novel form employed over the period in this paragon’s reproduction. 
 Little Billee’s developing conception of Trilby’s deep layer of shame 
exemplifies a cultural belief that natural feminine emotion can remake her, if only 
brought to the surface.  This surfacing of shame has two related facets: one, a literal 
clothing of Trilby that will end her actual practices of nude modeling; the other, a 
more metaphoric clothing that will raise to her consciousness a proper sense of 
feminine modesty.  Physical and psychological indecency are particularly linked in the 
notion, repeatedly voiced by the narrator, that Trilby needs to be both “clothed” and 
put in her “right mind.”  The narrator contrasts the praise of artists who painted Trilby 
in the nude with his own experience, stating, “For myself, I only speak of Trilby as I 
have seen her—clothed and in her right mind” (67).  However, the scene in which 
Trilby’s shame actually rises to the psychological surface greatly challenges any 
confident yoking of the influencing of a mind through shame and the modest clothing 
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of that mind.  While Little Billee is initially troubled, yet fascinated, by his insight into 
Trilby’s shame, his sight of its material exhibition, when he unexpectedly finds her 
modeling nude in an art class, simply causes him to bolt in shock and disgust.  As 
Trilby ponders Little Billee’s abrupt departure, shame finally rises into her own 
consciousness, put on vivid display for the reader:    
But Trilby was much disquieted, and fell to wondering what on earth was the 
matter. 
 
At first she wondered in French: French of the Quartier Latin.  She had not 
seen Little Billee for a week, and wondered if he were ill. She had looked 
forward so much to his painting her—painting her beautifully—and hoped he 
would soon come back, and lose no time. 
 Then she began to wonder in English—nice clean English of the studio in 
the Place St Anatole des Arts—her father’s English—and suddenly a quick 
thought pierced her through and through, and made the flesh tingle on her 
insteps and the backs of her hands, and bathed her brow and temples with 
sweat . . . 
 Could it be possible that he was shocked at seeing her sitting there? . . .  
 She turned alternately pale and red, pale and red all over, again and again, 
as the thought grew up in her—and soon the growing thought became a 
torment. 
 This new-born feeling of shame was unendurable—its birth a travail that 
racked and rent every fibre of her moral being, and she suffered agonies 
beyond anything she had ever felt in her life. (82) 
Rather than clothing her, the experience of shame, here, seems to further expose her.  
The narrative depiction of her shamed interiority—her “growing thought”—merges 
with her bare flesh and even further emphasizes and eroticizes her nude body, as she 
turns “alternately pale and red, pale and red all over, again and again.”  The 
reinforcing spectacles of shamed thoughts and exposed flesh cast the narrator’s act of 
minute interior description as itself an indecent invasion and exposure.  It is 
significantly the presence of shame, rather than shame’s lack, that constitutes and even 
accentuates the very exposure that makes Trilby an unsuitable wife.  The shame that 
earlier served as a guarantee of Trilby’s domestic potential proves much more difficult 
to mold to respectable contours when it must undergo literary depiction. 
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 This difficulty appears especially aligned with specifically novelistic 
deployments of shame if we remember that it is a crash course in novel-reading that 
has partially ushered Trilby toward this moment.  Little Billee and his two English 
friends share the narrator’s sentiments that Trilby would be better if clothed and in her 
right mind, and contribute to this righting of her mind and speech with the “nice clean 
English” of their studio, where they lend her “English books: Dickens. Thackeray, 
Walter Scott.” Through this reading Trilby “grew more English every day” (64).  This 
burgeoning Englishness culminates in the thought of shame that “grew up in her” in 
this passage. Thus, for Trilby to “wonder in English” is to wonder in novelistic 
English.  Accordingly, Trilby figures here a character whose thoughts are being 
exposed in the novel we read and a woman whose thoughts are themselves formed by 
novel reading.  Both registers of novelistic interiority are haunted by the specter of 
indecent public exposure that seems further intensified by their intersection.  The 
domestic woman is dually threatened, by the feminine exposure within psychological 
realism and by her formation and consumption of her own interiority—the making of 
her mind—through the commercial, widely distributed, and emotionally enthralling 
form of the novel.  Trilby’s densely accumulating shame and its ambiguous worth 
suggests that shame’s centrality in nineteenth-century literary characterization 
emanates in part from its capacity to register these broader concerns over both the 
depiction and fashioning of the emotive domestic women through art, especially the 
art of the popular novel.  
The uneasy slippage between Trilby’s deep, private interior shame and the 
exposed, aestheticized nude modeling that her shame signifies—and even animates—
finds a counterpart in the “two Trilbys” that the character eventually splits into, as 
Trilby is transformed by Svengali into a world-renowned star. One Trilby, the 
seemingly real Trilby, appears naturally to have the perfect affective makeup for 
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domesticity, which is only thwarted by middle-class prejudice against her past. But the 
other Trilby, who succumbs to Svengali’s mesmerism, is a moving but completely 
aesthetic amalgamation devoid herself of any sincere sensations, meaningful legibility 
or affective authenticity.  The novel’s sensational containment of both Trilbys in one 
female character continues the blurring of clean distinctions between the natural 
domestic woman and an aesthetic production, and shame especially continues to 
trouble—even as it is invoked to mark—clear delineations of the naturally emotive 
and the artificially constructed woman. 
Yet Trilby’s incarnation as La Svengali, singing for raving crowds, brings with 
it another striking spectacle of shame.  In this instance, Little Billee does not merely 
perceive but actively produces the scene’s shame as he watches Trilby sing.  Trilby’s 
performance revives his characteristic affective sensitivity, which has been deadened 
since his engagement with Trilby was broken off.  He discovers: 
 
[T]hat heavenly glimpse beyond the veil! And with it a crushing sense of his 
own infinitesimal significance by the side of this glorious pair of artists, one of 
whom had been his friend and the other his love—a love who had offered to be 
his humble mistress and slave, not feeling herself good enough to be his wife!  
 It made him sick and faint to remember, and filled him with hot shame, and 
then and there his love for Trilby became as that of a dog for its master! (214)  
Little Billee’s sense of shame is no longer, as it was at the novel’s start, an anxious 
honing in on Trilby’s inappropriate aesthetic display.  Instead his “hot shame” is an 
erotically overwhelming appreciation of Trilby’s artistry, even as this moving 
performance acts as an extension, even an exaggeration, of the shamefully public, 
commercial self-displays of her past modeling.  This moment revives his memory of 
the past humbling that brought Trilby closest to domestic suitability, and juxtaposes it 
with a shameful indulgence in the pleasures of feminine artifice. Shame finally—albeit 
still uneasily—links the near-domestic and the purely aesthetic woman in not just 
Trilby’s single body, but in Little Billee’s experience of intense affective response to 
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its aesthetic display.   
In Trilby, then, shame comes to signify the ultimate emotional depth and 
burgeoning emotional restraint of an essentially respectable woman as well as the 
height of erotically charged, potentially overwhelming aesthetic engagement.  This 
unstable oscillation highlights two related concerns that characterize not just Trilby but 
novelistic displays of feminine interiority throughout the nineteenth century.  The first 
concern is what kind of women are being made by the novel’s increasingly full display 
and mass-circulation of feminine interiority? Will the inescapable taint of a public and 
commercial aesthetic extend to—and perhaps even ruin—the receptive domestic 
reader? The second concern regards the eager response to, and even demand for, this 
display of interiority. What are both male and female readers responding to in these 
popular displays of feminine interiority?  Are readers learning to recognize, analyze 
and emulate emotional depths? Or are they being trained, perhaps like a dog by its 
master, to value and succumb to aesthetic illusions, even as those illusions could 
poison the affective well of interiority through inappropriate and unnatural 
indulgences and exhibitions?   
  Thus Du Maurier’s iconic image of two Trilbys contained in one beautiful 
form might seem a particularly extreme cautionary tale of the necessary evacuation of 
agency lurking within feminized emotional susceptibilities.  But I would like to 
conclude with the suggestion that it figures a more conciliatory recognition—even 
appreciation—of the necessary artistry constructing gendered subjectivity, and thus 
continues the attempts we have seen in the novels of Austen, Brontë and Thackeray to 
destabilize cultural attempts to naturalize and denigrate the emotional makeup of the 
domestic woman.  A suggestive end-point for the novelistic engagement with shame I 
have traced over the century, Trilby reveals a lingering if increasingly skeptical 
investment in shame, at the century’s end, as a possible aesthetic and relational 
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alternative to absolute, unreflective emotional submission.  Further, Trilby’s 
complicated, often contradictory deployments of shame—much like the broader 
novelistic negotiations of shame that it both thematizes and carries on—can be 
distinguished from understandings of shame as a merely repressive force in the 
nineteenth-century novel, and considered instead a valuable form of potential 
recognition, and at times resolution, of the complex interplay between aesthetics, 
emotions, and femininity.
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